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Message-ID: <1418668613.4200.4@mail.thefacebook.com>
Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 13:36:53 -0500
From: Chris Mason <clm@...com>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>, Shaohua Li <shli@...com>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>, <kernel-team@...com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/3] X86: Add a thread cpu time implementation to vDSO
On Thu, Dec 11, 2014 at 1:36 AM, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org> wrote:
>
> * Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Dec 10, 2014 at 2:56 PM, Shaohua Li <shli@...com> wrote:
>> > On Wed, Dec 10, 2014 at 02:13:23PM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> >> On Wed, Dec 10, 2014 at 1:57 PM, Shaohua Li <shli@...com> wrote:
>> >> > On Wed, Dec 10, 2014 at 11:10:52AM -0800, Andy Lutomirski
>> wrote:
>> >> >> On Sun, Dec 7, 2014 at 7:03 PM, Shaohua Li <shli@...com>
>> wrote:
>> >> >> > This primarily speeds up
>> clock_gettime(CLOCK_THREAD_CPUTIME_ID, ..). We
>> >> >> > use the following method to compute the thread cpu time:
>> >> >>
>> >> >> I like the idea, and I like making this type of profiling
>> fast. I
>> >> >> don't love the implementation because it's an information
>> leak (maybe
>> >> >> we don't care) and it's ugly.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> The info leak could be fixed completely by having a
>> per-process array
>> >> >> instead of a global array. That's currently tricky without
>> wasting
>> >> >> memory, but it could be created on demand if we wanted to do
>> that,
>> >> >> once my vvar .fault patches go in (assuming they do -- I need
>> to ping
>> >> >> the linux-mm people).
>> >> >
>> >> > those info leak really doesn't matter.
>> >>
>> >> Why not?
>> >
>> > Ofcourse I can't make sure completely, but how could this
>> > info be used as attack?
>>
>> It may leak interesting timing info, even from cpus that are
>> outside your affinity mask / cpuset. I don't know how much
>> anyone actually cares.
>
> Finegraned timing information has been successfully used to
> recover secret keys (and sometimes even coarse timing
> information), so it can be a security issue in certain setups.
Trying to nail this down a little more clearly. Are you worried about
the context switch count being exported or the clock_gettime data?
-chris
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