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Message-Id: <1408911690-7598-12-git-send-email-ast@plumgrid.com>
Date: Sun, 24 Aug 2014 13:21:12 -0700
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...mgrid.com>
To: "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@...hat.com>,
Chema Gonzalez <chema@...gle.com>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl>,
Brendan Gregg <brendan.d.gregg@...il.com>,
Namhyung Kim <namhyung@...nel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v5 net-next 11/29] bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log)
add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall:
BPF_PROG_LOG_LEVEL, /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */
BPF_PROG_LOG_BUF, /* user supplied buffer */
BPF_PROG_LOG_SIZE, /* size of user buffer */
In such case the verifier will return its verification log in the user
supplied buffer which can be used by humans to analyze why verifier
rejected given program
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...mgrid.com>
---
include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 4 +
kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 3 +
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 236 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 243 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
index 7468fe55db7b..d280acad4b28 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
@@ -379,6 +379,10 @@ enum bpf_prog_attributes {
BPF_PROG_UNSPEC,
BPF_PROG_TEXT, /* array of eBPF instructions */
BPF_PROG_LICENSE, /* license string */
+ /* optional program attributes */
+ BPF_PROG_LOG_LEVEL, /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */
+ BPF_PROG_LOG_BUF, /* user supplied buffer */
+ BPF_PROG_LOG_SIZE, /* size of user buffer */
__BPF_PROG_ATTR_MAX,
};
#define BPF_PROG_ATTR_MAX (__BPF_PROG_ATTR_MAX - 1)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index a3581646ee11..60cb760cb423 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -443,6 +443,9 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_get(u32 ufd)
static const struct nla_policy prog_policy[BPF_PROG_ATTR_MAX + 1] = {
[BPF_PROG_TEXT] = { .type = NLA_BINARY },
[BPF_PROG_LICENSE] = { .type = NLA_NUL_STRING },
+ [BPF_PROG_LOG_LEVEL] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
+ [BPF_PROG_LOG_BUF] = { .len = sizeof(void *) },
+ [BPF_PROG_LOG_SIZE] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
};
static int bpf_prog_load(enum bpf_prog_type type, struct nlattr __user *uattr,
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index c1dc2441994a..2484a3387ca2 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -144,9 +144,245 @@
* load/store to bpf_context are checked against known fields
*/
+/* single container for all structs
+ * one verifier_env per bpf_check() call
+ */
+struct verifier_env {
+};
+
+/* verbose verifier prints what it's seeing
+ * bpf_check() is called under lock, so no race to access these global vars
+ */
+static u32 log_level, log_size, log_len;
+static void *log_buf;
+
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(bpf_verifier_lock);
+
+/* log_level controls verbosity level of eBPF verifier.
+ * verbose() is used to dump the verification trace to the log, so the user
+ * can figure out what's wrong with the program
+ */
+static void verbose(const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list args;
+
+ if (log_level == 0 || log_len >= log_size - 1)
+ return;
+
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ log_len += vscnprintf(log_buf + log_len, log_size - log_len, fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+}
+
+static const char *const bpf_class_string[] = {
+ [BPF_LD] = "ld",
+ [BPF_LDX] = "ldx",
+ [BPF_ST] = "st",
+ [BPF_STX] = "stx",
+ [BPF_ALU] = "alu",
+ [BPF_JMP] = "jmp",
+ [BPF_RET] = "BUG",
+ [BPF_ALU64] = "alu64",
+};
+
+static const char *const bpf_alu_string[] = {
+ [BPF_ADD >> 4] = "+=",
+ [BPF_SUB >> 4] = "-=",
+ [BPF_MUL >> 4] = "*=",
+ [BPF_DIV >> 4] = "/=",
+ [BPF_OR >> 4] = "|=",
+ [BPF_AND >> 4] = "&=",
+ [BPF_LSH >> 4] = "<<=",
+ [BPF_RSH >> 4] = ">>=",
+ [BPF_NEG >> 4] = "neg",
+ [BPF_MOD >> 4] = "%=",
+ [BPF_XOR >> 4] = "^=",
+ [BPF_MOV >> 4] = "=",
+ [BPF_ARSH >> 4] = "s>>=",
+ [BPF_END >> 4] = "endian",
+};
+
+static const char *const bpf_ldst_string[] = {
+ [BPF_W >> 3] = "u32",
+ [BPF_H >> 3] = "u16",
+ [BPF_B >> 3] = "u8",
+ [BPF_DW >> 3] = "u64",
+};
+
+static const char *const bpf_jmp_string[] = {
+ [BPF_JA >> 4] = "jmp",
+ [BPF_JEQ >> 4] = "==",
+ [BPF_JGT >> 4] = ">",
+ [BPF_JGE >> 4] = ">=",
+ [BPF_JSET >> 4] = "&",
+ [BPF_JNE >> 4] = "!=",
+ [BPF_JSGT >> 4] = "s>",
+ [BPF_JSGE >> 4] = "s>=",
+ [BPF_CALL >> 4] = "call",
+ [BPF_EXIT >> 4] = "exit",
+};
+
+static void print_bpf_insn(struct bpf_insn *insn)
+{
+ u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
+
+ if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) {
+ if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X)
+ verbose("(%02x) %sr%d %s %sr%d\n",
+ insn->code, class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
+ insn->dst_reg,
+ bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
+ class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
+ insn->src_reg);
+ else
+ verbose("(%02x) %sr%d %s %s%d\n",
+ insn->code, class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
+ insn->dst_reg,
+ bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
+ class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
+ insn->imm);
+ } else if (class == BPF_STX) {
+ if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEM)
+ verbose("(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = r%d\n",
+ insn->code,
+ bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
+ insn->dst_reg,
+ insn->off, insn->src_reg);
+ else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_XADD)
+ verbose("(%02x) lock *(%s *)(r%d %+d) += r%d\n",
+ insn->code,
+ bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
+ insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
+ insn->src_reg);
+ else
+ verbose("BUG_%02x\n", insn->code);
+ } else if (class == BPF_ST) {
+ if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) {
+ verbose("BUG_st_%02x\n", insn->code);
+ return;
+ }
+ verbose("(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = %d\n",
+ insn->code,
+ bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
+ insn->dst_reg,
+ insn->off, insn->imm);
+ } else if (class == BPF_LDX) {
+ if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) {
+ verbose("BUG_ldx_%02x\n", insn->code);
+ return;
+ }
+ verbose("(%02x) r%d = *(%s *)(r%d %+d)\n",
+ insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
+ bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
+ insn->src_reg, insn->off);
+ } else if (class == BPF_LD) {
+ if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ABS) {
+ verbose("(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[%d]\n",
+ insn->code,
+ bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
+ insn->imm);
+ } else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IND) {
+ verbose("(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[r%d + %d]\n",
+ insn->code,
+ bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
+ insn->src_reg, insn->imm);
+ } else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IMM) {
+ verbose("(%02x) r%d = 0x%x\n",
+ insn->code, insn->dst_reg, insn->imm);
+ } else {
+ verbose("BUG_ld_%02x\n", insn->code);
+ return;
+ }
+ } else if (class == BPF_JMP) {
+ u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
+
+ if (opcode == BPF_CALL) {
+ verbose("(%02x) call %d\n", insn->code, insn->imm);
+ } else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_JA)) {
+ verbose("(%02x) goto pc%+d\n",
+ insn->code, insn->off);
+ } else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT)) {
+ verbose("(%02x) exit\n", insn->code);
+ } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
+ verbose("(%02x) if r%d %s r%d goto pc%+d\n",
+ insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
+ bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
+ insn->src_reg, insn->off);
+ } else {
+ verbose("(%02x) if r%d %s 0x%x goto pc%+d\n",
+ insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
+ bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
+ insn->imm, insn->off);
+ }
+ } else {
+ verbose("(%02x) %s\n", insn->code, bpf_class_string[class]);
+ }
+}
+
int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog *prog, struct nlattr *tb[BPF_PROG_ATTR_MAX + 1])
{
+ void __user *log_ubuf = NULL;
+ struct verifier_env *env;
int ret = -EINVAL;
+ if (prog->len <= 0 || prog->len > BPF_MAXINSNS)
+ return -E2BIG;
+
+ /* 'struct verifier_env' can be global, but since it's not small,
+ * allocate/free it every time bpf_check() is called
+ */
+ env = kzalloc(sizeof(struct verifier_env), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!env)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* grab the mutex to protect few globals used by verifier */
+ mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
+
+ if (tb[BPF_PROG_LOG_LEVEL] && tb[BPF_PROG_LOG_BUF] &&
+ tb[BPF_PROG_LOG_SIZE]) {
+ /* user requested verbose verifier output
+ * and supplied buffer to store the verification trace
+ */
+ log_level = nla_get_u32(tb[BPF_PROG_LOG_LEVEL]);
+ log_ubuf = *(void __user **) nla_data(tb[BPF_PROG_LOG_BUF]);
+ log_size = nla_get_u32(tb[BPF_PROG_LOG_SIZE]);
+ log_len = 0;
+
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ /* log_* values have to be sane */
+ if (log_size < 128 || log_size > UINT_MAX >> 8 ||
+ log_level == 0 || log_ubuf == NULL)
+ goto free_env;
+
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ log_buf = vmalloc(log_size);
+ if (!log_buf)
+ goto free_env;
+ } else {
+ log_level = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* ret = do_check(env); */
+
+ if (log_level && log_len >= log_size - 1) {
+ BUG_ON(log_len >= log_size);
+ /* verifier log exceeded user supplied buffer */
+ ret = -ENOSPC;
+ /* fall through to return what was recorded */
+ }
+
+ /* copy verifier log back to user space including trailing zero */
+ if (log_level && copy_to_user(log_ubuf, log_buf, log_len + 1) != 0) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto free_log_buf;
+ }
+
+
+free_log_buf:
+ if (log_level)
+ vfree(log_buf);
+free_env:
+ kfree(env);
+ mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
return ret;
}
--
1.7.9.5
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