[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-Id: <20150107021559.023627927@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Tue, 6 Jan 2015 18:16:10 -0800
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3.17 49/73] userns: Dont allow unprivileged creation of gid mappings
3.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
commit be7c6dba2332cef0677fbabb606e279ae76652c3 upstream.
As any gid mapping will allow and must allow for backwards
compatibility dropping groups don't allow any gid mappings to be
established without CAP_SETGID in the parent user namespace.
For a small class of applications this change breaks userspace
and removes useful functionality. This small class of applications
includes tools/testing/selftests/mount/unprivilged-remount-test.c
Most of the removed functionality will be added back with the addition
of a one way knob to disable setgroups. Once setgroups is disabled
setting the gid_map becomes as safe as setting the uid_map.
For more common applications that set the uid_map and the gid_map
with privilege this change will have no affect.
This is part of a fix for CVE-2014-8989.
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/user_namespace.c | 4 ----
1 file changed, 4 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
+++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
@@ -821,10 +821,6 @@ static bool new_idmap_permitted(const st
kuid_t uid = make_kuid(ns->parent, id);
if (uid_eq(uid, file->f_cred->fsuid))
return true;
- } else if (cap_setid == CAP_SETGID) {
- kgid_t gid = make_kgid(ns->parent, id);
- if (gid_eq(gid, file->f_cred->fsgid))
- return true;
}
}
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists