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Message-ID: <20150102224646.GB29018@amd>
Date: Fri, 2 Jan 2015 23:46:46 +0100
From: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
To: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@...hat.com>,
DaeSeok Youn <daeseok.youn@...il.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, vdavydov@...allels.com,
Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Brad Spengler <spender@...ecurity.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] [RFC] Deter exploit bruteforcing
On Fri 2015-01-02 23:32:35, Jiri Kosina wrote:
> On Fri, 2 Jan 2015, Pavel Machek wrote:
>
> > > > Can the slowdown be impelmented in glibc, then?
> > >
> > > glibc has a lot of asserts where it can detect stack smashing and kills the
> > > current process using abort(). Here it could of course also call
> > > sleep().
> >
> > Please do it in glibc, then.
>
> You also want to protect against binaries that are evil on purpose,
> right?
Umm. No. Not by default. We don't want to break crashme or trinity by
default.
We want to delay people trying to bruteforce glibc canaries. We want
to do it by default.
Pavel
--
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