linux-kernel - RE: [RFC PATCH] x86, entry: Switch stacks on a paranoid entry from userspace

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Message-ID: <3908561D78D1C84285E8C5FCA982C28F3292A157@ORSMSX114.amr.corp.intel.com>
Date:	Wed, 12 Nov 2014 01:06:06 +0000
From:	"Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@...el.com>
To:	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
CC:	Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
	Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>
Subject: RE: [RFC PATCH] x86, entry: Switch stacks on a paranoid entry from
 userspace

> I've thought about one sneaky option.  If we can reliably determine
> that we're an innocent bystander of a broadcast #MC, can we send an
> IPI-to-self and return without clearing MCIP?  Then we get another
> interrupt as soon as interrupts are enabled, and we can clear MCIP at
> a time when we're definitely not running on the IST stack.

Innocent bystanders have RIPV=1, EIPV=0 in MCG_STATUS ... so they
are quite easy to spot.  Perhaps we might look at subverting the silly
broadcast by just having them immediately clear MCG_STATUS and iret
(i.e. not go to do_machine_check() at all).  That would require lots of
surgery to do_machine_check() and friends - now it wouldn't be sure
how many processors to expect to show up.  It also opens a different
window - once they are back running normal code they might trip another
machine check while the victims of the first are still processing - so
another "boom, you're dead".  The advantage of hitting everyone
with the machine check is that it lessens the chance that another will
happen as everyone is running looking at a few pages of kernel code
& data.

The worrying part in that is "as soon as interrupts are enabled". Until
we do clear MCIP we're sitting in a mode where another machine check
means instant death no saving throw.  Nominally better than the "we'll
mess the stack up for you" that we are trying to avoid - but the old window
is quite short and known to be bounded. The new one might be a lot bigger.

-Tony