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Message-ID: <CACE9dm8ZmVJe7qadrLwXEQHYrmau_Mbahnz4FSBaWD4GB==JMw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 2 Oct 2014 21:32:30 +0300
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>
To: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@...sung.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Rusty Russell <rusty@...tcorp.com.au>,
keyrings <keyrings@...ux-nfs.org>,
Josh Boyer <jwboyer@...hat.com>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
pjones@...hat.com, Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 08/13] KEYS: Overhaul key identification when searching
for asymmetric keys
On 2 October 2014 19:04, Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@...sung.com> wrote:
> On 02/10/14 18:49, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
>> Hi David,
>>
>> I just took latest #next branch from James's security tree which
>> includes latest KEYs patches and noticed following:
>>
>> [ 9.812332] Request for unknown module key 'Magrathea: Glacier
>> signing key: 926305d6dda66f47139eb4e3cb25a6adef527f08' err -11
>>
>> Also I noticed that output of 'keyctl show' and 'cat /proc/keys' output
>> also has changed in respect of certificate ids..
>>
>> Those ids does not look any close to my kernel X509 X509v3 Subject Key
>> Identifier, which is:
>> 92:63:05:D6:DD:A6:6F:47:13:9E:B4:E3:CB:25:A6:AD:EF:52:7F:08
>>
>> proc/keys shows
>>
>> symmetri Magrathea: Glacier signing key: d9e2e4c6951f1e83: X509.RSA
>> 6865612e68326732 []
>>
Ok.. d9e2e4c6951f1e83 is serial number.
What is this 6865612e68326732?
Does it still support searching for the key by partially matching
Subject Key Identifier?
- Dmitry
>> Very different ids..
>>
>> How could I match certificate now?
>> Module verification code cannot find needed key..
>>
>> - Dmitry
>
>
> Hehe. Also now I get kernel Oops in asymmetric_key_id_same...
>
> -------------------------
> [ 132.816522] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at
> ffffffffffffffea
> [ 132.819902] IP: [<ffffffff812bfc20>] asymmetric_key_id_same+0x14/0x36
> [ 132.820302] PGD 1a12067 PUD 1a14067 PMD 0
> [ 132.820302] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
> [ 132.820302] Modules linked in: bridge(E) stp(E) llc(E) evdev(E)
> serio_raw(E) i2c_piix4(E) button(E) fuse(E)
> [ 132.820302] CPU: 0 PID: 2993 Comm: cat Tainted: G E
> 3.16.0-kds+ #2847
> [ 132.820302] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
> [ 132.820302] task: ffff88004249a430 ti: ffff880056640000 task.ti:
> ffff880056640000
> [ 132.820302] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812bfc20>] [<ffffffff812bfc20>]
> asymmetric_key_id_same+0x14/0x36
> [ 132.820302] RSP: 0018:ffff880056643930 EFLAGS: 00010246
> [ 132.820302] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffffffffffea RCX:
> ffff880056643ae0
> [ 132.820302] RDX: 000000000000005e RSI: ffffffffffffffea RDI:
> ffff88005bac9300
> [ 132.820302] RBP: ffff880056643948 R08: 0000000000000003 R09:
> 00000007504aa01a
> [ 132.820302] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12:
> ffff88005d68ca40
> [ 132.820302] R13: 0000000000000101 R14: 0000000000000000 R15:
> ffff88005bac5280
> [ 132.820302] FS: 00007f67a153c740(0000) GS:ffff88005da00000(0000)
> knlGS:0000000000000000
> [ 132.820302] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
> [ 132.820302] CR2: ffffffffffffffea CR3: 000000002e663000 CR4:
> 00000000000006f0
> [ 132.820302] Stack:
> [ 132.820302] ffffffff812bfc66 ffff880056643ae0 ffff88005bac5280
> ffff880056643958
> [ 132.820302] ffffffff812bfc9d ffff880056643980 ffffffff812971d9
> ffff88005ce930c1
> [ 132.820302] ffff88005ce930c0 0000000000000000 ffff8800566439c8
> ffffffff812fb753
> [ 132.820302] Call Trace:
> [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812bfc66>] ? asymmetric_match_key_ids+0x24/0x42
> [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812bfc9d>] asymmetric_key_cmp+0x19/0x1b
> [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812971d9>] keyring_search_iterator+0x74/0xd7
> [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812fb753>] assoc_array_subtree_iterate+0x67/0xd2
> [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff81297165>] ? key_default_cmp+0x20/0x20
> [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812fbaa1>] assoc_array_iterate+0x19/0x1e
> [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff81297332>] search_nested_keyrings+0xf6/0x2b6
> [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff810728da>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x91/0xa2
> [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff810860d2>] ? mark_held_locks+0x58/0x6e
> [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff810a137d>] ? current_kernel_time+0x77/0xb8
> [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff81297871>] keyring_search_aux+0xe1/0x14c
> [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812977fc>] ? keyring_search_aux+0x6c/0x14c
> [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff8129796b>] keyring_search+0x8f/0xb6
> [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812bfc84>] ? asymmetric_match_key_ids+0x42/0x42
> [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff81297165>] ? key_default_cmp+0x20/0x20
> [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812ab9e3>] asymmetric_verify+0xa4/0x214
> [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812ab90e>] integrity_digsig_verify+0xb1/0xe2
> [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812abe41>] ? evm_verifyxattr+0x6a/0x7a
> [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812b0390>] ima_appraise_measurement+0x160/0x370
> [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff81161db2>] ? d_absolute_path+0x5b/0x7a
> [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812ada30>] process_measurement+0x322/0x404
>
>
>> On 08/09/14 18:38, David Howells wrote:
>>> Make use of the new match string preparsing to overhaul key identification
>>> when searching for asymmetric keys. The following changes are made:
>>>
>>> (1) Use the previously created asymmetric_key_id struct to hold the following
>>> key IDs derived from the X.509 certificate or PKCS#7 message:
>>>
>>> id: serial number + issuer
>>> skid: subjKeyId + subject
>>> authority: authKeyId + issuer
>>>
>>> (2) Replace the hex fingerprint attached to key->type_data[1] with an
>>> asymmetric_key_ids struct containing the id and the skid (if present).
>>>
>>> (3) Make the asymmetric_type match data preparse select one of two searches:
>>>
>>> (a) An iterative search for the key ID given if prefixed with "id:". The
>>> prefix is expected to be followed by a hex string giving the ID to
>>> search for. The criterion key ID is checked against all key IDs
>>> recorded on the key.
>>>
>>> (b) A direct search if the key ID is not prefixed with "id:". This will
>>> look for an exact match on the key description.
>>>
>>> (4) Make x509_request_asymmetric_key() take a key ID. This is then converted
>>> into "id:<hex>" and passed into keyring_search() where match preparsing
>>> will turn it back into a binary ID.
>>>
>>> (5) X.509 certificate verification then takes the authority key ID and looks
>>> up a key that matches it to find the public key for the certificate
>>> signature.
>>>
>>> (6) PKCS#7 certificate verification then takes the id key ID and looks up a
>>> key that matches it to find the public key for the signed information
>>> block signature.
>>>
>>> Additional changes:
>>>
>>> (1) Multiple subjKeyId and authKeyId values on an X.509 certificate cause the
>>> cert to be rejected with -EBADMSG.
>>>
>>> (2) The 'fingerprint' ID is gone. This was primarily intended to convey PGP
>>> public key fingerprints. If PGP is supported in future, this should
>>> generate a key ID that carries the fingerprint.
>>>
>>> (3) Th ca_keyid= kernel command line option is now converted to a key ID and
>>> used to match the authority key ID. Possibly this should only match the
>>> actual authKeyId part and not the issuer as well.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
>>> ---
>>>
>>> crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h | 4 -
>>> crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | 133 ++++++++++++-----------------
>>> crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c | 38 ++++++--
>>> crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h | 5 -
>>> crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c | 6 -
>>> crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 44 ++++------
>>> crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 55 +++++++-----
>>> crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h | 5 +
>>> crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 89 +++++++++++--------
>>> include/crypto/public_key.h | 5 +
>>> 10 files changed, 198 insertions(+), 186 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h
>>> index 917be6b985e7..fd21ac28e0a0 100644
>>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h
>>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h
>>> @@ -9,13 +9,13 @@
>>> * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
>>> */
>>>
>>> -int asymmetric_keyid_match(const char *kid, const char *id);
>>> extern bool asymmetric_match_key_ids(const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids,
>>> const struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id);
>>>
>>> extern struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id);
>>>
>>> -static inline const char *asymmetric_key_id(const struct key *key)
>>> +static inline
>>> +const struct asymmetric_key_ids *asymmetric_key_ids(const struct key *key)
>>> {
>>> return key->type_data.p[1];
>>> }
>>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
>>> index 3bc71b4e1eed..6f16f647d21b 100644
>>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
>>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
>>> @@ -105,76 +105,15 @@ struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id)
>>> }
>>>
>>> /*
>>> - * Match asymmetric key id with partial match
>>> - * @id: key id to match in a form "id:<id>"
>>> - */
>>> -int asymmetric_keyid_match(const char *kid, const char *id)
>>> -{
>>> - size_t idlen, kidlen;
>>> -
>>> - if (!kid || !id)
>>> - return 0;
>>> -
>>> - /* make it possible to use id as in the request: "id:<id>" */
>>> - if (strncmp(id, "id:", 3) == 0)
>>> - id += 3;
>>> -
>>> - /* Anything after here requires a partial match on the ID string */
>>> - idlen = strlen(id);
>>> - kidlen = strlen(kid);
>>> - if (idlen > kidlen)
>>> - return 0;
>>> -
>>> - kid += kidlen - idlen;
>>> - if (strcasecmp(id, kid) != 0)
>>> - return 0;
>>> -
>>> - return 1;
>>> -}
>>> -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asymmetric_keyid_match);
>>> -
>>> -/*
>>> - * Match asymmetric keys on (part of) their name
>>> - * We have some shorthand methods for matching keys. We allow:
>>> - *
>>> - * "<desc>" - request a key by description
>>> - * "id:<id>" - request a key matching the ID
>>> - * "<subtype>:<id>" - request a key of a subtype
>>> + * Match asymmetric keys by ID.
>>> */
>>> static bool asymmetric_key_cmp(const struct key *key,
>>> const struct key_match_data *match_data)
>>> {
>>> - const struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key);
>>> - const char *description = match_data->raw_data;
>>> - const char *spec = description;
>>> - const char *id;
>>> - ptrdiff_t speclen;
>>> -
>>> - if (!subtype || !spec || !*spec)
>>> - return 0;
>>> -
>>> - /* See if the full key description matches as is */
>>> - if (key->description && strcmp(key->description, description) == 0)
>>> - return 1;
>>> -
>>> - /* All tests from here on break the criterion description into a
>>> - * specifier, a colon and then an identifier.
>>> - */
>>> - id = strchr(spec, ':');
>>> - if (!id)
>>> - return 0;
>>> -
>>> - speclen = id - spec;
>>> - id++;
>>> -
>>> - if (speclen == 2 && memcmp(spec, "id", 2) == 0)
>>> - return asymmetric_keyid_match(asymmetric_key_id(key), id);
>>> + const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = asymmetric_key_ids(key);
>>> + const struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id = match_data->preparsed;
>>>
>>> - if (speclen == subtype->name_len &&
>>> - memcmp(spec, subtype->name, speclen) == 0)
>>> - return 1;
>>> -
>>> - return 0;
>>> + return asymmetric_match_key_ids(kids, match_id);
>>> }
>>>
>>> /*
>>> @@ -191,8 +130,30 @@ static bool asymmetric_key_cmp(const struct key *key,
>>> */
>>> static int asymmetric_key_match_preparse(struct key_match_data *match_data)
>>> {
>>> - match_data->lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE;
>>> + struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id;
>>> + const char *spec = match_data->raw_data;
>>> + const char *id;
>>> +
>>> + if (!spec || !*spec)
>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>> + if (spec[0] == 'i' &&
>>> + spec[1] == 'd' &&
>>> + spec[2] == ':') {
>>> + id = spec + 3;
>>> + } else {
>>> + goto default_match;
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> + match_id = asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(id);
>>> + if (!match_id)
>>> + return -ENOMEM;
>>> +
>>> + match_data->preparsed = match_id;
>>> match_data->cmp = asymmetric_key_cmp;
>>> + match_data->lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE;
>>> + return 0;
>>> +
>>> +default_match:
>>> return 0;
>>> }
>>>
>>> @@ -201,6 +162,7 @@ static int asymmetric_key_match_preparse(struct key_match_data *match_data)
>>> */
>>> static void asymmetric_key_match_free(struct key_match_data *match_data)
>>> {
>>> + kfree(match_data->preparsed);
>>> }
>>>
>>> /*
>>> @@ -209,8 +171,10 @@ static void asymmetric_key_match_free(struct key_match_data *match_data)
>>> static void asymmetric_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
>>> {
>>> const struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key);
>>> - const char *kid = asymmetric_key_id(key);
>>> - size_t n;
>>> + const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = asymmetric_key_ids(key);
>>> + const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
>>> + const unsigned char *p;
>>> + int n;
>>>
>>> seq_puts(m, key->description);
>>>
>>> @@ -218,13 +182,16 @@ static void asymmetric_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
>>> seq_puts(m, ": ");
>>> subtype->describe(key, m);
>>>
>>> - if (kid) {
>>> + if (kids && kids->id[0]) {
>>> + kid = kids->id[0];
>>> seq_putc(m, ' ');
>>> - n = strlen(kid);
>>> - if (n <= 8)
>>> - seq_puts(m, kid);
>>> - else
>>> - seq_puts(m, kid + n - 8);
>>> + n = kid->len;
>>> + p = kid->data;
>>> + if (n > 8) {
>>> + p += n - 8;
>>> + n = 8;
>>> + }
>>> + seq_printf(m, "%*phN", n, p);
>>> }
>>>
>>> seq_puts(m, " [");
>>> @@ -275,6 +242,7 @@ static int asymmetric_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
>>> static void asymmetric_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
>>> {
>>> struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = prep->type_data[0];
>>> + struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = prep->type_data[1];
>>>
>>> pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
>>>
>>> @@ -282,7 +250,11 @@ static void asymmetric_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
>>> subtype->destroy(prep->payload[0]);
>>> module_put(subtype->owner);
>>> }
>>> - kfree(prep->type_data[1]);
>>> + if (kids) {
>>> + kfree(kids->id[0]);
>>> + kfree(kids->id[1]);
>>> + kfree(kids);
>>> + }
>>> kfree(prep->description);
>>> }
>>>
>>> @@ -292,13 +264,20 @@ static void asymmetric_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
>>> static void asymmetric_key_destroy(struct key *key)
>>> {
>>> struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key);
>>> + struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = key->type_data.p[1];
>>> +
>>> if (subtype) {
>>> subtype->destroy(key->payload.data);
>>> module_put(subtype->owner);
>>> key->type_data.p[0] = NULL;
>>> }
>>> - kfree(key->type_data.p[1]);
>>> - key->type_data.p[1] = NULL;
>>> +
>>> + if (kids) {
>>> + kfree(kids->id[0]);
>>> + kfree(kids->id[1]);
>>> + kfree(kids);
>>> + key->type_data.p[1] = NULL;
>>> + }
>>> }
>>>
>>> struct key_type key_type_asymmetric = {
>>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
>>> index 459d2077c61b..ad6ae9d7c884 100644
>>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
>>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
>>> @@ -29,6 +29,10 @@ struct pkcs7_parse_context {
>>> enum OID last_oid; /* Last OID encountered */
>>> unsigned x509_index;
>>> unsigned sinfo_index;
>>> + const void *raw_serial;
>>> + unsigned raw_serial_size;
>>> + unsigned raw_issuer_size;
>>> + const void *raw_issuer;
>>> };
>>>
>>> /*
>>> @@ -39,6 +43,7 @@ static void pkcs7_free_signed_info(struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
>>> if (sinfo) {
>>> mpi_free(sinfo->sig.mpi[0]);
>>> kfree(sinfo->sig.digest);
>>> + kfree(sinfo->signing_cert_id);
>>> kfree(sinfo);
>>> }
>>> }
>>> @@ -256,10 +261,10 @@ int pkcs7_extract_cert(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
>>> if (IS_ERR(x509))
>>> return PTR_ERR(x509);
>>>
>>> - pr_debug("Got cert for %s\n", x509->subject);
>>> - pr_debug("- fingerprint %s\n", x509->fingerprint);
>>> -
>>> x509->index = ++ctx->x509_index;
>>> + pr_debug("Got cert %u for %s\n", x509->index, x509->subject);
>>> + pr_debug("- fingerprint %*phN\n", x509->id->len, x509->id->data);
>>> +
>>> *ctx->ppcerts = x509;
>>> ctx->ppcerts = &x509->next;
>>> return 0;
>>> @@ -348,8 +353,8 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_serial(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
>>> const void *value, size_t vlen)
>>> {
>>> struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
>>> - ctx->sinfo->raw_serial = value;
>>> - ctx->sinfo->raw_serial_size = vlen;
>>> + ctx->raw_serial = value;
>>> + ctx->raw_serial_size = vlen;
>>> return 0;
>>> }
>>>
>>> @@ -361,8 +366,8 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_issuer(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
>>> const void *value, size_t vlen)
>>> {
>>> struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
>>> - ctx->sinfo->raw_issuer = value;
>>> - ctx->sinfo->raw_issuer_size = vlen;
>>> + ctx->raw_issuer = value;
>>> + ctx->raw_issuer_size = vlen;
>>> return 0;
>>> }
>>>
>>> @@ -395,10 +400,21 @@ int pkcs7_note_signed_info(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
>>> const void *value, size_t vlen)
>>> {
>>> struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
>>> -
>>> - ctx->sinfo->index = ++ctx->sinfo_index;
>>> - *ctx->ppsinfo = ctx->sinfo;
>>> - ctx->ppsinfo = &ctx->sinfo->next;
>>> + struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo = ctx->sinfo;
>>> + struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
>>> +
>>> + /* Generate cert issuer + serial number key ID */
>>> + kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(ctx->raw_serial,
>>> + ctx->raw_serial_size,
>>> + ctx->raw_issuer,
>>> + ctx->raw_issuer_size);
>>> + if (IS_ERR(kid))
>>> + return PTR_ERR(kid);
>>> +
>>> + sinfo->signing_cert_id = kid;
>>> + sinfo->index = ++ctx->sinfo_index;
>>> + *ctx->ppsinfo = sinfo;
>>> + ctx->ppsinfo = &sinfo->next;
>>> ctx->sinfo = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_signed_info), GFP_KERNEL);
>>> if (!ctx->sinfo)
>>> return -ENOMEM;
>>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
>>> index d25f4d15370f..91949f92bc72 100644
>>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
>>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
>>> @@ -33,10 +33,7 @@ struct pkcs7_signed_info {
>>> const void *authattrs;
>>>
>>> /* Issuing cert serial number and issuer's name */
>>> - const void *raw_serial;
>>> - unsigned raw_serial_size;
>>> - unsigned raw_issuer_size;
>>> - const void *raw_issuer;
>>> + struct asymmetric_key_id *signing_cert_id;
>>>
>>> /* Message signature.
>>> *
>>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
>>> index e666eb011a85..4e8dd7214753 100644
>>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
>>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
>>> @@ -49,8 +49,7 @@ int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
>>> /* Look to see if this certificate is present in the trusted
>>> * keys.
>>> */
>>> - key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, x509->subject,
>>> - x509->fingerprint);
>>> + key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, x509->id);
>>> if (!IS_ERR(key))
>>> /* One of the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message
>>> * is apparently the same as one we already trust.
>>> @@ -82,8 +81,7 @@ int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
>>> return -ENOKEY;
>>> }
>>>
>>> - key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, last->issuer,
>>> - last->authority);
>>> + key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, last->authority);
>>> if (IS_ERR(key))
>>> return PTR_ERR(key) == -ENOMEM ? -ENOMEM : -ENOKEY;
>>> x509 = last;
>>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
>>> index c62cf8006e1f..57e90fa17f2b 100644
>>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
>>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
>>> @@ -131,8 +131,7 @@ static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
>>> struct x509_certificate *x509;
>>> unsigned certix = 1;
>>>
>>> - kenter("%u,%u,%u",
>>> - sinfo->index, sinfo->raw_serial_size, sinfo->raw_issuer_size);
>>> + kenter("%u", sinfo->index);
>>>
>>> for (x509 = pkcs7->certs; x509; x509 = x509->next, certix++) {
>>> /* I'm _assuming_ that the generator of the PKCS#7 message will
>>> @@ -140,21 +139,11 @@ static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
>>> * PKCS#7 message - but I can't be 100% sure of that. It's
>>> * possible this will need element-by-element comparison.
>>> */
>>> - if (x509->raw_serial_size != sinfo->raw_serial_size ||
>>> - memcmp(x509->raw_serial, sinfo->raw_serial,
>>> - sinfo->raw_serial_size) != 0)
>>> + if (!asymmetric_key_id_same(x509->id, sinfo->signing_cert_id))
>>> continue;
>>> pr_devel("Sig %u: Found cert serial match X.509[%u]\n",
>>> sinfo->index, certix);
>>>
>>> - if (x509->raw_issuer_size != sinfo->raw_issuer_size ||
>>> - memcmp(x509->raw_issuer, sinfo->raw_issuer,
>>> - sinfo->raw_issuer_size) != 0) {
>>> - pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 subject and PKCS#7 issuer don't match\n",
>>> - sinfo->index);
>>> - continue;
>>> - }
>>> -
>>> if (x509->pub->pkey_algo != sinfo->sig.pkey_algo) {
>>> pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 algo and PKCS#7 sig algo don't match\n",
>>> sinfo->index);
>>> @@ -164,8 +153,10 @@ static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
>>> sinfo->signer = x509;
>>> return 0;
>>> }
>>> +
>>> pr_warn("Sig %u: Issuing X.509 cert not found (#%*ph)\n",
>>> - sinfo->index, sinfo->raw_serial_size, sinfo->raw_serial);
>>> + sinfo->index,
>>> + sinfo->signing_cert_id->len, sinfo->signing_cert_id->data);
>>> return -ENOKEY;
>>> }
>>>
>>> @@ -184,7 +175,9 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
>>> p->seen = false;
>>>
>>> for (;;) {
>>> - pr_debug("verify %s: %s\n", x509->subject, x509->fingerprint);
>>> + pr_debug("verify %s: %*phN\n",
>>> + x509->subject,
>>> + x509->raw_serial_size, x509->raw_serial);
>>> x509->seen = true;
>>> ret = x509_get_sig_params(x509);
>>> if (ret < 0)
>>> @@ -192,7 +185,8 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
>>>
>>> pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", x509->issuer);
>>> if (x509->authority)
>>> - pr_debug("- authkeyid %s\n", x509->authority);
>>> + pr_debug("- authkeyid %*phN\n",
>>> + x509->authority->len, x509->authority->data);
>>>
>>> if (!x509->authority ||
>>> strcmp(x509->subject, x509->issuer) == 0) {
>>> @@ -218,13 +212,14 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
>>> /* Look through the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message's
>>> * list to see if the next one is there.
>>> */
>>> - pr_debug("- want %s\n", x509->authority);
>>> + pr_debug("- want %*phN\n",
>>> + x509->authority->len, x509->authority->data);
>>> for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) {
>>> - pr_debug("- cmp [%u] %s\n", p->index, p->fingerprint);
>>> - if (p->raw_subject_size == x509->raw_issuer_size &&
>>> - strcmp(p->fingerprint, x509->authority) == 0 &&
>>> - memcmp(p->raw_subject, x509->raw_issuer,
>>> - x509->raw_issuer_size) == 0)
>>> + if (!p->skid)
>>> + continue;
>>> + pr_debug("- cmp [%u] %*phN\n",
>>> + p->index, p->skid->len, p->skid->data);
>>> + if (asymmetric_key_id_same(p->skid, x509->authority))
>>> goto found_issuer;
>>> }
>>>
>>> @@ -233,7 +228,7 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
>>> return 0;
>>>
>>> found_issuer:
>>> - pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", p->subject);
>>> + pr_debug("- subject %s\n", p->subject);
>>> if (p->seen) {
>>> pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 chain contains loop\n",
>>> sinfo->index);
>>> @@ -304,7 +299,8 @@ int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
>>> ret = x509_get_sig_params(x509);
>>> if (ret < 0)
>>> return ret;
>>> - pr_debug("X.509[%u] %s\n", n, x509->authority);
>>> + pr_debug("X.509[%u] %*phN\n",
>>> + n, x509->authority->len, x509->authority->data);
>>> }
>>>
>>> for (sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) {
>>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
>>> index ac72348c186a..96151b2b91a2 100644
>>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
>>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
>>> @@ -46,7 +46,8 @@ void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert)
>>> public_key_destroy(cert->pub);
>>> kfree(cert->issuer);
>>> kfree(cert->subject);
>>> - kfree(cert->fingerprint);
>>> + kfree(cert->id);
>>> + kfree(cert->skid);
>>> kfree(cert->authority);
>>> kfree(cert->sig.digest);
>>> mpi_free(cert->sig.rsa.s);
>>> @@ -62,6 +63,7 @@ struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen)
>>> {
>>> struct x509_certificate *cert;
>>> struct x509_parse_context *ctx;
>>> + struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
>>> long ret;
>>>
>>> ret = -ENOMEM;
>>> @@ -89,6 +91,17 @@ struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen)
>>> if (ret < 0)
>>> goto error_decode;
>>>
>>> + /* Generate cert issuer + serial number key ID */
>>> + kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(cert->raw_serial,
>>> + cert->raw_serial_size,
>>> + cert->raw_issuer,
>>> + cert->raw_issuer_size);
>>> + if (IS_ERR(kid)) {
>>> + ret = PTR_ERR(kid);
>>> + goto error_decode;
>>> + }
>>> + cert->id = kid;
>>> +
>>> kfree(ctx);
>>> return cert;
>>>
>>> @@ -407,36 +420,34 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
>>> const void *value, size_t vlen)
>>> {
>>> struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
>>> + struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
>>> const unsigned char *v = value;
>>> - char *f;
>>> int i;
>>>
>>> pr_debug("Extension: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
>>>
>>> if (ctx->last_oid == OID_subjectKeyIdentifier) {
>>> /* Get hold of the key fingerprint */
>>> - if (vlen < 3)
>>> + if (ctx->cert->skid || vlen < 3)
>>> return -EBADMSG;
>>> if (v[0] != ASN1_OTS || v[1] != vlen - 2)
>>> return -EBADMSG;
>>> v += 2;
>>> vlen -= 2;
>>>
>>> - f = kmalloc(vlen * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
>>> - if (!f)
>>> - return -ENOMEM;
>>> - for (i = 0; i < vlen; i++)
>>> - sprintf(f + i * 2, "%02x", v[i]);
>>> - pr_debug("fingerprint %s\n", f);
>>> - ctx->cert->fingerprint = f;
>>> + kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(v, vlen,
>>> + ctx->cert->raw_subject,
>>> + ctx->cert->raw_subject_size);
>>> + if (IS_ERR(kid))
>>> + return PTR_ERR(kid);
>>> + ctx->cert->skid = kid;
>>> + pr_debug("subjkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data);
>>> return 0;
>>> }
>>>
>>> if (ctx->last_oid == OID_authorityKeyIdentifier) {
>>> - size_t key_len;
>>> -
>>> /* Get hold of the CA key fingerprint */
>>> - if (vlen < 5)
>>> + if (ctx->cert->authority || vlen < 5)
>>> return -EBADMSG;
>>>
>>> /* Authority Key Identifier must be a Constructed SEQUENCE */
>>> @@ -454,7 +465,7 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
>>> v[3] > vlen - 4)
>>> return -EBADMSG;
>>>
>>> - key_len = v[3];
>>> + vlen = v[3];
>>> v += 4;
>>> } else {
>>> /* Long Form length */
>>> @@ -476,17 +487,17 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
>>> v[sub + 1] > vlen - 4 - sub)
>>> return -EBADMSG;
>>>
>>> - key_len = v[sub + 1];
>>> + vlen = v[sub + 1];
>>> v += (sub + 2);
>>> }
>>>
>>> - f = kmalloc(key_len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
>>> - if (!f)
>>> - return -ENOMEM;
>>> - for (i = 0; i < key_len; i++)
>>> - sprintf(f + i * 2, "%02x", v[i]);
>>> - pr_debug("authority %s\n", f);
>>> - ctx->cert->authority = f;
>>> + kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(v, vlen,
>>> + ctx->cert->raw_issuer,
>>> + ctx->cert->raw_issuer_size);
>>> + if (IS_ERR(kid))
>>> + return PTR_ERR(kid);
>>> + pr_debug("authkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data);
>>> + ctx->cert->authority = kid;
>>> return 0;
>>> }
>>>
>>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
>>> index 1b76f207c1f3..0e8d59b010fb 100644
>>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
>>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
>>> @@ -19,8 +19,9 @@ struct x509_certificate {
>>> struct public_key_signature sig; /* Signature parameters */
>>> char *issuer; /* Name of certificate issuer */
>>> char *subject; /* Name of certificate subject */
>>> - char *fingerprint; /* Key fingerprint as hex */
>>> - char *authority; /* Authority key fingerprint as hex */
>>> + struct asymmetric_key_id *id; /* Issuer + serial number */
>>> + struct asymmetric_key_id *skid; /* Subject key identifier */
>>> + struct asymmetric_key_id *authority; /* Authority key identifier */
>>> struct tm valid_from;
>>> struct tm valid_to;
>>> const void *tbs; /* Signed data */
>>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
>>> index f3d62307e6ee..c60905c3f4d2 100644
>>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
>>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
>>> @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
>>> #include "x509_parser.h"
>>>
>>> static bool use_builtin_keys;
>>> -static char *ca_keyid;
>>> +static struct asymmetric_key_id *ca_keyid;
>>>
>>> #ifndef MODULE
>>> static int __init ca_keys_setup(char *str)
>>> @@ -33,10 +33,16 @@ static int __init ca_keys_setup(char *str)
>>> if (!str) /* default system keyring */
>>> return 1;
>>>
>>> - if (strncmp(str, "id:", 3) == 0)
>>> - ca_keyid = str; /* owner key 'id:xxxxxx' */
>>> - else if (strcmp(str, "builtin") == 0)
>>> + if (strncmp(str, "id:", 3) == 0) {
>>> + struct asymmetric_key_id *p;
>>> + p = asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(str);
>>> + if (p == ERR_PTR(-EINVAL))
>>> + pr_err("Unparsable hex string in ca_keys\n");
>>> + else if (!IS_ERR(p))
>>> + ca_keyid = p; /* owner key 'id:xxxxxx' */
>>> + } else if (strcmp(str, "builtin") == 0) {
>>> use_builtin_keys = true;
>>> + }
>>>
>>> return 1;
>>> }
>>> @@ -46,31 +52,28 @@ __setup("ca_keys=", ca_keys_setup);
>>> /**
>>> * x509_request_asymmetric_key - Request a key by X.509 certificate params.
>>> * @keyring: The keys to search.
>>> - * @subject: The name of the subject to whom the key belongs.
>>> - * @key_id: The subject key ID as a hex string.
>>> + * @kid: The key ID.
>>> *
>>> * Find a key in the given keyring by subject name and key ID. These might,
>>> * for instance, be the issuer name and the authority key ID of an X.509
>>> * certificate that needs to be verified.
>>> */
>>> struct key *x509_request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring,
>>> - const char *subject,
>>> - const char *key_id)
>>> + const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid)
>>> {
>>> key_ref_t key;
>>> - size_t subject_len = strlen(subject), key_id_len = strlen(key_id);
>>> - char *id;
>>> + char *id, *p;
>>>
>>> - /* Construct an identifier "<subjname>:<keyid>". */
>>> - id = kmalloc(subject_len + 2 + key_id_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
>>> + /* Construct an identifier "id:<keyid>". */
>>> + p = id = kmalloc(2 + 1 + kid->len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
>>> if (!id)
>>> return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
>>>
>>> - memcpy(id, subject, subject_len);
>>> - id[subject_len + 0] = ':';
>>> - id[subject_len + 1] = ' ';
>>> - memcpy(id + subject_len + 2, key_id, key_id_len);
>>> - id[subject_len + 2 + key_id_len] = 0;
>>> + *p++ = 'i';
>>> + *p++ = 'd';
>>> + *p++ = ':';
>>> + p = bin2hex(p, kid->data, kid->len);
>>> + *p = 0;
>>>
>>> pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", id);
>>>
>>> @@ -195,11 +198,10 @@ static int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert,
>>> if (!trust_keyring)
>>> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>>>
>>> - if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_keyid_match(cert->authority, ca_keyid))
>>> + if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->authority, ca_keyid))
>>> return -EPERM;
>>>
>>> - key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
>>> - cert->issuer, cert->authority);
>>> + key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, cert->authority);
>>> if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
>>> if (!use_builtin_keys
>>> || test_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key->flags))
>>> @@ -214,9 +216,11 @@ static int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert,
>>> */
>>> static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
>>> {
>>> + struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids;
>>> struct x509_certificate *cert;
>>> + const char *q;
>>> size_t srlen, sulen;
>>> - char *desc = NULL;
>>> + char *desc = NULL, *p;
>>> int ret;
>>>
>>> cert = x509_cert_parse(prep->data, prep->datalen);
>>> @@ -249,19 +253,12 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
>>> pkey_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_algo],
>>> hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo]);
>>>
>>> - if (!cert->fingerprint) {
>>> - pr_warn("Cert for '%s' must have a SubjKeyId extension\n",
>>> - cert->subject);
>>> - ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
>>> - goto error_free_cert;
>>> - }
>>> -
>>> cert->pub->algo = pkey_algo[cert->pub->pkey_algo];
>>> cert->pub->id_type = PKEY_ID_X509;
>>>
>>> /* Check the signature on the key if it appears to be self-signed */
>>> if (!cert->authority ||
>>> - strcmp(cert->fingerprint, cert->authority) == 0) {
>>> + asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->skid, cert->authority)) {
>>> ret = x509_check_signature(cert->pub, cert); /* self-signed */
>>> if (ret < 0)
>>> goto error_free_cert;
>>> @@ -273,31 +270,47 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
>>>
>>> /* Propose a description */
>>> sulen = strlen(cert->subject);
>>> - srlen = strlen(cert->fingerprint);
>>> + srlen = cert->raw_serial_size;
>>> + q = cert->raw_serial;
>>> + if (srlen > 1 && *q == 0) {
>>> + srlen--;
>>> + q++;
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> ret = -ENOMEM;
>>> - desc = kmalloc(sulen + 2 + srlen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
>>> + desc = kmalloc(sulen + 2 + srlen * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
>>> if (!desc)
>>> goto error_free_cert;
>>> - memcpy(desc, cert->subject, sulen);
>>> - desc[sulen] = ':';
>>> - desc[sulen + 1] = ' ';
>>> - memcpy(desc + sulen + 2, cert->fingerprint, srlen);
>>> - desc[sulen + 2 + srlen] = 0;
>>> + p = memcpy(desc, cert->subject, sulen);
>>> + p += sulen;
>>> + *p++ = ':';
>>> + *p++ = ' ';
>>> + p = bin2hex(p, q, srlen);
>>> + *p = 0;
>>> +
>>> + kids = kmalloc(sizeof(struct asymmetric_key_ids), GFP_KERNEL);
>>> + if (!kids)
>>> + goto error_free_desc;
>>> + kids->id[0] = cert->id;
>>> + kids->id[1] = cert->skid;
>>>
>>> /* We're pinning the module by being linked against it */
>>> __module_get(public_key_subtype.owner);
>>> prep->type_data[0] = &public_key_subtype;
>>> - prep->type_data[1] = cert->fingerprint;
>>> + prep->type_data[1] = kids;
>>> prep->payload[0] = cert->pub;
>>> prep->description = desc;
>>> prep->quotalen = 100;
>>>
>>> /* We've finished with the certificate */
>>> cert->pub = NULL;
>>> - cert->fingerprint = NULL;
>>> + cert->id = NULL;
>>> + cert->skid = NULL;
>>> desc = NULL;
>>> ret = 0;
>>>
>>> +error_free_desc:
>>> + kfree(desc);
>>> error_free_cert:
>>> x509_free_certificate(cert);
>>> return ret;
>>> diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
>>> index 0d164c6af539..fa73a6fd536c 100644
>>> --- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
>>> +++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
>>> @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
>>> #define _LINUX_PUBLIC_KEY_H
>>>
>>> #include <linux/mpi.h>
>>> +#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
>>> #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
>>>
>>> enum pkey_algo {
>>> @@ -98,8 +99,8 @@ struct key;
>>> extern int verify_signature(const struct key *key,
>>> const struct public_key_signature *sig);
>>>
>>> +struct asymmetric_key_id;
>>> extern struct key *x509_request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring,
>>> - const char *issuer,
>>> - const char *key_id);
>>> + const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid);
>>>
>>> #endif /* _LINUX_PUBLIC_KEY_H */
>>>
>>> --
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>>> the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
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>>>
>> --
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>
> --
> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
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--
Thanks,
Dmitry
--
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