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Message-ID: <CALCETrW64-6xC6psP-8k0H-1GfVnWBTeEBNSrE_sH+-DFtuZQQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 15:15:50 -0800
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To: Aditya Kali <adityakali@...gle.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>, Li Zefan <lizefan@...wei.com>,
Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...ntu.com>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
cgroups@...r.kernel.org,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Linux Containers <containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org>,
Rohit Jnagal <jnagal@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCHv2 7/7] cgroup: mount cgroupns-root when inside non-init cgroupns
On Mon, Nov 3, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Aditya Kali <adityakali@...gle.com> wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 31, 2014 at 5:07 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> wrote:
>> On Fri, Oct 31, 2014 at 12:19 PM, Aditya Kali <adityakali@...gle.com> wrote:
>>> This patch enables cgroup mounting inside userns when a process
>>> as appropriate privileges. The cgroup filesystem mounted is
>>> rooted at the cgroupns-root. Thus, in a container-setup, only
>>> the hierarchy under the cgroupns-root is exposed inside the container.
>>> This allows container management tools to run inside the containers
>>> without depending on any global state.
>>> In order to support this, a new kernfs api is added to lookup the
>>> dentry for the cgroupns-root.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Aditya Kali <adityakali@...gle.com>
>>> ---
>>> fs/kernfs/mount.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>> include/linux/kernfs.h | 2 ++
>>> kernel/cgroup.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>>> 3 files changed, 95 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/fs/kernfs/mount.c b/fs/kernfs/mount.c
>>> index f973ae9..e334f45 100644
>>> --- a/fs/kernfs/mount.c
>>> +++ b/fs/kernfs/mount.c
>>> @@ -62,6 +62,54 @@ struct kernfs_root *kernfs_root_from_sb(struct super_block *sb)
>>> return NULL;
>>> }
>>>
>>> +/**
>>> + * kernfs_make_root - create new root dentry for the given kernfs_node.
>>> + * @sb: the kernfs super_block
>>> + * @kn: kernfs_node for which a dentry is needed
>>> + *
>>> + * This can used used by callers which want to mount only a part of the kernfs
>>> + * as root of the filesystem.
>>> + */
>>> +struct dentry *kernfs_obtain_root(struct super_block *sb,
>>> + struct kernfs_node *kn)
>>> +{
>>
>> I can't usefully review this, but kernfs_make_root and
>> kernfs_obtain_root aren't the same string...
>>
>>> diff --git a/kernel/cgroup.c b/kernel/cgroup.c
>>> index 7e5d597..250aaec 100644
>>> --- a/kernel/cgroup.c
>>> +++ b/kernel/cgroup.c
>>> @@ -1302,6 +1302,13 @@ static int parse_cgroupfs_options(char *data, struct cgroup_sb_opts *opts)
>>>
>>> memset(opts, 0, sizeof(*opts));
>>>
>>> + /* Implicitly add CGRP_ROOT_SANE_BEHAVIOR if inside a non-init cgroup
>>> + * namespace.
>>> + */
>>> + if (current->nsproxy->cgroup_ns != &init_cgroup_ns) {
>>> + opts->flags |= CGRP_ROOT_SANE_BEHAVIOR;
>>> + }
>>> +
>>
>> I don't like this implicit stuff. Can you just return -EINVAL if sane
>> behavior isn't requested?
>>
>
> I think the sane-behavior flag is only temporary and will be removed
> anyways, right? So I didn't bother asking user to supply it. But I can
> make the change as you suggested. We just have to make sure that tasks
> inside cgroupns cannot mount non-default hierarchies as it would be a
> regression.
>
>>> while ((token = strsep(&o, ",")) != NULL) {
>>> nr_opts++;
>>>
>>> @@ -1391,7 +1398,7 @@ static int parse_cgroupfs_options(char *data, struct cgroup_sb_opts *opts)
>>>
>>> if (opts->flags & CGRP_ROOT_SANE_BEHAVIOR) {
>>> pr_warn("sane_behavior: this is still under development and its behaviors will change, proceed at your own risk\n");
>>> - if (nr_opts != 1) {
>>> + if (nr_opts > 1) {
>>> pr_err("sane_behavior: no other mount options allowed\n");
>>> return -EINVAL;
>>
>> This looks wrong. But, if you make the change above, then it'll be right.
>>
>
> It would have been nice if simple 'mount -t cgroup cgroup <mnt>' from
> cgroupns does the right thing automatically.
>
This is a debatable point, but it's not what I meant. Won't your code
let 'mount -t cgroup -o one_evil_flag cgroup mountpoint' through?
>
>>> @@ -1685,6 +1701,14 @@ static struct dentry *cgroup_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
>>> int ret;
>>> int i;
>>> bool new_sb;
>>> + struct cgroup_namespace *ns =
>>> + get_cgroup_ns(current->nsproxy->cgroup_ns);
>>> +
>>> + /* Check if the caller has permission to mount. */
>>> + if (!ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
>>> + put_cgroup_ns(ns);
>>> + return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
>>> + }
>>
>> Why is this necessary?
>>
>
> Without this, if I unshare userns and mntns (but no cgroupns), I will
> be able to mount my parent's cgroupfs hierarchy. This is deviation
> from whats allowed today (i.e., today I can't mount cgroupfs even
> after unsharing userns & mntns). This check is there to prevent the
> unintended effect of cgroupns feature.
Oh, I get it. I misunderstood the code.
I guess this is reasonable. If it annoys anyone, it can be reverted
or weakened.
--Andy
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