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Message-ID: <CAHse=S9AGNF84cLYszPSM2q7-78+KfuTCoap7eYyMEcbx97Zyw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 17:37:37 +0000
From: David Drysdale <drysdale@...gle.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Meredydd Luff <meredydd@...atehouse.org>,
Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@...gle.com>,
Ricky Zhou <rickyz@...gle.com>,
Lee Campbell <leecam@...gle.com>,
Julien Tinnes <jln@...gle.com>,
Mike Depinet <mdepinet@...gle.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/3] fs: add O_BENEATH flag to openat(2)
On Mon, Nov 3, 2014 at 3:42 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 3, 2014 at 7:20 AM, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk> wrote:
>> On Mon, Nov 03, 2014 at 11:48:23AM +0000, David Drysdale wrote:
>>> Add a new O_BENEATH flag for openat(2) which restricts the
>>> provided path, rejecting (with -EACCES) paths that are not beneath
>>> the provided dfd. In particular, reject:
>>> - paths that contain .. components
>>> - paths that begin with /
>>> - symlinks that have paths as above.
>>
>> Yecch... The degree of usefulness aside (and I'm not convinced that it
>> is non-zero),
>
> This is extremely useful in conjunction with seccomp.
Yes, that was my understanding of how the Chrome[OS] folk wanted
to use it.
>> WTF pass one bit out of nameidata->flags in a separate argument?
I'll shift to using nd->flags; not sure what I was thinking of there.
(It *might* have made more sense in the full patchset this was extracted
from but it certainly doesn't look sensible in this narrower context.)
>> Through the mutual recursion, no less... And then you are not even attempting
>> to detect symlinks that are not followed by interpretation of _any_ pathname.
>
> How many symlinks like that are there? Is there anything except
> nd_jump_link users? All of those are in /proc. Arguably O_BENEATH
> should prevent traversal of all of those links.
>
> --Andy
On a quick search, the 2 users of nd_jump_link (namely proc_pid_follow_link
and proc_ns_follow_link) seem to be the only implementations of
inode_operations->follow_link that don't just call nd_set_link(). So
disallowing that for O_BENEATH might give sensible behaviour.
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