Date:	Wed, 10 Sep 2014 18:31:24 +0400
From:	Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@...sung.com>
To:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:	Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@...sung.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
	Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@...gle.com>,
	Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@...gle.com>,
	Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@...il.com>,
	Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@...il.com>,
	Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@...il.com>,
	Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@...cle.com>,
	Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>,
	Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
	Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>,
	Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@...il.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, x86@...nel.org,
	linux-mm@...ck.org, Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>
Subject: [RFC/PATCH v2 07/10] mm: slub: add kernel address sanitizer support
 for slub allocator

With this patch kasan will be able to catch bugs in memory allocated
by slub.
Initially all objects in newly allocated slab page, marked as free.
Later, when allocation of slub object happens, requested by caller
number of bytes marked as accessible, and the rest of the object
(including slub's metadata) marked as redzone (unaccessible).

We also mark object as accessible if ksize was called for this object.
There is some places in kernel where ksize function is called to inquire
size of really allocated area. Such callers could validly access whole
allocated memory, so it should be marked as accessible.

Code in slub.c and slab_common.c files could validly access to object's
metadata, so instrumentation for this files are disabled.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@...sung.com>
---
 include/linux/kasan.h |  24 ++++++++++++
 include/linux/slab.h  |  11 +++++-
 lib/Kconfig.kasan     |   1 +
 mm/Makefile           |   3 ++
 mm/kasan/kasan.c      | 101 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 mm/kasan/kasan.h      |   5 +++
 mm/kasan/report.c     |  26 ++++++++++++-
 mm/slab_common.c      |   5 ++-
 mm/slub.c             |  36 ++++++++++++++++--
 9 files changed, 203 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h
index c5ae971..728c046 100644
--- a/include/linux/kasan.h
+++ b/include/linux/kasan.h
@@ -33,6 +33,17 @@ void kasan_map_shadow(void);
 
 void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
 void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
+void kasan_mark_slab_padding(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object);
+
+void kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size);
+void kasan_kfree_large(const void *ptr);
+void kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *s, const void *object, size_t size);
+void kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t new_size);
+
+void kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object);
+void kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object);
+
+void kasan_free_slab_pages(struct page *page, int order);
 
 #else /* CONFIG_KASAN */
 
@@ -45,6 +56,19 @@ static inline void kasan_map_shadow(void) {}
 
 static inline void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
 static inline void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
+static inline void kasan_mark_slab_padding(struct kmem_cache *s,
+					void *object) {}
+
+static inline void kasan_kmalloc_large(void *ptr, size_t size) {}
+static inline void kasan_kfree_large(const void *ptr) {}
+static inline void kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *s, const void *object,
+				size_t size) {}
+static inline void kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t new_size) {}
+
+static inline void kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object) {}
+static inline void kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object) {}
+
+static inline void kasan_free_slab_pages(struct page *page, int order) {}
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */
 
diff --git a/include/linux/slab.h b/include/linux/slab.h
index c265bec..5f97037 100644
--- a/include/linux/slab.h
+++ b/include/linux/slab.h
@@ -104,6 +104,7 @@
 				(unsigned long)ZERO_SIZE_PTR)
 
 #include <linux/kmemleak.h>
+#include <linux/kasan.h>
 
 struct mem_cgroup;
 /*
@@ -326,7 +327,10 @@ kmem_cache_alloc_node_trace(struct kmem_cache *s,
 static __always_inline void *kmem_cache_alloc_trace(struct kmem_cache *s,
 		gfp_t flags, size_t size)
 {
-	return kmem_cache_alloc(s, flags);
+	void *ret = kmem_cache_alloc(s, flags);
+
+	kasan_kmalloc(s, ret, size);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static __always_inline void *
@@ -334,7 +338,10 @@ kmem_cache_alloc_node_trace(struct kmem_cache *s,
 			      gfp_t gfpflags,
 			      int node, size_t size)
 {
-	return kmem_cache_alloc_node(s, gfpflags, node);
+	void *ret = kmem_cache_alloc_node(s, gfpflags, node);
+
+	kasan_kmalloc(s, ret, size);
+	return ret;
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_TRACING */
 
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.kasan b/lib/Kconfig.kasan
index 156d3e6..69ea0d0 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig.kasan
+++ b/lib/Kconfig.kasan
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ if HAVE_ARCH_KASAN
 config KASAN
 	bool "AddressSanitizer: dynamic memory error detector"
 	depends on !MEMORY_HOTPLUG
+	depends on SLUB_DEBUG
 	default n
 	help
 	  Enables address sanitizer - dynamic memory error detector,
diff --git a/mm/Makefile b/mm/Makefile
index b3c8b77..ff191dd5 100644
--- a/mm/Makefile
+++ b/mm/Makefile
@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@
 # Makefile for the linux memory manager.
 #
 
+KASAN_SANITIZE_slab_common.o := n
+KASAN_SANITIZE_slub.o := n
+
 mmu-y			:= nommu.o
 mmu-$(CONFIG_MMU)	:= gup.o highmem.o madvise.o memory.o mincore.o \
 			   mlock.o mmap.o mprotect.o mremap.o msync.o rmap.o \
diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.c b/mm/kasan/kasan.c
index ed4e925..cf4feb3 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/kasan.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.c
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
 #include <linux/kasan.h>
 
 #include "kasan.h"
+#include "../slab.h"
 
 /*
  * Poisons the shadow memory for 'size' bytes starting from 'addr'.
@@ -119,8 +120,104 @@ void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
 {
 	if (likely(!PageHighMem(page)))
 		kasan_poison_shadow(page_address(page),
-				PAGE_SIZE << order,
-				KASAN_FREE_PAGE);
+				PAGE_SIZE << order, KASAN_FREE_PAGE);
+}
+
+void kasan_free_slab_pages(struct page *page, int order)
+{
+	kasan_poison_shadow(page_address(page),
+			PAGE_SIZE << order, KASAN_SLAB_FREE);
+}
+
+void kasan_mark_slab_padding(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object)
+{
+	unsigned long object_end = (unsigned long)object + s->size;
+	unsigned long padding_end = round_up(object_end, PAGE_SIZE);
+	unsigned long padding_start = round_up(object_end,
+					KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
+	size_t size = padding_end - padding_start;
+
+	if (size)
+		kasan_poison_shadow((void *)padding_start,
+				size, KASAN_SLAB_PADDING);
+}
+
+void kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
+{
+	kasan_kmalloc(cache, object, cache->object_size);
+}
+
+void kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
+{
+	unsigned long size = cache->size;
+	unsigned long rounded_up_size = round_up(size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
+
+	if (unlikely(cache->flags & SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU))
+		return;
+
+	kasan_poison_shadow(object, rounded_up_size, KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE);
+}
+
+void kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object, size_t size)
+{
+	unsigned long redzone_start;
+	unsigned long redzone_end;
+
+	if (unlikely(object == NULL))
+		return;
+
+	redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(object + size),
+				KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
+	redzone_end = (unsigned long)object + cache->size;
+
+	kasan_unpoison_shadow(object, size);
+	kasan_poison_shadow((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
+		KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
+
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_kmalloc);
+
+void kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size)
+{
+	struct page *page;
+	unsigned long redzone_start;
+	unsigned long redzone_end;
+
+	if (unlikely(ptr == NULL))
+		return;
+
+	page = virt_to_page(ptr);
+	redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(ptr + size),
+				KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
+	redzone_end = (unsigned long)ptr + (PAGE_SIZE << compound_order(page));
+
+	kasan_unpoison_shadow(ptr, size);
+	kasan_poison_shadow((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
+		KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_kmalloc_large);
+
+void kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t size)
+{
+	struct page *page;
+
+	if (unlikely(object == ZERO_SIZE_PTR))
+		return;
+
+	page = virt_to_head_page(object);
+
+	if (unlikely(!PageSlab(page)))
+		kasan_kmalloc_large(object, size);
+	else
+		kasan_kmalloc(page->slab_cache, object, size);
+}
+
+void kasan_kfree_large(const void *ptr)
+{
+	struct page *page = virt_to_page(ptr);
+
+	kasan_poison_shadow(ptr, PAGE_SIZE << compound_order(page),
+			KASAN_FREE_PAGE);
 }
 
 void __asan_load1(unsigned long addr)
diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
index 227e9c6..1dd8ec7 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h
+++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
@@ -7,6 +7,11 @@
 #define KASAN_SHADOW_MASK       (KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1)
 
 #define KASAN_FREE_PAGE         0xFF  /* page was freed */
+#define KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE      0xFE  /* redzone for kmalloc_large allocations */
+#define KASAN_SLAB_PADDING      0xFD  /* Slab page padding, does not belong to any slub object */
+#define KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE   0xFC  /* redzone inside slub object */
+#define KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE      0xFB  /* object was freed (kmem_cache_free/kfree) */
+#define KASAN_SLAB_FREE         0xFA  /* free slab page */
 #define KASAN_SHADOW_GAP        0xF9  /* address belongs to shadow memory */
 
 struct access_info {
diff --git a/mm/kasan/report.c b/mm/kasan/report.c
index 94d79e7..34ba46d 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/report.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/report.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 #include <linux/kasan.h>
 
 #include "kasan.h"
+#include "../slab.h"
 
 /* Shadow layout customization. */
 #define SHADOW_BYTES_PER_BLOCK 1
@@ -54,10 +55,15 @@ static void print_error_description(struct access_info *info)
 	shadow_val = *(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(info->first_bad_addr);
 
 	switch (shadow_val) {
+	case KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE:
+	case KASAN_SLAB_PADDING:
+	case KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE:
 	case 0 ... KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1:
 		bug_type = "out of bounds access";
 		break;
 	case KASAN_FREE_PAGE:
+	case KASAN_SLAB_FREE:
+	case KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE:
 		bug_type = "use after free";
 		break;
 	case KASAN_SHADOW_GAP:
@@ -74,14 +80,32 @@ static void print_address_description(struct access_info *info)
 {
 	void *object;
 	struct kmem_cache *cache;
-	void *slab_start;
 	struct page *page;
 	u8 shadow_val = *(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(info->first_bad_addr);
 
 	page = virt_to_head_page((void *)info->access_addr);
 
 	switch (shadow_val) {
+	case KASAN_SLAB_PADDING:
+		cache = page->slab_cache;
+		slab_err(cache, page, "access to slab redzone");
+		dump_stack();
+		break;
+	case KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE:
+	case KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE:
+	case 1 ... KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1:
+		if (PageSlab(page)) {
+			void *slab_page = page_address(page);
+
+			cache = page->slab_cache;
+			object = virt_to_obj(cache, slab_page,
+					(void *)info->access_addr);
+			object_err(cache, page, object, "kasan error");
+			break;
+		}
+	case KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE:
 	case KASAN_FREE_PAGE:
+	case KASAN_SLAB_FREE:
 		dump_page(page, "kasan error");
 		dump_stack();
 		break;
diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c
index d7d8ffd..4a4dd59 100644
--- a/mm/slab_common.c
+++ b/mm/slab_common.c
@@ -636,6 +636,7 @@ void *kmalloc_order(size_t size, gfp_t flags, unsigned int order)
 	page = alloc_kmem_pages(flags, order);
 	ret = page ? page_address(page) : NULL;
 	kmemleak_alloc(ret, size, 1, flags);
+	kasan_kmalloc_large(ret, size);
 	return ret;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmalloc_order);
@@ -810,8 +811,10 @@ static __always_inline void *__do_krealloc(const void *p, size_t new_size,
 	if (p)
 		ks = ksize(p);
 
-	if (ks >= new_size)
+	if (ks >= new_size) {
+		kasan_krealloc((void *)p, new_size);
 		return (void *)p;
+	}
 
 	ret = kmalloc_track_caller(new_size, flags);
 	if (ret && p)
diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
index f3603d2..8f5bb71 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
 #include <linux/stacktrace.h>
 #include <linux/prefetch.h>
 #include <linux/memcontrol.h>
+#include <linux/kasan.h>
 
 #include <trace/events/kmem.h>
 
@@ -479,10 +480,12 @@ static int disable_higher_order_debug;
 
 static inline void metadata_access_enable(void)
 {
+	kasan_disable_local();
 }
 
 static inline void metadata_access_disable(void)
 {
+	kasan_enable_local();
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1252,11 +1255,13 @@ static inline void dec_slabs_node(struct kmem_cache *s, int node,
 static inline void kmalloc_large_node_hook(void *ptr, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
 {
 	kmemleak_alloc(ptr, size, 1, flags);
+	kasan_kmalloc_large(ptr, size);
 }
 
 static inline void kfree_hook(const void *x)
 {
 	kmemleak_free(x);
+	kasan_kfree_large(x);
 }
 
 static inline int slab_pre_alloc_hook(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags)
@@ -1274,11 +1279,13 @@ static inline void slab_post_alloc_hook(struct kmem_cache *s,
 	flags &= gfp_allowed_mask;
 	kmemcheck_slab_alloc(s, flags, object, slab_ksize(s));
 	kmemleak_alloc_recursive(object, s->object_size, 1, s->flags, flags);
+	kasan_slab_alloc(s, object);
 }
 
 static inline void slab_free_hook(struct kmem_cache *s, void *x)
 {
 	kmemleak_free_recursive(x, s->flags);
+	kasan_slab_free(s, x);
 
 	/*
 	 * Trouble is that we may no longer disable interrupts in the fast path
@@ -1391,8 +1398,11 @@ static void setup_object(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
 				void *object)
 {
 	setup_object_debug(s, page, object);
-	if (unlikely(s->ctor))
+	if (unlikely(s->ctor)) {
+		kasan_slab_alloc(s, object);
 		s->ctor(object);
+	}
+	kasan_slab_free(s, object);
 }
 
 static struct page *new_slab(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, int node)
@@ -1426,8 +1436,10 @@ static struct page *new_slab(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, int node)
 		setup_object(s, page, p);
 		if (likely(idx < page->objects))
 			set_freepointer(s, p, p + s->size);
-		else
+		else {
 			set_freepointer(s, p, NULL);
+			kasan_mark_slab_padding(s, p);
+		}
 	}
 
 	page->freelist = start;
@@ -1452,6 +1464,7 @@ static void __free_slab(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page)
 	}
 
 	kmemcheck_free_shadow(page, compound_order(page));
+	kasan_free_slab_pages(page, compound_order(page));
 
 	mod_zone_page_state(page_zone(page),
 		(s->flags & SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT) ?
@@ -2486,6 +2499,7 @@ void *kmem_cache_alloc_trace(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t gfpflags, size_t size)
 {
 	void *ret = slab_alloc(s, gfpflags, _RET_IP_);
 	trace_kmalloc(_RET_IP_, ret, size, s->size, gfpflags);
+	kasan_kmalloc(s, ret, size);
 	return ret;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmem_cache_alloc_trace);
@@ -2512,6 +2526,8 @@ void *kmem_cache_alloc_node_trace(struct kmem_cache *s,
 
 	trace_kmalloc_node(_RET_IP_, ret,
 			   size, s->size, gfpflags, node);
+
+	kasan_kmalloc(s, ret, size);
 	return ret;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmem_cache_alloc_node_trace);
@@ -2901,6 +2917,7 @@ static void early_kmem_cache_node_alloc(int node)
 	init_object(kmem_cache_node, n, SLUB_RED_ACTIVE);
 	init_tracking(kmem_cache_node, n);
 #endif
+	kasan_kmalloc(kmem_cache_node, n, sizeof(struct kmem_cache_node));
 	init_kmem_cache_node(n);
 	inc_slabs_node(kmem_cache_node, node, page->objects);
 
@@ -3281,6 +3298,8 @@ void *__kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags)
 
 	trace_kmalloc(_RET_IP_, ret, size, s->size, flags);
 
+	kasan_kmalloc(s, ret, size);
+
 	return ret;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kmalloc);
@@ -3324,12 +3343,14 @@ void *__kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node)
 
 	trace_kmalloc_node(_RET_IP_, ret, size, s->size, flags, node);
 
+	kasan_kmalloc(s, ret, size);
+
 	return ret;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kmalloc_node);
 #endif
 
-size_t ksize(const void *object)
+static size_t __ksize(const void *object)
 {
 	struct page *page;
 
@@ -3345,6 +3366,15 @@ size_t ksize(const void *object)
 
 	return slab_ksize(page->slab_cache);
 }
+
+size_t ksize(const void *object)
+{
+	size_t size = __ksize(object);
+	/* We assume that ksize callers could use whole allocated area,
+	   so we need unpoison this area. */
+	kasan_krealloc(object, size);
+	return size;
+}
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(ksize);
 
 void kfree(const void *x)
-- 
1.8.5.5

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