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Date: Thu, 02 Oct 2014 13:43:34 +0300
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@...sung.com>
To: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...ito.it>,
Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>,
zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, linux-ima-devel@...ts.sourceforge.net,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [Linux-ima-devel] [PATCH v2 3/4] ima: check appraisal flag in the
ima_file_free() hook
On 02/10/14 13:06, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> On 10/02/2014 11:30 AM, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
>> On 02/10/14 11:26, Roberto Sassu wrote:
>>> On 10/01/2014 08:43 PM, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
>>>> ima_file_free() hook is only used by appraisal module to update hash
>>>> when file was modified. When there were no integrity checks on inode,
>>>> S_IMA flag is not set, integrity_iint_find() returns NULL and it
>>>> quits. When inode is only measured/audited but not appraised, iint
>>>> is allocated and it will cause calling ima_check_last_writer() which
>>>> unnecessarily locks i_mutex.
>>>>
>>>> Currently ima_file_free() checks 'iint_initialized'. But it looks that
>>>> it is a mistake and originally 'ima_appraise' had to be used instead.
>>>> In fact usage of 'iint_initialized' is completely unnecessary because
>>>> S_IMA flag would not be set if iint was not allocated.
>>>>
>>> Hi Dmitry
>>>
>>> sorry, I think there are two mistakes here.
>>>
>>> First, ima_file_free() is not used by the appraisal module only
>>> because, if a file has been written, also the IMA_MEASURED
>>> and IMA_AUDITED flags are cleared. Your patch prevents further
>>> measurements/audits if a file is modified.
>>>
>>> Second, the lock of i_mutex is necessary, as it protects the
>>> access to the fields of the 'integrity_iint_cache' structure.
>>>
>>> My suggestion is to provide a patch that fixes the commit a756024e
>>> of Mimi's 'next' branch. The patch should just replace the check
>>> of 'iint_initialized' with 'ima_policy_flag'. The removal of
>>> 'iint_initialized' could be done in a separate patch.
>>>
>>> Thanks
>>>
>>> Roberto Sassu
>>
>> Hi Roberto,
>>
>> You are right. Clearing flags slipped out from my eyes.
>> In such case we need to test entire flag as we do in other places.
>> But in such case the patch is more about remove iint_initialzed, because
>> S_IMA flag would not be set anyway.
>> I posted modified version.
>>
>
> Hi Dmitry
>
> thanks for the updated version. I would slightly modify the
> patch description by saying that your patch completes the switching
> to the 'ima_policy_flag' variable in the checks at the beginning
> of IMA functions, started with the commit a756024e.
>
Updated in my tree..
http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/kasatkin/linux-digsig.git/commit/?h=ima-next&id=cddb34c121434c71c69cb14069252c3c61c6ae11
Dmitry
> I noticed that James Morris pulled my previous patches, so also
> this one should be pulled after Mimi confirms that it is ok.
>
>
>>
>> This patch and other patches were posted a week ago on linux-ima-devel
>> mailing list.
>> I appreciate you would review patches when they come there so we could
>> spot more issues before they come to lsm mailing list.
>>
>
> Ok, sure.
>
> Thanks
>
> Roberto Sassu
>
>
>> Thanks,
>> Dmitry
>>
>>>
>>>> This patch uses lately introduced ima_policy_flag to test if appraisal
>>>> was enabled by policy.
>>>>
>>>> With this change 'iint_initialized' is no longer used anywhere.
>>>> Indeed,
>>>> integrity cache is allocated with SLAB_PANIC and kernel will panic if
>>>> allocation fails during kernel initialization. So this variable is
>>>> unnecessary and thus this patch removes it.
>>>>
>>>> Changes in v2:
>>>> * 'iint_initialized' removal patch merged to this patch (requested
>>>> by Mimi)
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@...sung.com>
>>>> ---
>>>> security/integrity/iint.c | 3 ---
>>>> security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 2 +-
>>>> security/integrity/integrity.h | 3 ---
>>>> 3 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 7 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
>>>> index a521edf..cc3eb4d 100644
>>>> --- a/security/integrity/iint.c
>>>> +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
>>>> @@ -25,8 +25,6 @@ static struct rb_root integrity_iint_tree = RB_ROOT;
>>>> static DEFINE_RWLOCK(integrity_iint_lock);
>>>> static struct kmem_cache *iint_cache __read_mostly;
>>>>
>>>> -int iint_initialized;
>>>> -
>>>> /*
>>>> * __integrity_iint_find - return the iint associated with an inode
>>>> */
>>>> @@ -166,7 +164,6 @@ static int __init integrity_iintcache_init(void)
>>>> iint_cache =
>>>> kmem_cache_create("iint_cache", sizeof(struct
>>>> integrity_iint_cache),
>>>> 0, SLAB_PANIC, init_once);
>>>> - iint_initialized = 1;
>>>> return 0;
>>>> }
>>>> security_initcall(integrity_iintcache_init);
>>>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
>>>> b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
>>>> index 62f59ec..87d7df7 100644
>>>> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
>>>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
>>>> @@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
>>>> struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
>>>> struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
>>>>
>>>> - if (!iint_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
>>>> + if (!(ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE) || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
>>>> return;
>>>>
>>>> iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
>>>> diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h
>>>> b/security/integrity/integrity.h
>>>> index aafb468..f51ad65 100644
>>>> --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
>>>> +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
>>>> @@ -169,6 +169,3 @@ static inline void integrity_audit_msg(int
>>>> audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
>>>> {
>>>> }
>>>> #endif
>>>> -
>>>> -/* set during initialization */
>>>> -extern int iint_initialized;
>>>>
>>>
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>>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/linux-ima-devel
>>>
>>
>
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