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Message-ID: <547B8731.90305@nod.at>
Date: Sun, 30 Nov 2014 22:08:01 +0100
From: Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>
To: Dave Chinner <david@...morbit.com>
CC: x86@...nel.org, tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com,
hpa@...or.com, gregkh@...uxfoundation.org,
rafael.j.wysocki@...el.com, pebolle@...cali.nl,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86: defconfig: Enable CONFIG_FHANDLE
Am 30.11.2014 um 21:54 schrieb Dave Chinner:
> On Wed, Nov 26, 2014 at 12:36:52AM +0100, Richard Weinberger wrote:
>> systemd has a hard dependency on CONFIG_FHANDLE.
>> If you run systemd with CONFIG_FHANDLE=n it will somehow
>> boot but fail to spawn a getty or other basic services.
>> As systemd is now used by most x86 distributions it
>> makes sense to enabled this by default and save kernel
>> hackers a lot of value debugging time.
>
> The bigger question to me is this: why does systemd need to
> store/open by handle rather than just opening paths directly when
> needed? This interface is intended for stable, pathless access to
> inodes across unmount/mount contexts (e.g. userspace NFS servers,
> filesystem backup programs, etc) so I'm curious as to the problem
> systemd is solving using this interface. I just can't see the
> problem being solved here, and why path based security checks on
> every open() aren't necessary...
Digging inter systemd source shows that they are using name_to_handle_at()
to get the mount id of a given path.
The actual struct file_handle result is always ignored.
Thanks,
//richard
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