[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <1419908780.14143.75.camel@dhcp-9-2-203-236.watson.ibm.com>
Date: Mon, 29 Dec 2014 22:06:20 -0500
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: David Lang <david@...g.hm>
Cc: Rob Landley <rob@...dley.net>, Christophe Fillot <cf@....fr>,
linux-ima-user@...ts.sourceforge.net,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [Linux-ima-user] Initramfs and IMA Appraisal
On Mon, 2014-12-29 at 18:25 -0800, David Lang wrote:
> On Mon, 29 Dec 2014, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>
> > Thanks Rob for the explanation. The problem is that ramfs does not
> > support extended attributes, while tmpfs does. The boot loader could
> > "measure" (trusted boot) the initramfs, but as the initramfs is
> > generated on the target system, the initramfs is not signed, preventing
> > it from being appraised (secure Boot). To close the initramfs integrity
> > appraisal gap requires verifying the individual initramfs file
> > signatures, which are stored as extended attributes.
>
> what's the point of checking the files on the filesystem against signatures
> stored on the same filesystem? If someone could alter the file contents they can
> alter the signatures as well.
It's all about limiting which public keys can be used to verify the file
signatures. As of 3.17, only keys signed by a "trusted" key on the
system keyring may be added to the IMA keyring.
Mimi
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists