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Message-ID: <CAHse=S8ZmYLkOb9hmOMPkvHabqXH1sCUBTJWVO-++PMJXES=sg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Nov 2014 17:21:48 +0000
From: David Drysdale <drysdale@...gle.com>
To: "Eric W.Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Meredydd Luff <meredydd@...atehouse.org>,
Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@...gle.com>,
Ricky Zhou <rickyz@...gle.com>,
Lee Campbell <leecam@...gle.com>,
Julien Tinnes <jln@...gle.com>,
Mike Depinet <mdepinet@...gle.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/3] fs: add O_BENEATH flag to openat(2)
On Tue, Nov 4, 2014 at 9:40 AM, David Drysdale <drysdale@...gle.com> wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 3, 2014 at 5:22 PM, Eric W.Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com> wrote:
>> On November 3, 2014 7:42:58 AM PST, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> wrote:
>>>On Mon, Nov 3, 2014 at 7:20 AM, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
>>>wrote:
>>>> On Mon, Nov 03, 2014 at 11:48:23AM +0000, David Drysdale wrote:
>>>>> Add a new O_BENEATH flag for openat(2) which restricts the
>>>>> provided path, rejecting (with -EACCES) paths that are not beneath
>>>>> the provided dfd. In particular, reject:
>>>>> - paths that contain .. components
>>>>> - paths that begin with /
>>>>> - symlinks that have paths as above.
>>>>
>>>> Yecch... The degree of usefulness aside (and I'm not convinced that
>>>it
>>>> is non-zero),
>>>
>>>This is extremely useful in conjunction with seccomp.
>>>
>>>> WTF pass one bit out of nameidata->flags in a separate argument?
>>>> Through the mutual recursion, no less... And then you are not even
>>>attempting
>>>> to detect symlinks that are not followed by interpretation of _any_
>>>pathname.
>>>
>>>How many symlinks like that are there? Is there anything except
>>>nd_jump_link users? All of those are in /proc. Arguably O_BENEATH
>>>should prevent traversal of all of those links.
>>
>> Not commenting on the sanity of this one way or another, and I haven't read the patch. There is an absolutely trivial implementation of this.
>>
>> After the path is resolved, walk backwards along d_parent and the mount tree, and see if you come to the file or directory dfd refers to.
>>
>> That can handle magic proc symlinks, and does not need to disallow .. or / explicitly so it should be much simpler code.
>>
>> My gut says that if Al says blech when looking at your code it is too complex to give you a security guarantee.
>>
>> Eric
>
> Well, the 'yecch' was deserved for the unnecessary duplication of the
> flags. Without that, the patch looks much simpler -- I'll send out a v2
> with those changes for discussion, and think about your alternative
> implementation suggestion (thanks!) separately.
One concern with the "walk upwards and see if you get back where you
started" approach -- it will allow use of a symlink that lives outside the
original directory, but which points back inside it. That's going to be
slightly surprising behaviour for users, and I worry that there's the
potential for unexpected information leakage from it.
(BTW, size-wise my initial naive implementation of the walk-upward
approach is only marginally smaller than the v2 patch.)
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