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Message-Id: <1409842224-11847-1-git-send-email-atomlin@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 4 Sep 2014 15:50:22 +0100
From: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@...hat.com>
To: peterz@...radead.org
Cc: mingo@...hat.com, dzickus@...hat.com, bmr@...hat.com,
jcastillo@...hat.com, atomlin@...hat.com, oleg@...hat.com,
pzijlstr@...hat.com, riel@...hat.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
tglx@...utronix.de, x86@...nel.org, rostedt@...dmis.org,
hannes@...xchg.org, aneesh.kumar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com,
akpm@...ux-foundation.org, linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org,
minchan@...nel.org
Subject: [PATCH 0/2] sched: Always check the integrity of the canary
Currently in the event of a stack overrun a call to schedule()
does not check for this type of corruption. This corruption is
often silent and can go unnoticed. However once the corrupted
region is examined at a later stage, the outcome is undefined
and often results in a sporadic page fault which cannot be
handled.
The first patch provides a helper to determine the integrity
of the canary. While the second patch checks for a stack
overrun and takes appropriate action since the damage is
already done, there is no point in continuing.
Aaron Tomlin (2):
sched: Add helper for task stack page overrun checking
sched: BUG when stack end location is over written
arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c | 6 ++----
arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 5 +----
include/linux/sched.h | 3 +++
kernel/sched/core.c | 3 +++
kernel/trace/trace_stack.c | 5 ++---
5 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
--
1.9.3
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