linux-kernel - Re: [PATCHv7 0/3] Kernel Live Patching

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Message-ID: <20141217124058.GC2433@suse.cz>
Date:	Wed, 17 Dec 2014 13:40:58 +0100
From:	Vojtech Pavlik <vojtech@...e.cz>
To:	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>
Cc:	Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>, Seth Jennings <sjenning@...hat.com>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
	Petr Mladek <pmladek@...e.cz>, Miroslav Benes <mbenes@...e.cz>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
	Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@...achi.com>,
	live-patching@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org, kpatch@...hat.com,
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCHv7 0/3] Kernel Live Patching

On Wed, Dec 17, 2014 at 01:22:21PM +0530, Balbir Singh wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 17, 2014 at 12:16 PM, Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz> wrote:
> > On Wed, 17 Dec 2014, Balbir Singh wrote:
> >
> >> >> Could you describe what this does to signing? I presume the patched
> >> >> module should cause a taint on module signing?
> >> >
> >> > Hmm, why should it?
> >>
> >> I wanted to clarify it from a different perspective
> >>
> >> If the base image is signed by X and the patched module is signed by
> >> Y, is that supported. What does it imply in the case of live-patching?
> >
> > Why should that matter? Both are signed by keys that kernel is configured
> > to trust, which makes them equal (even though they are technically
> > different).
> >
> 
> I am not sure they are equal, others can comment

Since any loaded kernel module can do virtually anything on a machine,
there can only be one level of trust. As such, all trusted keys are
equally trusted.

-- 
Vojtech Pavlik
Director SUSE Labs
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