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Message-ID: <CALCETrXyC7XPaqj6oe-TmyypOVc_CkZbF6UAAx8YfkyD=gEMOQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 13:05:07 -0800
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Cc: Linux Containers <containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org>,
Josh Triplett <josh@...htriplett.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Michael Kerrisk-manpages <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-man <linux-man@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
LSM <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>,
Kenton Varda <kenton@...dstorm.io>,
stable <stable@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [CFT][PATCH 2/3] userns: Add a knob to disable setgroups on a per
user namespace basis
On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 12:28 PM, Eric W. Biederman
<ebiederm@...ssion.com> wrote:
>
> - Expose the knob to user space through a proc file /proc/<pid>/setgroups
Can you rename this to something clearer, e.g. userns_setgroups_mode?
>
> A value of 0 means the setgroups system call is disabled in the
> current processes user namespace and can not be enabled in the
> future in this user namespace.
>
> A value of 1 means the segtoups system call is enabled.
Would it make more sense to put strings like "allow" and "deny" in
here? That way, future extensions could add additional values.
> diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/compat_linux.c b/arch/s390/kernel/compat_linux.c
> index 21c91feeca2d..6d0ee1b089fb 100644
> --- a/arch/s390/kernel/compat_linux.c
> +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/compat_linux.c
> @@ -252,6 +252,7 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(s390_setgroups16, int, gidsetsize, u16 __user *, grouplis
> int retval;
>
> if (!gid_mapping_possible(user_ns) ||
> + !atomic_read(&user_ns->setgroups_allowed) ||
> !capable(CAP_SETGID))
> return -EPERM;
This is now incomprehensible because of the gid_mapping_possible
thing. If you renamed gid_mapping_possible to
userns_setgroup_allowed, then this could be added to the
implementation, and this would all make sense (not to mention avoiding
duplicating this thing).
> @@ -826,6 +827,11 @@ static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file,
> kuid_t uid = make_kuid(ns->parent, id);
> if (uid_eq(uid, cred->euid))
> return true;
> + } else if (cap_setid == CAP_SETGID) {
> + kgid_t gid = make_kgid(ns->parent, id);
> + if (!atomic_read(&ns->setgroups_allowed) &&
> + gid_eq(gid, cred->egid))
> + return true;
I still don't see why egid is any better than fsgid here.
> }
> }
>
> @@ -844,6 +850,93 @@ static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file,
> return false;
> }
>
> +static void *setgroups_m_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *ppos)
> +{
> + struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
> +
> + return (*ppos == 0) ? ns : NULL;
> +}
> +
> +static void *setgroups_m_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *ppos)
> +{
> + ++*ppos;
> + return NULL;
> +}
> +
> +static void setgroups_m_stop(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
> +{
> +}
> +
> +static int setgroups_m_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
> +{
> + struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
> +
> + seq_printf(seq, "%u\n", atomic_read(&ns->setgroups_allowed));
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +const struct seq_operations proc_setgroups_seq_operations = {
> + .start = setgroups_m_start,
> + .stop = setgroups_m_stop,
> + .next = setgroups_m_next,
> + .show = setgroups_m_show,
> +};
> +
> +ssize_t proc_setgroups_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
> + size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
> +{
> + struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data;
> + struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
> + char kbuf[3];
> + int setgroups_allowed;
> + ssize_t ret;
> +
> + ret = -EPERM;
> + if (!file_ns_capable(file, ns, CAP_SETGID))
> + goto out;
CAP_SYS_ADMIN? This isn't setting a gid in the namespace; it's
reconfiguring the namespace.
> +
> + /* Only allow a very narrow range of strings to be written */
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + if ((*ppos != 0) || (count >= sizeof(kbuf)) || (count < 1))
> + goto out;
> +
> + /* What was written? */
> + ret = -EFAULT;
> + if (copy_from_user(kbuf, buf, count))
> + goto out;
> + kbuf[count] = '\0';
> +
> + /* What is being requested? */
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + if (kbuf[0] == '0')
> + setgroups_allowed = 0;
> + else if (kbuf[0] == '1')
> + setgroups_allowed = 1;
> + else
> + goto out;
> +
> + /* Allow a trailing newline */
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + if ((count == 2) && (kbuf[1] != '\n'))
> + goto out;
> +
> +
> + if (setgroups_allowed) {
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + if (atomic_read(&ns->setgroups_allowed) == 0)
> + goto out;
> + } else {
I would disallow this if gid_map has been written in the interest of sanity.
> + atomic_set(&ns->setgroups_allowed, 0);
> + /* sigh memory barriers! */
I don't think that any barriers are needed. If you ever observe
setgroups_allowed == 0, it will stay that way forever.
> + }
> +
> + /* Report a successful write */
> + *ppos = count;
> + ret = count;
> +out:
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> static void *userns_get(struct task_struct *task)
> {
> struct user_namespace *user_ns;
--Andy
--
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