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Date:	Fri, 14 Nov 2014 12:19:11 -0500
From:	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>
To:	Petr Mladek <pmladek@...e.cz>
Cc:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 13/23 v4] tracing: Create seq_buf layer in
 trace_seq

On Fri, 14 Nov 2014 17:26:52 +0100
Petr Mladek <pmladek@...e.cz> wrote:

> On Thu 2014-11-13 20:12:57, Steven Rostedt wrote:
> > From: "Steven Rostedt (Red Hat)" <rostedt@...dmis.org>
> > 
> > Create a seq_buf layer that trace_seq sits on. The seq_buf will not
> > be limited to page size. This will allow other usages of seq_buf
> > instead of a hard set PAGE_SIZE one that trace_seq has.
> > 
> > Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141104160221.864997179@goodmis.org
> > 
> > Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>
> > Acked-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>
> > Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>
> > ---
> >  include/linux/seq_buf.h              |  81 +++++++++
> >  include/linux/trace_seq.h            |  12 +-
> >  kernel/trace/Makefile                |   1 +
> >  kernel/trace/seq_buf.c               | 341 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  kernel/trace/trace.c                 |  39 ++--
> >  kernel/trace/trace_events.c          |   6 +-
> >  kernel/trace/trace_functions_graph.c |   6 +-
> >  kernel/trace/trace_seq.c             | 172 +++++++++---------
> >  8 files changed, 538 insertions(+), 120 deletions(-)
> >  create mode 100644 include/linux/seq_buf.h
> >  create mode 100644 kernel/trace/seq_buf.c
> > 
> > diff --git a/kernel/trace/seq_buf.c b/kernel/trace/seq_buf.c
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..e9a7861595d2
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/kernel/trace/seq_buf.c
> [...]
> > +/**
> > + * seq_buf_to_user - copy the squence buffer to user space
> > + * @s: seq_buf descriptor
> > + * @ubuf: The userspace memory location to copy to
> > + * @cnt: The amount to copy
> > + *
> > + * Copies the sequence buffer into the userspace memory pointed to
> > + * by @ubuf. It starts from the last read position (@s->readpos)
> > + * and writes up to @cnt characters or till it reaches the end of
> > + * the content in the buffer (@s->len), which ever comes first.
> > + *
> > + * On success, it returns a positive number of the number of bytes
> > + * it copied.
> > + *
> > + * On failure it returns -EBUSY if all of the content in the
> > + * sequence has been already read, which includes nothing in the
> > + * sequence (@s->len == @s->readpos).
> > + *
> > + * Returns -EFAULT if the copy to userspace fails.
> > + */
> > +int seq_buf_to_user(struct seq_buf *s, char __user *ubuf, int cnt)
> > +{
> > +	int len;
> > +	int ret;
> > +
> > +	if (!cnt)
> > +		return 0;
> > +
> > +	if (s->len <= s->readpos)
> > +		return -EBUSY;
> 
> Ah, we should add here:
> 
> 	if (seq_buf_has_overflowed(s))
> 		return -EINVAL;
> 
> It will be especially important after appyling "[RFC][PATCH 17/23 v4]
> tracing: Have seq_buf use full buffer".
> 
> The patch will make "seq.len = seq.size + 1" when there is an
>  overflow. It could cause overflow in the following copy_to_user().
> 
> It is pity that I have not realized this in the earlier review.
> Ach, it was OK in this patch.

Actually, I wouldn't use -EINVAL but instead use the seq_buf_used()
helper function:

	len = seq_buf_used(s);

> 
> > +	len = s->len - s->readpos;
> > +	if (cnt > len)
> > +		cnt = len;
> > +	ret = copy_to_user(ubuf, s->buffer + s->readpos, cnt);
> > +	if (ret == cnt)
> > +		return -EFAULT;
> > +
> > +	cnt -= ret;
> > +
> > +	s->readpos += cnt;
> > +	return cnt;
> > +}
> > diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace.c b/kernel/trace/trace.c
> > index f5a435a6e8fb..dd43a0d3843a 100644
> > --- a/kernel/trace/trace.c
> > +++ b/kernel/trace/trace.c
> > @@ -938,19 +938,20 @@ out:
> >  	return ret;
> >  }
> >  
> > +/* TODO add a seq_buf_to_buffer() */
> >  static ssize_t trace_seq_to_buffer(struct trace_seq *s, void *buf, size_t cnt)
> >  {
> >  	int len;
> >  
> > -	if (s->len <= s->readpos)
> > +	if (s->seq.len <= s->seq.readpos)
> >  		return -EBUSY;
> >  
> > -	len = s->len - s->readpos;
> > +	len = s->seq.len - s->seq.readpos;
> 
> Similar problem is here. if (seq.len = seq.size + 1) the
> following memcpy might access outside of the buffer.
> 
> I am afraid that we need to get rid of all direct uses
> of seq.len outside of the seq_buf implemetation.

Yep, I agree. The seq_buf_used() should be used instead.

> 
> >  	if (cnt > len)
> >  		cnt = len;
> > -	memcpy(buf, s->buffer + s->readpos, cnt);
> > +	memcpy(buf, s->buffer + s->seq.readpos, cnt);
> >  
> > -	s->readpos += cnt;
> > +	s->seq.readpos += cnt;
> >  	return cnt;
> >  }
> >  
> > @@ -4314,6 +4315,8 @@ static int tracing_open_pipe(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
> >  		goto out;
> >  	}
> >  
> > +	trace_seq_init(&iter->seq);
> > +
> >  	/*
> >  	 * We make a copy of the current tracer to avoid concurrent
> >  	 * changes on it while we are reading.
> > @@ -4510,18 +4513,18 @@ waitagain:
> >  	trace_access_lock(iter->cpu_file);
> >  	while (trace_find_next_entry_inc(iter) != NULL) {
> >  		enum print_line_t ret;
> > -		int len = iter->seq.len;
> > +		int len = iter->seq.seq.len;
> >  
> >  		ret = print_trace_line(iter);
> >  		if (ret == TRACE_TYPE_PARTIAL_LINE) {
> >  			/* don't print partial lines */
> > -			iter->seq.len = len;
> > +			iter->seq.seq.len = len;
> 
> It is fine here because it just restore the original value but...

but?

> 
> >  			break;
> >  		}
> >  		if (ret != TRACE_TYPE_NO_CONSUME)
> >  			trace_consume(iter);
> >  
> > -		if (iter->seq.len >= cnt)
> > +		if (iter->seq.seq.len >= cnt)
> >  			break;
> >  
> >  		/*
> > @@ -4537,7 +4540,7 @@ waitagain:
> >  
> >  	/* Now copy what we have to the user */
> >  	sret = trace_seq_to_user(&iter->seq, ubuf, cnt);
> > -	if (iter->seq.readpos >= iter->seq.len)
> > +	if (iter->seq.seq.readpos >= iter->seq.seq.len)
> >  		trace_seq_init(&iter->seq);
> >  
> >  	/*
> > @@ -4575,16 +4578,16 @@ tracing_fill_pipe_page(size_t rem, struct trace_iterator *iter)
> >  
> >  	/* Seq buffer is page-sized, exactly what we need. */
> >  	for (;;) {
> > -		count = iter->seq.len;
> > +		count = iter->seq.seq.len;
> >  		ret = print_trace_line(iter);
> > -		count = iter->seq.len - count;
> > +		count = iter->seq.seq.len - count;
> 
> this looks safe as well;

This should use the seq_buf_used() as well.

> 
> >  		if (rem < count) {
> >  			rem = 0;
> > -			iter->seq.len -= count;
> > +			iter->seq.seq.len -= count;
> >  			break;
> >  		}
> >  		if (ret == TRACE_TYPE_PARTIAL_LINE) {
> > -			iter->seq.len -= count;
> > +			iter->seq.seq.len -= count;
> >  			break;
> >  		}
> >  
> > @@ -4665,13 +4668,13 @@ static ssize_t tracing_splice_read_pipe(struct file *filp,
> >  		/* Copy the data into the page, so we can start over. */
> >  		ret = trace_seq_to_buffer(&iter->seq,
> >  					  page_address(spd.pages[i]),
> > -					  iter->seq.len);
> > +					  iter->seq.seq.len);
> >  		if (ret < 0) {
> >  			__free_page(spd.pages[i]);
> >  			break;
> >  		}
> >  		spd.partial[i].offset = 0;
> > -		spd.partial[i].len = iter->seq.len;
> > +		spd.partial[i].len = iter->seq.seq.len;
> >  
> >  		trace_seq_init(&iter->seq);
> >  	}
> > @@ -5672,7 +5675,7 @@ tracing_stats_read(struct file *filp, char __user *ubuf,
> >  	cnt = ring_buffer_read_events_cpu(trace_buf->buffer, cpu);
> >  	trace_seq_printf(s, "read events: %ld\n", cnt);
> >  
> > -	count = simple_read_from_buffer(ubuf, count, ppos, s->buffer, s->len);
> > +	count = simple_read_from_buffer(ubuf, count, ppos, s->buffer, s->seq.len);
> 
> but this looks dangerous.

Agreed.

> 
> >  	kfree(s);
> >  
> > @@ -6635,11 +6638,11 @@ void
> >  trace_printk_seq(struct trace_seq *s)
> >  {
> >  	/* Probably should print a warning here. */
> > -	if (s->len >= TRACE_MAX_PRINT)
> > -		s->len = TRACE_MAX_PRINT;
> > +	if (s->seq.len >= TRACE_MAX_PRINT)
> > +		s->seq.len = TRACE_MAX_PRINT;
> 
> looks safe

Yeah.

> 
> 
> >  	/* should be zero ended, but we are paranoid. */
> > -	s->buffer[s->len] = 0;
> > +	s->buffer[s->seq.len] = 0;
> >  
> >  	printk(KERN_TRACE "%s", s->buffer);
> >  
> > diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_events.c b/kernel/trace/trace_events.c
> > index 0cc51edde3a8..33525bf6cbf5 100644
> > --- a/kernel/trace/trace_events.c
> > +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events.c
> > @@ -1044,7 +1044,7 @@ event_filter_read(struct file *filp, char __user *ubuf, size_t cnt,
> >  	mutex_unlock(&event_mutex);
> >  
> >  	if (file)
> > -		r = simple_read_from_buffer(ubuf, cnt, ppos, s->buffer, s->len);
> > +		r = simple_read_from_buffer(ubuf, cnt, ppos, s->buffer, s->seq.len);
> 
> dangerous...

Agreed.

> 
> [...]
> 
> > diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_seq.c b/kernel/trace/trace_seq.c
> > index e54c0a1fb3f0..3c63b619d6b7 100644
> > --- a/kernel/trace/trace_seq.c
> > +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_seq.c
> [...]
> > @@ -72,24 +82,24 @@ int trace_print_seq(struct seq_file *m, struct trace_seq *s)
> >   */
> >  void trace_seq_printf(struct trace_seq *s, const char *fmt, ...)
> >  {
> > -	unsigned int len = TRACE_SEQ_BUF_LEFT(s);
> > +	unsigned int save_len = s->seq.len;
> >  	va_list ap;
> > -	int ret;
> >  
> > -	if (s->full || !len)
> > +	if (s->full)
> >  		return;
> >  
> > +	__trace_seq_init(s);
> > +
> >  	va_start(ap, fmt);
> > -	ret = vsnprintf(s->buffer + s->len, len, fmt, ap);
> > +	seq_buf_vprintf(&s->seq, fmt, ap);
> >  	va_end(ap);
> >  
> >  	/* If we can't write it all, don't bother writing anything */
> > -	if (ret >= len) {
> > +	if (unlikely(seq_buf_has_overflowed(&s->seq))) {
> > +		s->seq.len = save_len;
> >  		s->full = 1;
> >  		return;
> 
> The return is redundant here.

Heh, yep. Doing a lot of rather trivial updates makes one do stupid
things like this.

> 
> >  	}
> > -
> > -	s->len += ret;
> >  }
> >  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(trace_seq_printf);
> >  
> > @@ -104,14 +114,19 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(trace_seq_printf);
> >  void trace_seq_bitmask(struct trace_seq *s, const unsigned long *maskp,
> >  		      int nmaskbits)
> >  {
> > -	unsigned int len = TRACE_SEQ_BUF_LEFT(s);
> > -	int ret;
> > +	unsigned int save_len = s->seq.len;
> >  
> > -	if (s->full || !len)
> > +	if (s->full)
> >  		return;
> >  
> > -	ret = bitmap_scnprintf(s->buffer + s->len, len, maskp, nmaskbits);
> > -	s->len += ret;
> > +	__trace_seq_init(s);
> > +
> > +	seq_buf_bitmask(&s->seq, maskp, nmaskbits);
> > +
> > +	if (unlikely(seq_buf_has_overflowed(&s->seq))) {
> > +		s->seq.len = save_len;
> > +		s->full = 1;
> > +	}
> >  }
> >  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(trace_seq_bitmask);
> >  
> > @@ -128,21 +143,22 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(trace_seq_bitmask);
> >   */
> >  void trace_seq_vprintf(struct trace_seq *s, const char *fmt, va_list args)
> >  {
> > -	unsigned int len = TRACE_SEQ_BUF_LEFT(s);
> > +	unsigned int save_len = s->seq.len;
> >  	int ret;
> >  
> > -	if (s->full || !len)
> > +	if (s->full)
> >  		return;
> >  
> > -	ret = vsnprintf(s->buffer + s->len, len, fmt, args);
> > +	__trace_seq_init(s);
> > +
> > +	ret = seq_buf_vprintf(&s->seq, fmt, args);
> 
> The ret value is not used.

Yep, I'll nuke it.

> 
> >  	/* If we can't write it all, don't bother writing anything */
> > -	if (ret >= len) {
> > +	if (unlikely(seq_buf_has_overflowed(&s->seq))) {
> > +		s->seq.len = save_len;
> >  		s->full = 1;
> >  		return;
> 
> The return is redundant.

Yep, Just missed it.

> 
> The above mentioned potential overflows happen only if
> we apply "[RFC][PATCH 17/23 v4]
> tracing: Have seq_buf use full buffer". The code is safe
> at this stage. The other problems are minor.
> 
> If you decide to address the potential overflows in another
> patch, feel free to add to this one:

Yeah, I'll do that after the seq_buf_used() is introduced.

> 
> Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@...e.cz>

Thanks!

-- Steve

> 
> Best Regards,
> Petr

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