linux-kernel - Re: [RFC][PATCH 8/9] ima: include tmpfs in ima_appraise

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Message-ID: <CA+5PVA7QiaLpiH+7oWQ5Uu8Z30mPczou89_9ga1CnW6c+_cQWQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date:	Thu, 8 Jan 2015 08:53:46 -0500
From:	Josh Boyer <jwboyer@...oraproject.org>
To:	Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc:	initramfs <initramfs@...r.kernel.org>,
	Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
	linux-ima-devel@...ts.sourceforge.net,
	linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 8/9] ima: include tmpfs in ima_appraise_tcb policy

On Wed, Jan 7, 2015 at 3:52 PM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> Now that the rootfs includes extended attributes, don't
> automatically exclude tmpfs file systems from being appraised.
>
> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
> ---
>  security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c   | 1 +
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 ++
>  2 files changed, 3 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> index 9c71af7..e942e63 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
>  #include <linux/module.h>
>  #include <linux/crypto.h>
>  #include <linux/audit.h>
> +#include <linux/magic.h>
>  #include <linux/xattr.h>
>  #include <linux/integrity.h>
>  #include <linux/evm.h>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index d1eefb9..7267eac 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -93,7 +93,9 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = {
>         {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
>         {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
>         {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> +#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509
>         {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> +#endif

The commit log makes it sound like tmpfs should be appraised
unconditionally, but you only have it being appraised if IMA_LOAD_X509
is set.  Which is correct (and why isn't it based on whether
CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE is set)?

Also, what happens if someone creates an initramfs that doesn't
include xattrs and has this option set?

Slightly confusing.

josh
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