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Open Source and information security mailing list archives
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Date: Sun, 26 Oct 2014 11:16:10 -0700 From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard.weinberger@...il.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>, "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org> Subject: Re: vmalloced stacks on x86_64? On Sat, Oct 25, 2014 at 4:16 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> wrote: > > On brief inspection, grsecurity isn't actually vmallocing the stack. > It seems to be allocating it the normal way and then vmapping it. > That allows it to modify sg_set_buf to work on stack addresses (sigh). Perhaps more importantly, the vmalloc space is a limited resource (at least on 32-bit), and using vmap probably results in less fragmentation. I don't think either is really even an option on 32-bit due to the limited address space. On 64-bit, maybe a virtually remapped stack would be ok. Linus -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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