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Message-ID: <20140904165606.640df107@alan.etchedpixels.co.uk>
Date: Thu, 4 Sep 2014 16:56:06 +0100
From: One Thousand Gnomes <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>
To: "H. Peter Anvin" <h.peter.anvin@...el.com>
Cc: Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>
Subject: Re: RFC: Tainting the kernel on raw I/O access
On Wed, 03 Sep 2014 15:25:32 -0700
"H. Peter Anvin" <h.peter.anvin@...el.com> wrote:
> On 09/03/2014 03:20 PM, One Thousand Gnomes wrote:
> >
> > If you just want some "detector bits" for bug report filtering them its
> > quite a different need to fixing "secure" boot mode. Even in the detector
> > bits case there should be an overall plan and some defined properties
> > that provide the security and which you can show should always be true.
> >
>
> As far as I'm concerning this is just a set of "detector bits". My
> observation was simply that this is a *subset* of what "secure boot"
> will eventually need.
I think that observation is untrue. The only partially overap.
> (As far as I'm concerned, I'd be happy tainting the kernel for any
> operation that requires CAP_RAWIO, but maybe that is too extreme.)
You can't then for example format some types of disk in your data center.
Alan
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