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Message-Id: <725f6824f86949a1610d47477e08f5c08d128308.1411724724.git.jslaby@suse.cz>
Date: Fri, 26 Sep 2014 11:45:10 +0200
From: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>
To: stable@...r.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Dave Chinner <dchinner@...hat.com>,
Dave Chinner <david@...morbit.com>, Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>
Subject: [PATCH 3.12 099/142] xfs: ensure verifiers are attached to recovered buffers
From: Dave Chinner <dchinner@...hat.com>
3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
===============
commit 67dc288c21064b31a98a53dc64f6b9714b819fd6 upstream.
Crash testing of CRC enabled filesystems has resulted in a number of
reports of bad CRCs being detected after the filesystem was mounted.
Errors such as the following were being seen:
XFS (sdb3): Mounting V5 Filesystem
XFS (sdb3): Starting recovery (logdev: internal)
XFS (sdb3): Metadata CRC error detected at xfs_agf_read_verify+0x5a/0x100 [xfs], block 0x1
XFS (sdb3): Unmount and run xfs_repair
XFS (sdb3): First 64 bytes of corrupted metadata buffer:
ffff880136ffd600: 58 41 47 46 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 0f aa 40 XAGF...........@
ffff880136ffd610: 00 02 6d 53 00 02 77 f8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 ..mS..w.........
ffff880136ffd620: 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 ................
ffff880136ffd630: 00 00 00 04 00 08 81 d0 00 08 81 a7 00 00 00 00 ................
XFS (sdb3): metadata I/O error: block 0x1 ("xfs_trans_read_buf_map") error 74 numblks 1
The errors were typically being seen in AGF, AGI and their related
btree block buffers some time after log recovery had run. Often it
wasn't until later subsequent mounts that the problem was
discovered. The common symptom was a buffer with the correct
contents, but a CRC and an LSN that matched an older version of the
contents.
Some debug added to _xfs_buf_ioapply() indicated that buffers were
being written without verifiers attached to them from log recovery,
and Jan Kara isolated the cause to log recovery readahead an dit's
interactions with buffers that had a more recent LSN on disk than
the transaction being recovered. In this case, the buffer did not
get a verifier attached, and os when the second phase of log
recovery ran and recovered EFIs and unlinked inodes, the buffers
were modified and written without the verifier running. Hence they
had up to date contents, but stale LSNs and CRCs.
Fix it by attaching verifiers to buffers we skip due to future LSN
values so they don't escape into the buffer cache without the
correct verifier attached.
This patch is based on analysis and a patch from Jan Kara.
Reported-by: Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>
Reported-by: Fanael Linithien <fanael4@...il.com>
Reported-by: Grozdan <neutrino8@...il.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@...hat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@...hat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@...morbit.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>
---
fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c
index 39797490a1f1..5b166a07d55e 100644
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c
@@ -2121,6 +2121,17 @@ xlog_recover_validate_buf_type(
__uint16_t magic16;
__uint16_t magicda;
+ /*
+ * We can only do post recovery validation on items on CRC enabled
+ * fielsystems as we need to know when the buffer was written to be able
+ * to determine if we should have replayed the item. If we replay old
+ * metadata over a newer buffer, then it will enter a temporarily
+ * inconsistent state resulting in verification failures. Hence for now
+ * just avoid the verification stage for non-crc filesystems
+ */
+ if (!xfs_sb_version_hascrc(&mp->m_sb))
+ return;
+
magic32 = be32_to_cpu(*(__be32 *)bp->b_addr);
magic16 = be16_to_cpu(*(__be16*)bp->b_addr);
magicda = be16_to_cpu(info->magic);
@@ -2156,8 +2167,6 @@ xlog_recover_validate_buf_type(
bp->b_ops = &xfs_agf_buf_ops;
break;
case XFS_BLFT_AGFL_BUF:
- if (!xfs_sb_version_hascrc(&mp->m_sb))
- break;
if (magic32 != XFS_AGFL_MAGIC) {
xfs_warn(mp, "Bad AGFL block magic!");
ASSERT(0);
@@ -2190,10 +2199,6 @@ xlog_recover_validate_buf_type(
#endif
break;
case XFS_BLFT_DINO_BUF:
- /*
- * we get here with inode allocation buffers, not buffers that
- * track unlinked list changes.
- */
if (magic16 != XFS_DINODE_MAGIC) {
xfs_warn(mp, "Bad INODE block magic!");
ASSERT(0);
@@ -2273,8 +2278,6 @@ xlog_recover_validate_buf_type(
bp->b_ops = &xfs_attr3_leaf_buf_ops;
break;
case XFS_BLFT_ATTR_RMT_BUF:
- if (!xfs_sb_version_hascrc(&mp->m_sb))
- break;
if (magic32 != XFS_ATTR3_RMT_MAGIC) {
xfs_warn(mp, "Bad attr remote magic!");
ASSERT(0);
@@ -2381,16 +2384,7 @@ xlog_recover_do_reg_buffer(
/* Shouldn't be any more regions */
ASSERT(i == item->ri_total);
- /*
- * We can only do post recovery validation on items on CRC enabled
- * fielsystems as we need to know when the buffer was written to be able
- * to determine if we should have replayed the item. If we replay old
- * metadata over a newer buffer, then it will enter a temporarily
- * inconsistent state resulting in verification failures. Hence for now
- * just avoid the verification stage for non-crc filesystems
- */
- if (xfs_sb_version_hascrc(&mp->m_sb))
- xlog_recover_validate_buf_type(mp, bp, buf_f);
+ xlog_recover_validate_buf_type(mp, bp, buf_f);
}
/*
@@ -2625,12 +2619,29 @@ xlog_recover_buffer_pass2(
}
/*
- * recover the buffer only if we get an LSN from it and it's less than
+ * Recover the buffer only if we get an LSN from it and it's less than
* the lsn of the transaction we are replaying.
+ *
+ * Note that we have to be extremely careful of readahead here.
+ * Readahead does not attach verfiers to the buffers so if we don't
+ * actually do any replay after readahead because of the LSN we found
+ * in the buffer if more recent than that current transaction then we
+ * need to attach the verifier directly. Failure to do so can lead to
+ * future recovery actions (e.g. EFI and unlinked list recovery) can
+ * operate on the buffers and they won't get the verifier attached. This
+ * can lead to blocks on disk having the correct content but a stale
+ * CRC.
+ *
+ * It is safe to assume these clean buffers are currently up to date.
+ * If the buffer is dirtied by a later transaction being replayed, then
+ * the verifier will be reset to match whatever recover turns that
+ * buffer into.
*/
lsn = xlog_recover_get_buf_lsn(mp, bp);
- if (lsn && lsn != -1 && XFS_LSN_CMP(lsn, current_lsn) >= 0)
+ if (lsn && lsn != -1 && XFS_LSN_CMP(lsn, current_lsn) >= 0) {
+ xlog_recover_validate_buf_type(mp, bp, buf_f);
goto out_release;
+ }
if (buf_f->blf_flags & XFS_BLF_INODE_BUF) {
error = xlog_recover_do_inode_buffer(mp, item, bp, buf_f);
--
2.1.0
--
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