linux-kernel - Re: bit fields && data tearing

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Message-ID: <5410E3AE.8020609@hurleysoftware.com>
Date:	Wed, 10 Sep 2014 19:50:06 -0400
From:	Peter Hurley <peter@...leysoftware.com>
To:	James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senPartnership.com>
CC:	paulmck@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
	One Thousand Gnomes <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
	Jakub Jelinek <jakub@...hat.com>,
	Mikael Pettersson <mikpelinux@...il.com>,
	Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@...nel.crashing.org>,
	Richard Henderson <rth@...ddle.net>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
	Miroslav Franc <mfranc@...hat.com>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@...ba.org>,
	linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>,
	linux-ia64@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: bit fields && data tearing

On 09/10/2014 05:48 PM, James Bottomley wrote:
> On Tue, 2014-09-09 at 06:40 -0400, Peter Hurley wrote:
>> On 09/08/2014 10:56 PM, James Bottomley wrote:
>>> On Mon, 2014-09-08 at 19:30 -0400, Peter Hurley wrote:
>>>> On 09/08/2014 01:50 AM, James Bottomley wrote:
>>>>>> But additionally, even if gcc combines adjacent writes _that are part
>>>>>> of the program flow_ then I believe the situation is no worse than
>>>>>> would otherwise exist.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> For instance, given the following:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> struct x {
>>>>>> 	spinlock_t lock;
>>>>>> 	long a;
>>>>>> 	byte b;
>>>>>> 	byte c;
>>>>>> };
>>>>>>
>>>>>> void locked_store_b(struct x *p)
>>>>>> {
>>>>>> 	spin_lock(&p->lock);
>>>>>> 	p->b = 1;
>>>>>> 	spin_unlock(&p->lock);
>>>>>> 	p->c = 2;
>>>>>> }
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Granted, the author probably expects ordered writes of
>>>>>> 	STORE B
>>>>>> 	STORE C
>>>>>> but that's not guaranteed because there is no memory barrier
>>>>>> ordering B before C.
>>>>>
>>>>> Yes, there is: loads and stores may not migrate into or out of critical
>>>>> sections.
>>>>
>>>> That's a common misconception.
>>>>
>>>> The processor is free to re-order this to:
>>>>
>>>> 	STORE C
>>>> 	STORE B
>>>> 	UNLOCK
>>>>
>>>> That's because the unlock() only guarantees that:
>>>>
>>>> Stores before the unlock in program order are guaranteed to complete
>>>> before the unlock completes. Stores after the unlock _may_ complete
>>>> before the unlock completes.
>>>>
>>>> My point was that even if compiler barriers had the same semantics
>>>> as memory barriers, the situation would be no worse. That is, code
>>>> that is sensitive to memory barriers (like the example I gave above)
>>>> would merely have the same fragility with one-way compiler barriers
>>>> (with respect to the compiler combining writes).
>>>>
>>>> That's what I meant by "no worse than would otherwise exist".
>>>
>>> Actually, that's not correct.  This is actually deja vu with me on the
>>> other side of the argument.  When we first did spinlocks on PA, I argued
>>> as you did: lock only a barrier for code after and unlock for code
>>> before.  The failing case is that you can have a critical section which
>>> performs an atomically required operation and a following unit which
>>> depends on it being performed.  If you begin the following unit before
>>> the atomic requirement, you may end up losing.  It turns out this kind
>>> of pattern is inherent in a lot of mail box device drivers: you need to
>>> set up the mailbox atomically then poke it.  Setup is usually atomic,
>>> deciding which mailbox to prime and actually poking it is in the
>>> following unit.  Priming often involves an I/O bus transaction and if
>>> you poke before priming, you get a misfire.
>>
>> Take it up with the man because this was discussed extensively last
>> year and it was decided that unlocks would not be full barriers.
>> Thus the changes to memory-barriers.txt that explicitly note this
>> and the addition of smp_mb__after_unlock_lock() (for two different
>> locks; an unlock followed by a lock on the same lock is a full barrier).
>>
>> Code that expects ordered writes after an unlock needs to explicitly
>> add the memory barrier.
> 
> I don't really care what ARM does; spin locks are full barriers on
> architectures that need them.  The driver problem we had that detected
> our semi permeable spinlocks was an LSI 53c875 which is enterprise class
> PCI, so presumably not relevant to ARM anyway.

Almost certainly ia64 arch_spin_unlock() is not a full barrier.


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