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Message-ID: <alpine.DEB.2.11.1411012308490.5308@nanos>
Date: Sat, 1 Nov 2014 23:10:02 +0100 (CET)
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
cc: X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
"hillf.zj" <hillf.zj@...baba-inc.com>,
Vince Weaver <vince@...ter.net>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Paul Mackerras <paulus@...ba.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...nel.org>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
Valdis Kletnieks <Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 5/8] perf: Add pmu callbacks to track event mapping
and unmapping
On Sat, 1 Nov 2014, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Nov 1, 2014 1:39 PM, "Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@...utronix.de> wrote:
> > On Sat, 1 Nov 2014, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > > There's plenty of room to tighten up the restrictions further, but
> > > this is, I think, a decent first step, and it solves the problem of
> > > information leaking into seccomp sandboxes.
> >
> > In which way?
>
> All the performance counters were readable without using any syscalls.
> That leaks hints as to which events are in use, and it possibly leaks
> interesting side channel information. With this series applied, you
> need a at least mmap an rdpmc-able event, which most seccomp sandboxes
> won't allow.
Ok. So you are preventing the seccomp sandboxes to open/mmap a counter.
> Unfortunately, rdpmc access to counters can't be controlled
> individually, so it's hard to do all that much better than this.
Yeah, I know ...
Thanks,
tglx
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