linux-kernel - Re: [fuse-devel] [PATCH v4 4/5] fuse: Support privileged xattrs only with a mount option

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Date:	Thu, 23 Oct 2014 16:24:51 -0500
From:	Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@...onical.com>
To:	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Cc:	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	"Serge H. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@...ntu.com>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
	Michael j Theall <mtheall@...ibm.com>,
	Miklos Szeredi <miklos@...redi.hu>,
	Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
	fuse-devel@...ts.sourceforge.net
Subject: Re: [fuse-devel] [PATCH v4 4/5] fuse: Support privileged xattrs only
 with a mount option

On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 11:32:41AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Oct 21, 2014 9:59 PM, "Seth Forshee" <seth.forshee@...onical.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 02:27:13PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > > On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 2:21 PM, Seth Forshee
> > >
> > > >         return s;
> > > >
> > > >  fail:
> > > > diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c
> > > > index 64e83efb742d..383bb9f25555 100644
> > > > --- a/fs/xattr.c
> > > > +++ b/fs/xattr.c
> > > > @@ -40,6 +40,12 @@ xattr_permission(struct inode *inode, const char *name, int mask)
> > > >                         return -EPERM;
> > > >         }
> > > >
> > > > +       /* Restrict security.* and trusted.* to mounts from init_user_ns. */
> > > > +       if (inode->i_sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
> > > > +           (!strcmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN) ||
> > > > +            !strcmp(name, XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX, XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)))
> > > > +               return -EPERM;
> > > > +
> > >
> > > trusted.* should be fine already, I think -- it checks global
> > > capabilities.  And I still think that security.* should be left to
> > > LSMs, which IMO really do need to be fixed for user namespaces.
> > >
> > > But how does this help with FUSE at all?   Does FUSE end up calling
> > > xattr_permission?
> >
> > It gets called from vfs_getxattr, and thus for the getxattr syscall for
> > all fs types, so this would block reading any trusted.* xattrs from the
> > fuse userspace process.
> 
> Oh.  It seems weird to me that getxattr would get an error instead of
> FUSE being prevented from setting those attributes.
> 
> I'm still unconvinced that this is the right approach.  And anything
> that tries to use LSMs in a container will eventually want those
> attributes.

I suppose so. I'll have to think about this some more.

Thanks,
Seth
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