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Message-ID: <CALCETrUtwbw8LKxaO6AeOAJTNEkjDh7faXFTi85J99y=x9P3fA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 08:37:59 -0700
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc: Valdis Kletnieks <Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Paul Mackerras <paulus@...ba.org>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...nel.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
Erik Bosman <ebn310@....vu.nl>
Subject: Re: [RFC 5/5] x86,perf: Only allow rdpmc if a perf_event is mapped
On Thu, Oct 16, 2014 at 1:42 AM, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org> wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 14, 2014 at 03:57:39PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> We currently allow any process to use rdpmc. This significantly
>> weakens the protection offered by PR_TSC_DISABLED, and it could be
>> helpful to users attempting to exploit timing attacks.
>>
>> Since we can't enable access to individual counters, use a very
>> coarse heuristic to limit access to rdpmc: allow access only when
>> a perf_event is mmapped. This protects seccomp sandboxes.
>>
>> There is plenty of room to further tighen these restrictions. For
>> example, on x86, *all* perf_event mappings set cap_user_rdpmc. This
>> should probably be changed to only apply to perf_events that are
>> accessible using rdpmc.
>
> So I suppose this patch is a little over engineered,
:) I won't argue.
>
>> @@ -1852,10 +1865,26 @@ static ssize_t set_attr_rdpmc(struct device *cdev,
>> if (x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc_broken)
>> return -ENOTSUPP;
>>
>> + mutex_lock(&rdpmc_enable_mutex);
>> if (!!val != !!x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc) {
>> - x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc = !!val;
>> - on_each_cpu(change_rdpmc, (void *)val, 1);
>> + if (val) {
>> + static_key_slow_inc(&rdpmc_enabled);
>> + on_each_cpu(refresh_pce, NULL, 1);
>> + smp_wmb();
>> + x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc = 1;
>> + } else {
>> + /*
>> + * This direction can race against existing
>> + * rdpmc-capable mappings. Try our best regardless.
>> + */
>> + x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc = 0;
>> + smp_wmb();
>> + static_key_slow_dec(&rdpmc_enabled);
>> + WARN_ON(static_key_true(&rdpmc_enabled));
>> + on_each_cpu(refresh_pce, NULL, 1);
>> + }
>> }
>> + mutex_unlock(&rdpmc_enable_mutex);
>>
>> return count;
>> }
>
> why do you care about that rdpmc_enabled static key thing? Also you
> should not expose static key control to userspace like this, they can
> totally wreck the system. At the very least it should be
> static_key_slow_dec_deferred() -- gawd I hate the static_key API.
This particular control is only available to root, so I don't think it
matters too much. I did it this way to avoid hitting an extra dcache
line on every switch_mm.
A nicer solution might be to track whether rdpmc is allowed for each
perf_event and to count the number that allow rdpmc. That would cause
'echo 0 > rdpmc' to only work for new perf_events, but it fixes a
race.
Doing this will require passing more info to
arch_perf_update_userpage, I think. Should I do that? It'll probably
get a better result, but this patchset will get even longer and even
more overengineered.
--Andy
--
Andy Lutomirski
AMA Capital Management, LLC
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