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Open Source and information security mailing list archives
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Date: Thu, 8 Jan 2015 14:12:24 -0800
From: Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
Cc: lwn@....net, Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>
Subject: Re: Linux 3.14.28
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 944db2356a7c..a2e572bfff7d 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
VERSION = 3
PATCHLEVEL = 14
-SUBLEVEL = 27
+SUBLEVEL = 28
EXTRAVERSION =
NAME = Remembering Coco
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/armada-370.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/armada-370.dtsi
index 0d8530c98cf5..34841fc1a977 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/armada-370.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/armada-370.dtsi
@@ -106,11 +106,6 @@
reg = <0x11100 0x20>;
};
- system-controller@...00 {
- compatible = "marvell,armada-370-xp-system-controller";
- reg = <0x18200 0x100>;
- };
-
pinctrl {
compatible = "marvell,mv88f6710-pinctrl";
reg = <0x18000 0x38>;
@@ -167,6 +162,11 @@
interrupts = <91>;
};
+ system-controller@...00 {
+ compatible = "marvell,armada-370-xp-system-controller";
+ reg = <0x18200 0x100>;
+ };
+
gateclk: clock-gating-control@...20 {
compatible = "marvell,armada-370-gating-clock";
reg = <0x18220 0x4>;
diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-tegra/reset-handler.S b/arch/arm/mach-tegra/reset-handler.S
index 8c1ba4fea384..350579961e78 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mach-tegra/reset-handler.S
+++ b/arch/arm/mach-tegra/reset-handler.S
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ ENTRY(tegra_resume)
THUMB( it ne )
bne cpu_resume @ no
+ tegra_get_soc_id TEGRA_APB_MISC_BASE, r6
/* Are we on Tegra20? */
cmp r6, #TEGRA20
beq 1f @ Yes
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/hwcap.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/hwcap.h
index 6cddbb0c9f54..e0ec201eaf56 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/hwcap.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/hwcap.h
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
#define COMPAT_HWCAP_IDIVA (1 << 17)
#define COMPAT_HWCAP_IDIVT (1 << 18)
#define COMPAT_HWCAP_IDIV (COMPAT_HWCAP_IDIVA|COMPAT_HWCAP_IDIVT)
+#define COMPAT_HWCAP_LPAE (1 << 20)
#define COMPAT_HWCAP_EVTSTRM (1 << 21)
#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c
index c8e9effe52e1..071c3822442b 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c
@@ -67,7 +67,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(elf_hwcap);
COMPAT_HWCAP_FAST_MULT|COMPAT_HWCAP_EDSP|\
COMPAT_HWCAP_TLS|COMPAT_HWCAP_VFP|\
COMPAT_HWCAP_VFPv3|COMPAT_HWCAP_VFPv4|\
- COMPAT_HWCAP_NEON|COMPAT_HWCAP_IDIV)
+ COMPAT_HWCAP_NEON|COMPAT_HWCAP_IDIV|\
+ COMPAT_HWCAP_LPAE)
unsigned int compat_elf_hwcap __read_mostly = COMPAT_ELF_HWCAP_DEFAULT;
#endif
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/compat_linux.c b/arch/s390/kernel/compat_linux.c
index db02052bd137..5426c9eb5114 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/compat_linux.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/compat_linux.c
@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys32_setgroups16(int gidsetsize, u16 __user *grouplist)
struct group_info *group_info;
int retval;
- if (!capable(CAP_SETGID))
+ if (!may_setgroups())
return -EPERM;
if ((unsigned)gidsetsize > NGROUPS_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/ldt.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/ldt.h
index 46727eb37bfe..6e1aaf73852a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/ldt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/ldt.h
@@ -28,6 +28,13 @@ struct user_desc {
unsigned int seg_not_present:1;
unsigned int useable:1;
#ifdef __x86_64__
+ /*
+ * Because this bit is not present in 32-bit user code, user
+ * programs can pass uninitialized values here. Therefore, in
+ * any context in which a user_desc comes from a 32-bit program,
+ * the kernel must act as though lm == 0, regardless of the
+ * actual value.
+ */
unsigned int lm:1;
#endif
};
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
index 713f1b3bad52..0b1e1d5dbc5b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
@@ -280,7 +280,14 @@ do_async_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
static void __init paravirt_ops_setup(void)
{
pv_info.name = "KVM";
- pv_info.paravirt_enabled = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * KVM isn't paravirt in the sense of paravirt_enabled. A KVM
+ * guest kernel works like a bare metal kernel with additional
+ * features, and paravirt_enabled is about features that are
+ * missing.
+ */
+ pv_info.paravirt_enabled = 0;
if (kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_NOP_IO_DELAY))
pv_cpu_ops.io_delay = kvm_io_delay;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
index e6041094ff26..c8e98cdc84c2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
@@ -263,7 +263,6 @@ void __init kvmclock_init(void)
#endif
kvm_get_preset_lpj();
clocksource_register_hz(&kvm_clock, NSEC_PER_SEC);
- pv_info.paravirt_enabled = 1;
pv_info.name = "KVM";
if (kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE_STABLE_BIT))
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
index 9c0280f93d05..e2d26ce9b854 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
@@ -286,24 +286,9 @@ __switch_to(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p)
fpu = switch_fpu_prepare(prev_p, next_p, cpu);
- /*
- * Reload esp0, LDT and the page table pointer:
- */
+ /* Reload esp0 and ss1. */
load_sp0(tss, next);
- /*
- * Switch DS and ES.
- * This won't pick up thread selector changes, but I guess that is ok.
- */
- savesegment(es, prev->es);
- if (unlikely(next->es | prev->es))
- loadsegment(es, next->es);
-
- savesegment(ds, prev->ds);
- if (unlikely(next->ds | prev->ds))
- loadsegment(ds, next->ds);
-
-
/* We must save %fs and %gs before load_TLS() because
* %fs and %gs may be cleared by load_TLS().
*
@@ -312,41 +297,101 @@ __switch_to(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p)
savesegment(fs, fsindex);
savesegment(gs, gsindex);
+ /*
+ * Load TLS before restoring any segments so that segment loads
+ * reference the correct GDT entries.
+ */
load_TLS(next, cpu);
/*
- * Leave lazy mode, flushing any hypercalls made here.
- * This must be done before restoring TLS segments so
- * the GDT and LDT are properly updated, and must be
- * done before math_state_restore, so the TS bit is up
- * to date.
+ * Leave lazy mode, flushing any hypercalls made here. This
+ * must be done after loading TLS entries in the GDT but before
+ * loading segments that might reference them, and and it must
+ * be done before math_state_restore, so the TS bit is up to
+ * date.
*/
arch_end_context_switch(next_p);
+ /* Switch DS and ES.
+ *
+ * Reading them only returns the selectors, but writing them (if
+ * nonzero) loads the full descriptor from the GDT or LDT. The
+ * LDT for next is loaded in switch_mm, and the GDT is loaded
+ * above.
+ *
+ * We therefore need to write new values to the segment
+ * registers on every context switch unless both the new and old
+ * values are zero.
+ *
+ * Note that we don't need to do anything for CS and SS, as
+ * those are saved and restored as part of pt_regs.
+ */
+ savesegment(es, prev->es);
+ if (unlikely(next->es | prev->es))
+ loadsegment(es, next->es);
+
+ savesegment(ds, prev->ds);
+ if (unlikely(next->ds | prev->ds))
+ loadsegment(ds, next->ds);
+
/*
* Switch FS and GS.
*
- * Segment register != 0 always requires a reload. Also
- * reload when it has changed. When prev process used 64bit
- * base always reload to avoid an information leak.
+ * These are even more complicated than FS and GS: they have
+ * 64-bit bases are that controlled by arch_prctl. Those bases
+ * only differ from the values in the GDT or LDT if the selector
+ * is 0.
+ *
+ * Loading the segment register resets the hidden base part of
+ * the register to 0 or the value from the GDT / LDT. If the
+ * next base address zero, writing 0 to the segment register is
+ * much faster than using wrmsr to explicitly zero the base.
+ *
+ * The thread_struct.fs and thread_struct.gs values are 0
+ * if the fs and gs bases respectively are not overridden
+ * from the values implied by fsindex and gsindex. They
+ * are nonzero, and store the nonzero base addresses, if
+ * the bases are overridden.
+ *
+ * (fs != 0 && fsindex != 0) || (gs != 0 && gsindex != 0) should
+ * be impossible.
+ *
+ * Therefore we need to reload the segment registers if either
+ * the old or new selector is nonzero, and we need to override
+ * the base address if next thread expects it to be overridden.
+ *
+ * This code is unnecessarily slow in the case where the old and
+ * new indexes are zero and the new base is nonzero -- it will
+ * unnecessarily write 0 to the selector before writing the new
+ * base address.
+ *
+ * Note: This all depends on arch_prctl being the only way that
+ * user code can override the segment base. Once wrfsbase and
+ * wrgsbase are enabled, most of this code will need to change.
*/
if (unlikely(fsindex | next->fsindex | prev->fs)) {
loadsegment(fs, next->fsindex);
+
/*
- * Check if the user used a selector != 0; if yes
- * clear 64bit base, since overloaded base is always
- * mapped to the Null selector
+ * If user code wrote a nonzero value to FS, then it also
+ * cleared the overridden base address.
+ *
+ * XXX: if user code wrote 0 to FS and cleared the base
+ * address itself, we won't notice and we'll incorrectly
+ * restore the prior base address next time we reschdule
+ * the process.
*/
if (fsindex)
prev->fs = 0;
}
- /* when next process has a 64bit base use it */
if (next->fs)
wrmsrl(MSR_FS_BASE, next->fs);
prev->fsindex = fsindex;
if (unlikely(gsindex | next->gsindex | prev->gs)) {
load_gs_index(next->gsindex);
+
+ /* This works (and fails) the same way as fsindex above. */
if (gsindex)
prev->gs = 0;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c
index f7fec09e3e3a..4e942f31b1a7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c
@@ -27,6 +27,37 @@ static int get_free_idx(void)
return -ESRCH;
}
+static bool tls_desc_okay(const struct user_desc *info)
+{
+ if (LDT_empty(info))
+ return true;
+
+ /*
+ * espfix is required for 16-bit data segments, but espfix
+ * only works for LDT segments.
+ */
+ if (!info->seg_32bit)
+ return false;
+
+ /* Only allow data segments in the TLS array. */
+ if (info->contents > 1)
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * Non-present segments with DPL 3 present an interesting attack
+ * surface. The kernel should handle such segments correctly,
+ * but TLS is very difficult to protect in a sandbox, so prevent
+ * such segments from being created.
+ *
+ * If userspace needs to remove a TLS entry, it can still delete
+ * it outright.
+ */
+ if (info->seg_not_present)
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
static void set_tls_desc(struct task_struct *p, int idx,
const struct user_desc *info, int n)
{
@@ -66,6 +97,9 @@ int do_set_thread_area(struct task_struct *p, int idx,
if (copy_from_user(&info, u_info, sizeof(info)))
return -EFAULT;
+ if (!tls_desc_okay(&info))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
if (idx == -1)
idx = info.entry_number;
@@ -192,6 +226,7 @@ int regset_tls_set(struct task_struct *target, const struct user_regset *regset,
{
struct user_desc infobuf[GDT_ENTRY_TLS_ENTRIES];
const struct user_desc *info;
+ int i;
if (pos >= GDT_ENTRY_TLS_ENTRIES * sizeof(struct user_desc) ||
(pos % sizeof(struct user_desc)) != 0 ||
@@ -205,6 +240,10 @@ int regset_tls_set(struct task_struct *target, const struct user_regset *regset,
else
info = infobuf;
+ for (i = 0; i < count / sizeof(struct user_desc); i++)
+ if (!tls_desc_okay(info + i))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
set_tls_desc(target,
GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN + (pos / sizeof(struct user_desc)),
info, count / sizeof(struct user_desc));
diff --git a/crypto/af_alg.c b/crypto/af_alg.c
index 6a3ad8011585..1de4beeb25f8 100644
--- a/crypto/af_alg.c
+++ b/crypto/af_alg.c
@@ -449,6 +449,9 @@ void af_alg_complete(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err)
{
struct af_alg_completion *completion = req->data;
+ if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
+ return;
+
completion->err = err;
complete(&completion->completion);
}
diff --git a/drivers/md/bitmap.c b/drivers/md/bitmap.c
index 4195a01b1535..8e51b3a3e7b9 100644
--- a/drivers/md/bitmap.c
+++ b/drivers/md/bitmap.c
@@ -883,7 +883,6 @@ void bitmap_unplug(struct bitmap *bitmap)
{
unsigned long i;
int dirty, need_write;
- int wait = 0;
if (!bitmap || !bitmap->storage.filemap ||
test_bit(BITMAP_STALE, &bitmap->flags))
@@ -901,16 +900,13 @@ void bitmap_unplug(struct bitmap *bitmap)
clear_page_attr(bitmap, i, BITMAP_PAGE_PENDING);
write_page(bitmap, bitmap->storage.filemap[i], 0);
}
- if (dirty)
- wait = 1;
- }
- if (wait) { /* if any writes were performed, we need to wait on them */
- if (bitmap->storage.file)
- wait_event(bitmap->write_wait,
- atomic_read(&bitmap->pending_writes)==0);
- else
- md_super_wait(bitmap->mddev);
}
+ if (bitmap->storage.file)
+ wait_event(bitmap->write_wait,
+ atomic_read(&bitmap->pending_writes)==0);
+ else
+ md_super_wait(bitmap->mddev);
+
if (test_bit(BITMAP_WRITE_ERROR, &bitmap->flags))
bitmap_file_kick(bitmap);
}
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-bufio.c b/drivers/md/dm-bufio.c
index a1cebf745b22..03c872fd5d5c 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-bufio.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-bufio.c
@@ -532,6 +532,19 @@ static void use_dmio(struct dm_buffer *b, int rw, sector_t block,
end_io(&b->bio, r);
}
+static void inline_endio(struct bio *bio, int error)
+{
+ bio_end_io_t *end_fn = bio->bi_private;
+
+ /*
+ * Reset the bio to free any attached resources
+ * (e.g. bio integrity profiles).
+ */
+ bio_reset(bio);
+
+ end_fn(bio, error);
+}
+
static void use_inline_bio(struct dm_buffer *b, int rw, sector_t block,
bio_end_io_t *end_io)
{
@@ -543,7 +556,12 @@ static void use_inline_bio(struct dm_buffer *b, int rw, sector_t block,
b->bio.bi_max_vecs = DM_BUFIO_INLINE_VECS;
b->bio.bi_iter.bi_sector = block << b->c->sectors_per_block_bits;
b->bio.bi_bdev = b->c->bdev;
- b->bio.bi_end_io = end_io;
+ b->bio.bi_end_io = inline_endio;
+ /*
+ * Use of .bi_private isn't a problem here because
+ * the dm_buffer's inline bio is local to bufio.
+ */
+ b->bio.bi_private = end_io;
/*
* We assume that if len >= PAGE_SIZE ptr is page-aligned.
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-cache-target.c b/drivers/md/dm-cache-target.c
index 2331543005b2..ff284b7a17bd 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-cache-target.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-cache-target.c
@@ -946,10 +946,14 @@ static void migration_success_post_commit(struct dm_cache_migration *mg)
}
} else {
- clear_dirty(cache, mg->new_oblock, mg->cblock);
- if (mg->requeue_holder)
+ if (mg->requeue_holder) {
+ clear_dirty(cache, mg->new_oblock, mg->cblock);
cell_defer(cache, mg->new_ocell, true);
- else {
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * The block was promoted via an overwrite, so it's dirty.
+ */
+ set_dirty(cache, mg->new_oblock, mg->cblock);
bio_endio(mg->new_ocell->holder, 0);
cell_defer(cache, mg->new_ocell, false);
}
@@ -1060,7 +1064,8 @@ static void issue_copy(struct dm_cache_migration *mg)
avoid = is_discarded_oblock(cache, mg->new_oblock);
- if (!avoid && bio_writes_complete_block(cache, bio)) {
+ if (writeback_mode(&cache->features) &&
+ !avoid && bio_writes_complete_block(cache, bio)) {
issue_overwrite(mg, bio);
return;
}
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
index 9533f835ce07..4a8d19d0a5a4 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
@@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ static int crypt_iv_tcw_whitening(struct crypt_config *cc,
for (i = 0; i < ((1 << SECTOR_SHIFT) / 8); i++)
crypto_xor(data + i * 8, buf, 8);
out:
- memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+ memzero_explicit(buf, sizeof(buf));
return r;
}
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-thin.c b/drivers/md/dm-thin.c
index 37f2648c112b..f7e052c7ab5f 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-thin.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-thin.c
@@ -916,6 +916,24 @@ static void schedule_zero(struct thin_c *tc, dm_block_t virt_block,
}
}
+static void set_pool_mode(struct pool *pool, enum pool_mode new_mode);
+
+static void check_for_space(struct pool *pool)
+{
+ int r;
+ dm_block_t nr_free;
+
+ if (get_pool_mode(pool) != PM_OUT_OF_DATA_SPACE)
+ return;
+
+ r = dm_pool_get_free_block_count(pool->pmd, &nr_free);
+ if (r)
+ return;
+
+ if (nr_free)
+ set_pool_mode(pool, PM_WRITE);
+}
+
/*
* A non-zero return indicates read_only or fail_io mode.
* Many callers don't care about the return value.
@@ -930,6 +948,8 @@ static int commit(struct pool *pool)
r = dm_pool_commit_metadata(pool->pmd);
if (r)
metadata_operation_failed(pool, "dm_pool_commit_metadata", r);
+ else
+ check_for_space(pool);
return r;
}
@@ -948,8 +968,6 @@ static void check_low_water_mark(struct pool *pool, dm_block_t free_blocks)
}
}
-static void set_pool_mode(struct pool *pool, enum pool_mode new_mode);
-
static int alloc_data_block(struct thin_c *tc, dm_block_t *result)
{
int r;
@@ -1592,7 +1610,7 @@ static void set_pool_mode(struct pool *pool, enum pool_mode new_mode)
pool->process_bio = process_bio_read_only;
pool->process_discard = process_discard;
pool->process_prepared_mapping = process_prepared_mapping;
- pool->process_prepared_discard = process_prepared_discard_passdown;
+ pool->process_prepared_discard = process_prepared_discard;
if (!pool->pf.error_if_no_space && no_space_timeout)
queue_delayed_work(pool->wq, &pool->no_space_timeout, no_space_timeout);
diff --git a/drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-space-map-metadata.c b/drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-space-map-metadata.c
index 786b689bdfc7..f4e22bcc7fb8 100644
--- a/drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-space-map-metadata.c
+++ b/drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-space-map-metadata.c
@@ -564,7 +564,9 @@ static int sm_bootstrap_get_nr_blocks(struct dm_space_map *sm, dm_block_t *count
{
struct sm_metadata *smm = container_of(sm, struct sm_metadata, sm);
- return smm->ll.nr_blocks;
+ *count = smm->ll.nr_blocks;
+
+ return 0;
}
static int sm_bootstrap_get_nr_free(struct dm_space_map *sm, dm_block_t *count)
diff --git a/drivers/mfd/tc6393xb.c b/drivers/mfd/tc6393xb.c
index 11c19e538551..48579e5ef02c 100644
--- a/drivers/mfd/tc6393xb.c
+++ b/drivers/mfd/tc6393xb.c
@@ -263,6 +263,17 @@ static int tc6393xb_ohci_disable(struct platform_device *dev)
return 0;
}
+static int tc6393xb_ohci_suspend(struct platform_device *dev)
+{
+ struct tc6393xb_platform_data *tcpd = dev_get_platdata(dev->dev.parent);
+
+ /* We can't properly store/restore OHCI state, so fail here */
+ if (tcpd->resume_restore)
+ return -EBUSY;
+
+ return tc6393xb_ohci_disable(dev);
+}
+
static int tc6393xb_fb_enable(struct platform_device *dev)
{
struct tc6393xb *tc6393xb = dev_get_drvdata(dev->dev.parent);
@@ -403,7 +414,7 @@ static struct mfd_cell tc6393xb_cells[] = {
.num_resources = ARRAY_SIZE(tc6393xb_ohci_resources),
.resources = tc6393xb_ohci_resources,
.enable = tc6393xb_ohci_enable,
- .suspend = tc6393xb_ohci_disable,
+ .suspend = tc6393xb_ohci_suspend,
.resume = tc6393xb_ohci_enable,
.disable = tc6393xb_ohci_disable,
},
diff --git a/drivers/mmc/card/block.c b/drivers/mmc/card/block.c
index 7b5424f398ac..df72c478c5a2 100644
--- a/drivers/mmc/card/block.c
+++ b/drivers/mmc/card/block.c
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ static ssize_t force_ro_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
int ret;
struct mmc_blk_data *md = mmc_blk_get(dev_to_disk(dev));
- ret = snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d",
+ ret = snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n",
get_disk_ro(dev_to_disk(dev)) ^
md->read_only);
mmc_blk_put(md);
diff --git a/drivers/mmc/host/dw_mmc.c b/drivers/mmc/host/dw_mmc.c
index 55cd110a49c4..caed9d53e8fa 100644
--- a/drivers/mmc/host/dw_mmc.c
+++ b/drivers/mmc/host/dw_mmc.c
@@ -632,6 +632,13 @@ static void dw_mci_ctrl_rd_thld(struct dw_mci *host, struct mmc_data *data)
WARN_ON(!(data->flags & MMC_DATA_READ));
+ /*
+ * CDTHRCTL doesn't exist prior to 240A (in fact that register offset is
+ * in the FIFO region, so we really shouldn't access it).
+ */
+ if (host->verid < DW_MMC_240A)
+ return;
+
if (host->timing != MMC_TIMING_MMC_HS200 &&
host->timing != MMC_TIMING_UHS_SDR104)
goto disable;
diff --git a/drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-pci-o2micro.c b/drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-pci-o2micro.c
index f49666bcc52a..257e9ca30166 100644
--- a/drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-pci-o2micro.c
+++ b/drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-pci-o2micro.c
@@ -88,8 +88,6 @@ void sdhci_pci_o2_fujin2_pci_init(struct sdhci_pci_chip *chip)
return;
scratch_32 &= ~((1 << 21) | (1 << 30));
- /* Set RTD3 function disabled */
- scratch_32 |= ((1 << 29) | (1 << 28));
pci_write_config_dword(chip->pdev, O2_SD_FUNC_REG3, scratch_32);
/* Set L1 Entrance Timer */
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/NCR5380.c b/drivers/scsi/NCR5380.c
index 1e9d6ad9302b..7563b3d9cc76 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/NCR5380.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/NCR5380.c
@@ -2655,14 +2655,14 @@ static void NCR5380_dma_complete(NCR5380_instance * instance) {
*
* Purpose : abort a command
*
- * Inputs : cmd - the Scsi_Cmnd to abort, code - code to set the
- * host byte of the result field to, if zero DID_ABORTED is
+ * Inputs : cmd - the Scsi_Cmnd to abort, code - code to set the
+ * host byte of the result field to, if zero DID_ABORTED is
* used.
*
- * Returns : 0 - success, -1 on failure.
+ * Returns : SUCCESS - success, FAILED on failure.
*
- * XXX - there is no way to abort the command that is currently
- * connected, you have to wait for it to complete. If this is
+ * XXX - there is no way to abort the command that is currently
+ * connected, you have to wait for it to complete. If this is
* a problem, we could implement longjmp() / setjmp(), setjmp()
* called where the loop started in NCR5380_main().
*
@@ -2712,7 +2712,7 @@ static int NCR5380_abort(Scsi_Cmnd * cmd) {
* aborted flag and get back into our main loop.
*/
- return 0;
+ return SUCCESS;
}
#endif
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/aha1740.c b/drivers/scsi/aha1740.c
index 5f3101797c93..31ace4bef8fe 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/aha1740.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/aha1740.c
@@ -531,7 +531,7 @@ static int aha1740_eh_abort_handler (Scsi_Cmnd *dummy)
* quiet as possible...
*/
- return 0;
+ return SUCCESS;
}
static struct scsi_host_template aha1740_template = {
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/atari_NCR5380.c b/drivers/scsi/atari_NCR5380.c
index 0f3cdbc80ba6..30073d43d87b 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/atari_NCR5380.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/atari_NCR5380.c
@@ -2613,7 +2613,7 @@ static void NCR5380_reselect(struct Scsi_Host *instance)
* host byte of the result field to, if zero DID_ABORTED is
* used.
*
- * Returns : 0 - success, -1 on failure.
+ * Returns : SUCCESS - success, FAILED on failure.
*
* XXX - there is no way to abort the command that is currently
* connected, you have to wait for it to complete. If this is
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/esas2r/esas2r_main.c b/drivers/scsi/esas2r/esas2r_main.c
index f37f3e3dd5d5..28fe6feae44c 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/esas2r/esas2r_main.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/esas2r/esas2r_main.c
@@ -1057,7 +1057,7 @@ int esas2r_eh_abort(struct scsi_cmnd *cmd)
cmd->scsi_done(cmd);
- return 0;
+ return SUCCESS;
}
spin_lock_irqsave(&a->queue_lock, flags);
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/megaraid.c b/drivers/scsi/megaraid.c
index 816db12ef5d5..52587ceac099 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/megaraid.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/megaraid.c
@@ -1967,7 +1967,7 @@ megaraid_abort_and_reset(adapter_t *adapter, Scsi_Cmnd *cmd, int aor)
cmd->device->id, cmd->device->lun);
if(list_empty(&adapter->pending_list))
- return FALSE;
+ return FAILED;
list_for_each_safe(pos, next, &adapter->pending_list) {
@@ -1990,7 +1990,7 @@ megaraid_abort_and_reset(adapter_t *adapter, Scsi_Cmnd *cmd, int aor)
(aor==SCB_ABORT) ? "ABORTING":"RESET",
scb->idx);
- return FALSE;
+ return FAILED;
}
else {
@@ -2015,12 +2015,12 @@ megaraid_abort_and_reset(adapter_t *adapter, Scsi_Cmnd *cmd, int aor)
list_add_tail(SCSI_LIST(cmd),
&adapter->completed_list);
- return TRUE;
+ return SUCCESS;
}
}
}
- return FALSE;
+ return FAILED;
}
static inline int
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c b/drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c
index 3b7ad10497fe..c80afde97e96 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c
@@ -953,7 +953,7 @@ megasas_issue_blocked_abort_cmd(struct megasas_instance *instance,
cpu_to_le32(upper_32_bits(cmd_to_abort->frame_phys_addr));
cmd->sync_cmd = 1;
- cmd->cmd_status = 0xFF;
+ cmd->cmd_status = ENODATA;
instance->instancet->issue_dcmd(instance, cmd);
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/sun3_NCR5380.c b/drivers/scsi/sun3_NCR5380.c
index 636bbe0ea84c..fc57c8aec2b3 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/sun3_NCR5380.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/sun3_NCR5380.c
@@ -2597,15 +2597,15 @@ static void NCR5380_reselect (struct Scsi_Host *instance)
* Purpose : abort a command
*
* Inputs : cmd - the struct scsi_cmnd to abort, code - code to set the
- * host byte of the result field to, if zero DID_ABORTED is
+ * host byte of the result field to, if zero DID_ABORTED is
* used.
*
- * Returns : 0 - success, -1 on failure.
+ * Returns : SUCCESS - success, FAILED on failure.
*
- * XXX - there is no way to abort the command that is currently
- * connected, you have to wait for it to complete. If this is
+ * XXX - there is no way to abort the command that is currently
+ * connected, you have to wait for it to complete. If this is
* a problem, we could implement longjmp() / setjmp(), setjmp()
- * called where the loop started in NCR5380_main().
+ * called where the loop started in NCR5380_main().
*/
static int NCR5380_abort(struct scsi_cmnd *cmd)
diff --git a/drivers/thermal/thermal_core.c b/drivers/thermal/thermal_core.c
index 71b0ec0c370d..284733e1fb6f 100644
--- a/drivers/thermal/thermal_core.c
+++ b/drivers/thermal/thermal_core.c
@@ -1824,10 +1824,10 @@ static int __init thermal_init(void)
exit_netlink:
genetlink_exit();
-unregister_governors:
- thermal_unregister_governors();
unregister_class:
class_unregister(&thermal_class);
+unregister_governors:
+ thermal_unregister_governors();
error:
idr_destroy(&thermal_tz_idr);
idr_destroy(&thermal_cdev_idr);
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c
index 370ef7450157..0db8ded65923 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c
@@ -3978,12 +3978,6 @@ again:
if (ret)
break;
- /* opt_discard */
- if (btrfs_test_opt(root, DISCARD))
- ret = btrfs_error_discard_extent(root, start,
- end + 1 - start,
- NULL);
-
clear_extent_dirty(unpin, start, end, GFP_NOFS);
btrfs_error_unpin_extent_range(root, start, end);
cond_resched();
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c b/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c
index 3ff98e23f651..d2f1c011d73a 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c
@@ -5503,7 +5503,8 @@ void btrfs_prepare_extent_commit(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
update_global_block_rsv(fs_info);
}
-static int unpin_extent_range(struct btrfs_root *root, u64 start, u64 end)
+static int unpin_extent_range(struct btrfs_root *root, u64 start, u64 end,
+ const bool return_free_space)
{
struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info = root->fs_info;
struct btrfs_block_group_cache *cache = NULL;
@@ -5527,7 +5528,8 @@ static int unpin_extent_range(struct btrfs_root *root, u64 start, u64 end)
if (start < cache->last_byte_to_unpin) {
len = min(len, cache->last_byte_to_unpin - start);
- btrfs_add_free_space(cache, start, len);
+ if (return_free_space)
+ btrfs_add_free_space(cache, start, len);
}
start += len;
@@ -5590,7 +5592,7 @@ int btrfs_finish_extent_commit(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
end + 1 - start, NULL);
clear_extent_dirty(unpin, start, end, GFP_NOFS);
- unpin_extent_range(root, start, end);
+ unpin_extent_range(root, start, end, true);
cond_resched();
}
@@ -8886,7 +8888,7 @@ out:
int btrfs_error_unpin_extent_range(struct btrfs_root *root, u64 start, u64 end)
{
- return unpin_extent_range(root, start, end);
+ return unpin_extent_range(root, start, end, false);
}
int btrfs_error_discard_extent(struct btrfs_root *root, u64 bytenr,
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/extent_map.c b/fs/btrfs/extent_map.c
index 996ad56b57db..82845a6c63c2 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/extent_map.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/extent_map.c
@@ -290,8 +290,6 @@ int unpin_extent_cache(struct extent_map_tree *tree, u64 start, u64 len,
if (!em)
goto out;
- if (!test_bit(EXTENT_FLAG_LOGGING, &em->flags))
- list_move(&em->list, &tree->modified_extents);
em->generation = gen;
clear_bit(EXTENT_FLAG_PINNED, &em->flags);
em->mod_start = em->start;
diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c b/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c
index 2f6735dbf1a9..31b148f3e772 100644
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c
@@ -1917,7 +1917,6 @@ ecryptfs_decode_from_filename(unsigned char *dst, size_t *dst_size,
break;
case 2:
dst[dst_byte_offset++] |= (src_byte);
- dst[dst_byte_offset] = 0;
current_bit_offset = 0;
break;
}
diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/file.c b/fs/ecryptfs/file.c
index b1eaa7a1f82c..03df50211c48 100644
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/file.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/file.c
@@ -191,23 +191,11 @@ static int ecryptfs_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
int rc = 0;
struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat = NULL;
- struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat;
struct dentry *ecryptfs_dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
/* Private value of ecryptfs_dentry allocated in
* ecryptfs_lookup() */
struct ecryptfs_file_info *file_info;
- mount_crypt_stat = &ecryptfs_superblock_to_private(
- ecryptfs_dentry->d_sb)->mount_crypt_stat;
- if ((mount_crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED_VIEW_ENABLED)
- && ((file->f_flags & O_WRONLY) || (file->f_flags & O_RDWR)
- || (file->f_flags & O_CREAT) || (file->f_flags & O_TRUNC)
- || (file->f_flags & O_APPEND))) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "Mount has encrypted view enabled; "
- "files may only be read\n");
- rc = -EPERM;
- goto out;
- }
/* Released in ecryptfs_release or end of function if failure */
file_info = kmem_cache_zalloc(ecryptfs_file_info_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
ecryptfs_set_file_private(file, file_info);
diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/main.c b/fs/ecryptfs/main.c
index 1b119d3bf924..34eb8433d93f 100644
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/main.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/main.c
@@ -493,6 +493,7 @@ static struct dentry *ecryptfs_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, int flags
{
struct super_block *s;
struct ecryptfs_sb_info *sbi;
+ struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat;
struct ecryptfs_dentry_info *root_info;
const char *err = "Getting sb failed";
struct inode *inode;
@@ -511,6 +512,7 @@ static struct dentry *ecryptfs_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, int flags
err = "Error parsing options";
goto out;
}
+ mount_crypt_stat = &sbi->mount_crypt_stat;
s = sget(fs_type, NULL, set_anon_super, flags, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(s)) {
@@ -557,11 +559,19 @@ static struct dentry *ecryptfs_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, int flags
/**
* Set the POSIX ACL flag based on whether they're enabled in the lower
- * mount. Force a read-only eCryptfs mount if the lower mount is ro.
- * Allow a ro eCryptfs mount even when the lower mount is rw.
+ * mount.
*/
s->s_flags = flags & ~MS_POSIXACL;
- s->s_flags |= path.dentry->d_sb->s_flags & (MS_RDONLY | MS_POSIXACL);
+ s->s_flags |= path.dentry->d_sb->s_flags & MS_POSIXACL;
+
+ /**
+ * Force a read-only eCryptfs mount when:
+ * 1) The lower mount is ro
+ * 2) The ecryptfs_encrypted_view mount option is specified
+ */
+ if (path.dentry->d_sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY ||
+ mount_crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED_VIEW_ENABLED)
+ s->s_flags |= MS_RDONLY;
s->s_maxbytes = path.dentry->d_sb->s_maxbytes;
s->s_blocksize = path.dentry->d_sb->s_blocksize;
diff --git a/fs/isofs/rock.c b/fs/isofs/rock.c
index f488bbae541a..735d7522a3a9 100644
--- a/fs/isofs/rock.c
+++ b/fs/isofs/rock.c
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ struct rock_state {
int cont_size;
int cont_extent;
int cont_offset;
+ int cont_loops;
struct inode *inode;
};
@@ -73,6 +74,9 @@ static void init_rock_state(struct rock_state *rs, struct inode *inode)
rs->inode = inode;
}
+/* Maximum number of Rock Ridge continuation entries */
+#define RR_MAX_CE_ENTRIES 32
+
/*
* Returns 0 if the caller should continue scanning, 1 if the scan must end
* and -ve on error.
@@ -105,6 +109,8 @@ static int rock_continue(struct rock_state *rs)
goto out;
}
ret = -EIO;
+ if (++rs->cont_loops >= RR_MAX_CE_ENTRIES)
+ goto out;
bh = sb_bread(rs->inode->i_sb, rs->cont_extent);
if (bh) {
memcpy(rs->buffer, bh->b_data + rs->cont_offset,
@@ -356,6 +362,9 @@ repeat:
rs.cont_size = isonum_733(rr->u.CE.size);
break;
case SIG('E', 'R'):
+ /* Invalid length of ER tag id? */
+ if (rr->u.ER.len_id + offsetof(struct rock_ridge, u.ER.data) > rr->len)
+ goto out;
ISOFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_rock = 1;
printk(KERN_DEBUG "ISO 9660 Extensions: ");
{
diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index d9bf3efbf040..039f3802d70e 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -1295,6 +1295,8 @@ void umount_tree(struct mount *mnt, int how)
}
if (last) {
last->mnt_hash.next = unmounted.first;
+ if (unmounted.first)
+ unmounted.first->pprev = &last->mnt_hash.next;
unmounted.first = tmp_list.first;
unmounted.first->pprev = &unmounted.first;
}
@@ -1439,6 +1441,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(umount, char __user *, name, int, flags)
goto dput_and_out;
if (mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED)
goto dput_and_out;
+ retval = -EPERM;
+ if (flags & MNT_FORCE && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ goto dput_and_out;
retval = do_umount(mnt, flags);
dput_and_out:
@@ -1964,7 +1969,13 @@ static int do_remount(struct path *path, int flags, int mnt_flags,
}
if ((mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCK_NODEV) &&
!(mnt_flags & MNT_NODEV)) {
- return -EPERM;
+ /* Was the nodev implicitly added in mount? */
+ if ((mnt->mnt_ns->user_ns != &init_user_ns) &&
+ !(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_USERNS_DEV_MOUNT)) {
+ mnt_flags |= MNT_NODEV;
+ } else {
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
}
if ((mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCK_NOSUID) &&
!(mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)) {
diff --git a/fs/ncpfs/ioctl.c b/fs/ncpfs/ioctl.c
index 60426ccb3b65..2f970de02b16 100644
--- a/fs/ncpfs/ioctl.c
+++ b/fs/ncpfs/ioctl.c
@@ -448,7 +448,6 @@ static long __ncp_ioctl(struct inode *inode, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg
result = -EIO;
}
}
- result = 0;
}
mutex_unlock(&server->root_setup_lock);
diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
index bd01803d0656..58258ad50d5f 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
@@ -7589,6 +7589,9 @@ nfs4_proc_layoutget(struct nfs4_layoutget *lgp, gfp_t gfp_flags)
dprintk("--> %s\n", __func__);
+ /* nfs4_layoutget_release calls pnfs_put_layout_hdr */
+ pnfs_get_layout_hdr(NFS_I(inode)->layout);
+
lgp->args.layout.pages = nfs4_alloc_pages(max_pages, gfp_flags);
if (!lgp->args.layout.pages) {
nfs4_layoutget_release(lgp);
@@ -7601,9 +7604,6 @@ nfs4_proc_layoutget(struct nfs4_layoutget *lgp, gfp_t gfp_flags)
lgp->res.seq_res.sr_slot = NULL;
nfs4_init_sequence(&lgp->args.seq_args, &lgp->res.seq_res, 0);
- /* nfs4_layoutget_release calls pnfs_put_layout_hdr */
- pnfs_get_layout_hdr(NFS_I(inode)->layout);
-
task = rpc_run_task(&task_setup_data);
if (IS_ERR(task))
return ERR_CAST(task);
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index b9760628e1fd..489ba8caafc0 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -2555,6 +2555,57 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_projid_map_operations = {
.llseek = seq_lseek,
.release = proc_id_map_release,
};
+
+static int proc_setgroups_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ struct user_namespace *ns = NULL;
+ struct task_struct *task;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = -ESRCH;
+ task = get_proc_task(inode);
+ if (task) {
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ ns = get_user_ns(task_cred_xxx(task, user_ns));
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ put_task_struct(task);
+ }
+ if (!ns)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
+ ret = -EACCES;
+ if (!ns_capable(ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ goto err_put_ns;
+ }
+
+ ret = single_open(file, &proc_setgroups_show, ns);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_put_ns;
+
+ return 0;
+err_put_ns:
+ put_user_ns(ns);
+err:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int proc_setgroups_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data;
+ struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
+ int ret = single_release(inode, file);
+ put_user_ns(ns);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations proc_setgroups_operations = {
+ .open = proc_setgroups_open,
+ .write = proc_setgroups_write,
+ .read = seq_read,
+ .llseek = seq_lseek,
+ .release = proc_setgroups_release,
+};
#endif /* CONFIG_USER_NS */
static int proc_pid_personality(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
@@ -2663,6 +2714,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tgid_base_stuff[] = {
REG("uid_map", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_uid_map_operations),
REG("gid_map", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_gid_map_operations),
REG("projid_map", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_projid_map_operations),
+ REG("setgroups", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_setgroups_operations),
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
REG("timers", S_IRUGO, proc_timers_operations),
@@ -2998,6 +3050,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tid_base_stuff[] = {
REG("uid_map", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_uid_map_operations),
REG("gid_map", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_gid_map_operations),
REG("projid_map", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_projid_map_operations),
+ REG("setgroups", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_setgroups_operations),
#endif
};
diff --git a/fs/udf/symlink.c b/fs/udf/symlink.c
index d7c6dbe4194b..d89f324bc387 100644
--- a/fs/udf/symlink.c
+++ b/fs/udf/symlink.c
@@ -80,11 +80,17 @@ static int udf_symlink_filler(struct file *file, struct page *page)
struct inode *inode = page->mapping->host;
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
unsigned char *symlink;
- int err = -EIO;
+ int err;
unsigned char *p = kmap(page);
struct udf_inode_info *iinfo;
uint32_t pos;
+ /* We don't support symlinks longer than one block */
+ if (inode->i_size > inode->i_sb->s_blocksize) {
+ err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
+ goto out_unmap;
+ }
+
iinfo = UDF_I(inode);
pos = udf_block_map(inode, 0);
@@ -94,8 +100,10 @@ static int udf_symlink_filler(struct file *file, struct page *page)
} else {
bh = sb_bread(inode->i_sb, pos);
- if (!bh)
- goto out;
+ if (!bh) {
+ err = -EIO;
+ goto out_unlock_inode;
+ }
symlink = bh->b_data;
}
@@ -109,9 +117,10 @@ static int udf_symlink_filler(struct file *file, struct page *page)
unlock_page(page);
return 0;
-out:
+out_unlock_inode:
up_read(&iinfo->i_data_sem);
SetPageError(page);
+out_unmap:
kunmap(page);
unlock_page(page);
return err;
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index ec1464df4c60..419b7d7d7a7f 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ struct sk_buff;
struct audit_krule {
int vers_ops;
+ u32 pflags;
u32 flags;
u32 listnr;
u32 action;
@@ -64,6 +65,9 @@ struct audit_krule {
u64 prio;
};
+/* Flag to indicate legacy AUDIT_LOGINUID unset usage */
+#define AUDIT_LOGINUID_LEGACY 0x1
+
struct audit_field {
u32 type;
u32 val;
diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
index 04421e825365..6c58dd7cb9ac 100644
--- a/include/linux/cred.h
+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ extern void groups_free(struct group_info *);
extern int set_current_groups(struct group_info *);
extern int set_groups(struct cred *, struct group_info *);
extern int groups_search(const struct group_info *, kgid_t);
+extern bool may_setgroups(void);
/* access the groups "array" with this macro */
#define GROUP_AT(gi, i) \
diff --git a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
index 4836ba3c1cd8..e92abf9e796f 100644
--- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h
+++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
@@ -17,6 +17,10 @@ struct uid_gid_map { /* 64 bytes -- 1 cache line */
} extent[UID_GID_MAP_MAX_EXTENTS];
};
+#define USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED 1UL
+
+#define USERNS_INIT_FLAGS USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED
+
struct user_namespace {
struct uid_gid_map uid_map;
struct uid_gid_map gid_map;
@@ -27,6 +31,7 @@ struct user_namespace {
kuid_t owner;
kgid_t group;
unsigned int proc_inum;
+ unsigned long flags;
/* Register of per-UID persistent keyrings for this namespace */
#ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
@@ -63,6 +68,9 @@ extern struct seq_operations proc_projid_seq_operations;
extern ssize_t proc_uid_map_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
extern ssize_t proc_gid_map_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
extern ssize_t proc_projid_map_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
+extern ssize_t proc_setgroups_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
+extern int proc_setgroups_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
+extern bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns);
#else
static inline struct user_namespace *get_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns)
@@ -87,6 +95,10 @@ static inline void put_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns)
{
}
+static inline bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns)
+{
+ return true;
+}
#endif
#endif /* _LINUX_USER_H */
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 92062fd6cc8c..598c1dcf26dd 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -429,6 +429,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
if ((f->type == AUDIT_LOGINUID) && (f->val == AUDIT_UID_UNSET)) {
f->type = AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET;
f->val = 0;
+ entry->rule.pflags |= AUDIT_LOGINUID_LEGACY;
}
err = audit_field_valid(entry, f);
@@ -604,6 +605,13 @@ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule)
data->buflen += data->values[i] =
audit_pack_string(&bufp, krule->filterkey);
break;
+ case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
+ if (krule->pflags & AUDIT_LOGINUID_LEGACY && !f->val) {
+ data->fields[i] = AUDIT_LOGINUID;
+ data->values[i] = AUDIT_UID_UNSET;
+ break;
+ }
+ /* fallthrough if set */
default:
data->values[i] = f->val;
}
@@ -620,6 +628,7 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
int i;
if (a->flags != b->flags ||
+ a->pflags != b->pflags ||
a->listnr != b->listnr ||
a->action != b->action ||
a->field_count != b->field_count)
@@ -738,6 +747,7 @@ struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old)
new = &entry->rule;
new->vers_ops = old->vers_ops;
new->flags = old->flags;
+ new->pflags = old->pflags;
new->listnr = old->listnr;
new->action = old->action;
for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
diff --git a/kernel/groups.c b/kernel/groups.c
index 90cf1c38c8ea..67b4ba30475f 100644
--- a/kernel/groups.c
+++ b/kernel/groups.c
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
/* init to 2 - one for init_task, one to ensure it is never freed */
@@ -223,6 +224,14 @@ out:
return i;
}
+bool may_setgroups(void)
+{
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns();
+
+ return ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SETGID) &&
+ userns_may_setgroups(user_ns);
+}
+
/*
* SMP: Our groups are copy-on-write. We can set them safely
* without another task interfering.
@@ -233,7 +242,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setgroups, int, gidsetsize, gid_t __user *, grouplist)
struct group_info *group_info;
int retval;
- if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SETGID))
+ if (!may_setgroups())
return -EPERM;
if ((unsigned)gidsetsize > NGROUPS_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
diff --git a/kernel/pid.c b/kernel/pid.c
index 9b9a26698144..82430c858d69 100644
--- a/kernel/pid.c
+++ b/kernel/pid.c
@@ -341,6 +341,8 @@ out:
out_unlock:
spin_unlock_irq(&pidmap_lock);
+ put_pid_ns(ns);
+
out_free:
while (++i <= ns->level)
free_pidmap(pid->numbers + i);
diff --git a/kernel/uid16.c b/kernel/uid16.c
index 602e5bbbceff..d58cc4d8f0d1 100644
--- a/kernel/uid16.c
+++ b/kernel/uid16.c
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setgroups16, int, gidsetsize, old_gid_t __user *, grouplist)
struct group_info *group_info;
int retval;
- if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SETGID))
+ if (!may_setgroups())
return -EPERM;
if ((unsigned)gidsetsize > NGROUPS_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
diff --git a/kernel/user.c b/kernel/user.c
index c006131beb77..c2bbb50f5a90 100644
--- a/kernel/user.c
+++ b/kernel/user.c
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ struct user_namespace init_user_ns = {
.owner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
.group = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID,
.proc_inum = PROC_USER_INIT_INO,
+ .flags = USERNS_INIT_FLAGS,
#ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
.persistent_keyring_register_sem =
__RWSEM_INITIALIZER(init_user_ns.persistent_keyring_register_sem),
diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
index 80a57afd8647..153971e4798a 100644
--- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
+++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
static struct kmem_cache *user_ns_cachep __read_mostly;
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(userns_state_mutex);
static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file,
struct user_namespace *ns, int cap_setid,
@@ -99,6 +100,11 @@ int create_user_ns(struct cred *new)
ns->owner = owner;
ns->group = group;
+ /* Inherit USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED from our parent */
+ mutex_lock(&userns_state_mutex);
+ ns->flags = parent_ns->flags;
+ mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex);
+
set_cred_user_ns(new, ns);
#ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
@@ -581,9 +587,6 @@ static bool mappings_overlap(struct uid_gid_map *new_map, struct uid_gid_extent
return false;
}
-
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(id_map_mutex);
-
static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos,
int cap_setid,
@@ -600,7 +603,7 @@ static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
ssize_t ret = -EINVAL;
/*
- * The id_map_mutex serializes all writes to any given map.
+ * The userns_state_mutex serializes all writes to any given map.
*
* Any map is only ever written once.
*
@@ -618,7 +621,7 @@ static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
* order and smp_rmb() is guaranteed that we don't have crazy
* architectures returning stale data.
*/
- mutex_lock(&id_map_mutex);
+ mutex_lock(&userns_state_mutex);
ret = -EPERM;
/* Only allow one successful write to the map */
@@ -745,7 +748,7 @@ static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
*ppos = count;
ret = count;
out:
- mutex_unlock(&id_map_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex);
if (page)
free_page(page);
return ret;
@@ -804,17 +807,21 @@ static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file,
struct user_namespace *ns, int cap_setid,
struct uid_gid_map *new_map)
{
- /* Allow mapping to your own filesystem ids */
- if ((new_map->nr_extents == 1) && (new_map->extent[0].count == 1)) {
+ const struct cred *cred = file->f_cred;
+ /* Don't allow mappings that would allow anything that wouldn't
+ * be allowed without the establishment of unprivileged mappings.
+ */
+ if ((new_map->nr_extents == 1) && (new_map->extent[0].count == 1) &&
+ uid_eq(ns->owner, cred->euid)) {
u32 id = new_map->extent[0].lower_first;
if (cap_setid == CAP_SETUID) {
kuid_t uid = make_kuid(ns->parent, id);
- if (uid_eq(uid, file->f_cred->fsuid))
+ if (uid_eq(uid, cred->euid))
return true;
- }
- else if (cap_setid == CAP_SETGID) {
+ } else if (cap_setid == CAP_SETGID) {
kgid_t gid = make_kgid(ns->parent, id);
- if (gid_eq(gid, file->f_cred->fsgid))
+ if (!(ns->flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED) &&
+ gid_eq(gid, cred->egid))
return true;
}
}
@@ -834,6 +841,100 @@ static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file,
return false;
}
+int proc_setgroups_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+ struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
+ unsigned long userns_flags = ACCESS_ONCE(ns->flags);
+
+ seq_printf(seq, "%s\n",
+ (userns_flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED) ?
+ "allow" : "deny");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+ssize_t proc_setgroups_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data;
+ struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
+ char kbuf[8], *pos;
+ bool setgroups_allowed;
+ ssize_t ret;
+
+ /* Only allow a very narrow range of strings to be written */
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ if ((*ppos != 0) || (count >= sizeof(kbuf)))
+ goto out;
+
+ /* What was written? */
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ if (copy_from_user(kbuf, buf, count))
+ goto out;
+ kbuf[count] = '\0';
+ pos = kbuf;
+
+ /* What is being requested? */
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ if (strncmp(pos, "allow", 5) == 0) {
+ pos += 5;
+ setgroups_allowed = true;
+ }
+ else if (strncmp(pos, "deny", 4) == 0) {
+ pos += 4;
+ setgroups_allowed = false;
+ }
+ else
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Verify there is not trailing junk on the line */
+ pos = skip_spaces(pos);
+ if (*pos != '\0')
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ mutex_lock(&userns_state_mutex);
+ if (setgroups_allowed) {
+ /* Enabling setgroups after setgroups has been disabled
+ * is not allowed.
+ */
+ if (!(ns->flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED))
+ goto out_unlock;
+ } else {
+ /* Permanently disabling setgroups after setgroups has
+ * been enabled by writing the gid_map is not allowed.
+ */
+ if (ns->gid_map.nr_extents != 0)
+ goto out_unlock;
+ ns->flags &= ~USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED;
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex);
+
+ /* Report a successful write */
+ *ppos = count;
+ ret = count;
+out:
+ return ret;
+out_unlock:
+ mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex);
+ goto out;
+}
+
+bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns)
+{
+ bool allowed;
+
+ mutex_lock(&userns_state_mutex);
+ /* It is not safe to use setgroups until a gid mapping in
+ * the user namespace has been established.
+ */
+ allowed = ns->gid_map.nr_extents != 0;
+ /* Is setgroups allowed? */
+ allowed = allowed && (ns->flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED);
+ mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex);
+
+ return allowed;
+}
+
static void *userns_get(struct task_struct *task)
{
struct user_namespace *user_ns;
diff --git a/net/mac80211/key.c b/net/mac80211/key.c
index 6ff65a1ebaa9..d78b37a5d951 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/key.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/key.c
@@ -652,7 +652,7 @@ void ieee80211_free_sta_keys(struct ieee80211_local *local,
int i;
mutex_lock(&local->key_mtx);
- for (i = 0; i < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS; i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sta->gtk); i++) {
key = key_mtx_dereference(local, sta->gtk[i]);
if (!key)
continue;
diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c
index 095c16037bc5..1e4dc4ed5e0d 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/rx.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c
@@ -1679,14 +1679,14 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
sc = le16_to_cpu(hdr->seq_ctrl);
frag = sc & IEEE80211_SCTL_FRAG;
- if (likely(!ieee80211_has_morefrags(fc) && frag == 0))
- goto out;
-
if (is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1)) {
rx->local->dot11MulticastReceivedFrameCount++;
- goto out;
+ goto out_no_led;
}
+ if (likely(!ieee80211_has_morefrags(fc) && frag == 0))
+ goto out;
+
I802_DEBUG_INC(rx->local->rx_handlers_fragments);
if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
@@ -1777,9 +1777,10 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
status->rx_flags |= IEEE80211_RX_FRAGMENTED;
out:
+ ieee80211_led_rx(rx->local);
+ out_no_led:
if (rx->sta)
rx->sta->rx_packets++;
- ieee80211_led_rx(rx->local);
return RX_CONTINUE;
}
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
index 9e1e005c7596..c4c8df4b214d 100644
--- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
@@ -1018,10 +1018,13 @@ static int __init init_encrypted(void)
ret = encrypted_shash_alloc();
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
+ ret = aes_get_sizes();
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
ret = register_key_type(&key_type_encrypted);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
- return aes_get_sizes();
+ return 0;
out:
encrypted_shash_release();
return ret;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/mount/unprivileged-remount-test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/mount/unprivileged-remount-test.c
index 1b3ff2fda4d0..517785052f1c 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/mount/unprivileged-remount-test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/mount/unprivileged-remount-test.c
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/vfs.h>
+#include <sys/statvfs.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
@@ -32,11 +34,14 @@
# define CLONE_NEWPID 0x20000000
#endif
+#ifndef MS_REC
+# define MS_REC 16384
+#endif
#ifndef MS_RELATIME
-#define MS_RELATIME (1 << 21)
+# define MS_RELATIME (1 << 21)
#endif
#ifndef MS_STRICTATIME
-#define MS_STRICTATIME (1 << 24)
+# define MS_STRICTATIME (1 << 24)
#endif
static void die(char *fmt, ...)
@@ -48,17 +53,14 @@ static void die(char *fmt, ...)
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
-static void write_file(char *filename, char *fmt, ...)
+static void vmaybe_write_file(bool enoent_ok, char *filename, char *fmt, va_list ap)
{
char buf[4096];
int fd;
ssize_t written;
int buf_len;
- va_list ap;
- va_start(ap, fmt);
buf_len = vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, ap);
- va_end(ap);
if (buf_len < 0) {
die("vsnprintf failed: %s\n",
strerror(errno));
@@ -69,6 +71,8 @@ static void write_file(char *filename, char *fmt, ...)
fd = open(filename, O_WRONLY);
if (fd < 0) {
+ if ((errno == ENOENT) && enoent_ok)
+ return;
die("open of %s failed: %s\n",
filename, strerror(errno));
}
@@ -87,6 +91,65 @@ static void write_file(char *filename, char *fmt, ...)
}
}
+static void maybe_write_file(char *filename, char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list ap;
+
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ vmaybe_write_file(true, filename, fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+
+}
+
+static void write_file(char *filename, char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list ap;
+
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ vmaybe_write_file(false, filename, fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+
+}
+
+static int read_mnt_flags(const char *path)
+{
+ int ret;
+ struct statvfs stat;
+ int mnt_flags;
+
+ ret = statvfs(path, &stat);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ die("statvfs of %s failed: %s\n",
+ path, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ if (stat.f_flag & ~(ST_RDONLY | ST_NOSUID | ST_NODEV | \
+ ST_NOEXEC | ST_NOATIME | ST_NODIRATIME | ST_RELATIME | \
+ ST_SYNCHRONOUS | ST_MANDLOCK)) {
+ die("Unrecognized mount flags\n");
+ }
+ mnt_flags = 0;
+ if (stat.f_flag & ST_RDONLY)
+ mnt_flags |= MS_RDONLY;
+ if (stat.f_flag & ST_NOSUID)
+ mnt_flags |= MS_NOSUID;
+ if (stat.f_flag & ST_NODEV)
+ mnt_flags |= MS_NODEV;
+ if (stat.f_flag & ST_NOEXEC)
+ mnt_flags |= MS_NOEXEC;
+ if (stat.f_flag & ST_NOATIME)
+ mnt_flags |= MS_NOATIME;
+ if (stat.f_flag & ST_NODIRATIME)
+ mnt_flags |= MS_NODIRATIME;
+ if (stat.f_flag & ST_RELATIME)
+ mnt_flags |= MS_RELATIME;
+ if (stat.f_flag & ST_SYNCHRONOUS)
+ mnt_flags |= MS_SYNCHRONOUS;
+ if (stat.f_flag & ST_MANDLOCK)
+ mnt_flags |= ST_MANDLOCK;
+
+ return mnt_flags;
+}
+
static void create_and_enter_userns(void)
{
uid_t uid;
@@ -100,13 +163,10 @@ static void create_and_enter_userns(void)
strerror(errno));
}
+ maybe_write_file("/proc/self/setgroups", "deny");
write_file("/proc/self/uid_map", "0 %d 1", uid);
write_file("/proc/self/gid_map", "0 %d 1", gid);
- if (setgroups(0, NULL) != 0) {
- die("setgroups failed: %s\n",
- strerror(errno));
- }
if (setgid(0) != 0) {
die ("setgid(0) failed %s\n",
strerror(errno));
@@ -118,7 +178,8 @@ static void create_and_enter_userns(void)
}
static
-bool test_unpriv_remount(int mount_flags, int remount_flags, int invalid_flags)
+bool test_unpriv_remount(const char *fstype, const char *mount_options,
+ int mount_flags, int remount_flags, int invalid_flags)
{
pid_t child;
@@ -151,9 +212,11 @@ bool test_unpriv_remount(int mount_flags, int remount_flags, int invalid_flags)
strerror(errno));
}
- if (mount("testing", "/tmp", "ramfs", mount_flags, NULL) != 0) {
- die("mount of /tmp failed: %s\n",
- strerror(errno));
+ if (mount("testing", "/tmp", fstype, mount_flags, mount_options) != 0) {
+ die("mount of %s with options '%s' on /tmp failed: %s\n",
+ fstype,
+ mount_options? mount_options : "",
+ strerror(errno));
}
create_and_enter_userns();
@@ -181,62 +244,127 @@ bool test_unpriv_remount(int mount_flags, int remount_flags, int invalid_flags)
static bool test_unpriv_remount_simple(int mount_flags)
{
- return test_unpriv_remount(mount_flags, mount_flags, 0);
+ return test_unpriv_remount("ramfs", NULL, mount_flags, mount_flags, 0);
}
static bool test_unpriv_remount_atime(int mount_flags, int invalid_flags)
{
- return test_unpriv_remount(mount_flags, mount_flags, invalid_flags);
+ return test_unpriv_remount("ramfs", NULL, mount_flags, mount_flags,
+ invalid_flags);
+}
+
+static bool test_priv_mount_unpriv_remount(void)
+{
+ pid_t child;
+ int ret;
+ const char *orig_path = "/dev";
+ const char *dest_path = "/tmp";
+ int orig_mnt_flags, remount_mnt_flags;
+
+ child = fork();
+ if (child == -1) {
+ die("fork failed: %s\n",
+ strerror(errno));
+ }
+ if (child != 0) { /* parent */
+ pid_t pid;
+ int status;
+ pid = waitpid(child, &status, 0);
+ if (pid == -1) {
+ die("waitpid failed: %s\n",
+ strerror(errno));
+ }
+ if (pid != child) {
+ die("waited for %d got %d\n",
+ child, pid);
+ }
+ if (!WIFEXITED(status)) {
+ die("child did not terminate cleanly\n");
+ }
+ return WEXITSTATUS(status) == EXIT_SUCCESS ? true : false;
+ }
+
+ orig_mnt_flags = read_mnt_flags(orig_path);
+
+ create_and_enter_userns();
+ ret = unshare(CLONE_NEWNS);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ die("unshare(CLONE_NEWNS) failed: %s\n",
+ strerror(errno));
+ }
+
+ ret = mount(orig_path, dest_path, "bind", MS_BIND | MS_REC, NULL);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ die("recursive bind mount of %s onto %s failed: %s\n",
+ orig_path, dest_path, strerror(errno));
+ }
+
+ ret = mount(dest_path, dest_path, "none",
+ MS_REMOUNT | MS_BIND | orig_mnt_flags , NULL);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ /* system("cat /proc/self/mounts"); */
+ die("remount of /tmp failed: %s\n",
+ strerror(errno));
+ }
+
+ remount_mnt_flags = read_mnt_flags(dest_path);
+ if (orig_mnt_flags != remount_mnt_flags) {
+ die("Mount flags unexpectedly changed during remount of %s originally mounted on %s\n",
+ dest_path, orig_path);
+ }
+ exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
- if (!test_unpriv_remount_simple(MS_RDONLY|MS_NODEV)) {
+ if (!test_unpriv_remount_simple(MS_RDONLY)) {
die("MS_RDONLY malfunctions\n");
}
- if (!test_unpriv_remount_simple(MS_NODEV)) {
+ if (!test_unpriv_remount("devpts", "newinstance", MS_NODEV, MS_NODEV, 0)) {
die("MS_NODEV malfunctions\n");
}
- if (!test_unpriv_remount_simple(MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV)) {
+ if (!test_unpriv_remount_simple(MS_NOSUID)) {
die("MS_NOSUID malfunctions\n");
}
- if (!test_unpriv_remount_simple(MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV)) {
+ if (!test_unpriv_remount_simple(MS_NOEXEC)) {
die("MS_NOEXEC malfunctions\n");
}
- if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_RELATIME|MS_NODEV,
- MS_NOATIME|MS_NODEV))
+ if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_RELATIME,
+ MS_NOATIME))
{
die("MS_RELATIME malfunctions\n");
}
- if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NODEV,
- MS_NOATIME|MS_NODEV))
+ if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_STRICTATIME,
+ MS_NOATIME))
{
die("MS_STRICTATIME malfunctions\n");
}
- if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_NOATIME|MS_NODEV,
- MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NODEV))
+ if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_NOATIME,
+ MS_STRICTATIME))
{
- die("MS_RELATIME malfunctions\n");
+ die("MS_NOATIME malfunctions\n");
}
- if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_RELATIME|MS_NODIRATIME|MS_NODEV,
- MS_NOATIME|MS_NODEV))
+ if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_RELATIME|MS_NODIRATIME,
+ MS_NOATIME))
{
- die("MS_RELATIME malfunctions\n");
+ die("MS_RELATIME|MS_NODIRATIME malfunctions\n");
}
- if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NODIRATIME|MS_NODEV,
- MS_NOATIME|MS_NODEV))
+ if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NODIRATIME,
+ MS_NOATIME))
{
- die("MS_RELATIME malfunctions\n");
+ die("MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NODIRATIME malfunctions\n");
}
- if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_NOATIME|MS_NODIRATIME|MS_NODEV,
- MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NODEV))
+ if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_NOATIME|MS_NODIRATIME,
+ MS_STRICTATIME))
{
- die("MS_RELATIME malfunctions\n");
+ die("MS_NOATIME|MS_DIRATIME malfunctions\n");
}
- if (!test_unpriv_remount(MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NODEV, MS_NODEV,
- MS_NOATIME|MS_NODEV))
+ if (!test_unpriv_remount("ramfs", NULL, MS_STRICTATIME, 0, MS_NOATIME))
{
die("Default atime malfunctions\n");
}
+ if (!test_priv_mount_unpriv_remount()) {
+ die("Mount flags unexpectedly changed after remount\n");
+ }
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
--
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