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Date: Fri, 26 Sep 2014 08:52:57 -0700
From: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
To: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@...sung.com>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@...gle.com>,
Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@...gle.com>,
Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@...il.com>,
Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@...il.com>,
Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@...il.com>,
Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@...cle.com>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>,
Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@...il.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Dave Jones <davej@...hat.com>,
x86@...nel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 09/13] mm: slub: add kernel address sanitizer support
for slub allocator
On Fri, Sep 26, 2014 at 12:25 AM, Andrey Ryabinin
<a.ryabinin@...sung.com> wrote:
> On 09/26/2014 08:48 AM, Dmitry Vyukov wrote:
>> On Wed, Sep 24, 2014 at 5:44 AM, Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@...sung.com> wrote:
>>> --- a/lib/Kconfig.kasan
>>> +++ b/lib/Kconfig.kasan
>>> @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ if HAVE_ARCH_KASAN
>>> config KASAN
>>> bool "AddressSanitizer: runtime memory debugger"
>>> depends on !MEMORY_HOTPLUG
>>> + depends on SLUB_DEBUG
>>
>>
>> What does SLUB_DEBUG do? I think that generally we don't want any
>> other *heavy* debug checks to be required for kasan.
>>
>
> SLUB_DEBUG enables support for different debugging features.
> It doesn't enables this debugging features by default, it only allows
> you to switch them on/off in runtime.
> Generally SLUB_DEBUG option is enabled in most kernels. SLUB_DEBUG disabled
> only with intention to get minimal kernel.
>
> Without SLUB_DEBUG there will be no redzones, no user tracking info (allocation/free stacktraces).
> KASAN won't be so usefull without SLUB_DEBUG.
Ack.
>>> --- a/mm/kasan/kasan.c
>>> +++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.c
>>> @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
>>> #include <linux/kasan.h>
>>>
>>> #include "kasan.h"
>>> +#include "../slab.h"
>>>
>>> /*
>>> * Poisons the shadow memory for 'size' bytes starting from 'addr'.
>>> @@ -265,6 +266,102 @@ void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
>>> KASAN_FREE_PAGE);
>>> }
>>>
>>> +void kasan_free_slab_pages(struct page *page, int order)
>>
>> Doesn't this callback followed by actually freeing the pages, and so
>> kasan_free_pages callback that will poison the range? If so, I would
>> prefer to not double poison.
>>
>
> Yes, this could be removed.
>>> +{
>>> + kasan_poison_shadow(page_address(page),
>>> + PAGE_SIZE << order, KASAN_SLAB_FREE);
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +void kasan_mark_slab_padding(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object)
>>> +{
>>> + unsigned long object_end = (unsigned long)object + s->size;
>>> + unsigned long padding_end = round_up(object_end, PAGE_SIZE);
>>> + unsigned long padding_start = round_up(object_end,
>>> + KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
>>> + size_t size = padding_end - padding_start;
>>> +
>>> + if (size)
>>> + kasan_poison_shadow((void *)padding_start,
>>> + size, KASAN_SLAB_PADDING);
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +void kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
>>> +{
>>> + kasan_kmalloc(cache, object, cache->object_size);
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +void kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
>>> +{
>>> + unsigned long size = cache->size;
>>> + unsigned long rounded_up_size = round_up(size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
>>> +
>>
>> Add a comment saying that SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU objects can be "legally"
>> used after free.
>>
>
> Ok.
>
>>> + if (unlikely(cache->flags & SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU))
>>> + return;
>>> +
>>> + kasan_poison_shadow(object, rounded_up_size, KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE);
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +void kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object, size_t size)
>>> +{
>>> + unsigned long redzone_start;
>>> + unsigned long redzone_end;
>>> +
>>> + if (unlikely(object == NULL))
>>> + return;
>>> +
>>> + redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(object + size),
>>> + KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
>>> + redzone_end = (unsigned long)object + cache->size;
>>> +
>>> + kasan_unpoison_shadow(object, size);
>>> + kasan_poison_shadow((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
>>> + KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
>>> +
>>> +}
>>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_kmalloc);
>>> +
>>> +void kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size)
>>> +{
>>> + struct page *page;
>>> + unsigned long redzone_start;
>>> + unsigned long redzone_end;
>>> +
>>> + if (unlikely(ptr == NULL))
>>> + return;
>>> +
>>> + page = virt_to_page(ptr);
>>> + redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(ptr + size),
>>> + KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
>>> + redzone_end = (unsigned long)ptr + (PAGE_SIZE << compound_order(page));
>>
>> If size == N*PAGE_SIZE - KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1, the object does
>> not receive any redzone at all.
>
> If size == N*PAGE_SIZE - KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1, there will be redzone
> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE + 1 bytes. There will be no readzone if and only if
> (size == PAGE_SIZE << compound_order(page))
Ah, OK, I misread the code.
The current code looks fine.
>> Can we pass full memory block size
>> from above to fix it? Will compound_order(page) do?
>>
>
> What is full memory block size?
> PAGE_SIZE << compound_order(page) is how much was really allocated.
>>>
>>> static struct page *new_slab(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, int node)
>>> @@ -1416,8 +1426,10 @@ static struct page *new_slab(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, int node)
>>> setup_object(s, page, p);
>>> if (likely(idx < page->objects))
>>> set_freepointer(s, p, p + s->size);
>>
>> Sorry, I don't fully follow this code, so I will just ask some questions.
>> Can we have some slab padding after last object in this case as well?
>>
> This case is for not the last object. Padding is the place after the last object.
> The last object initialized bellow in else case.
>
>>> - else
>>> + else {
>>> set_freepointer(s, p, NULL);
>>> + kasan_mark_slab_padding(s, p);
>>
>> kasan_mark_slab_padding poisons only up to end of the page. Can there
>> be multiple pages that we need to poison?
>>
> Yep, that's a good catch.
>
> Thanks.
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