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Message-Id: <20141028033523.590411234@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2014 11:36:02 +0800
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Subject: [PATCH 3.10 04/43] fs: Add a missing permission check to do_umount
3.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
commit a1480dcc3c706e309a88884723446f2e84fedd5b upstream.
Accessing do_remount_sb should require global CAP_SYS_ADMIN, but
only one of the two call sites was appropriately protected.
Fixes CVE-2014-7975.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
fs/namespace.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -1274,6 +1274,8 @@ static int do_umount(struct mount *mnt,
* Special case for "unmounting" root ...
* we just try to remount it readonly.
*/
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
down_write(&sb->s_umount);
if (!(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY))
retval = do_remount_sb(sb, MS_RDONLY, NULL, 0);
--
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