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Date: Thu, 22 Jan 2015 16:46:01 -0500 From: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@...cle.com> To: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@...il.com> CC: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@...sung.com>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>, Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@...gle.com>, Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@...gle.com>, Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@...il.com>, Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@...il.com>, Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@...il.com>, Michal Marek <mmarek@...e.cz>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>, Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>, David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>, Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>, Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>, Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@...il.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>, "linux-mm@...ck.org" <linux-mm@...ck.org>, Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, Dave Jones <davej@...hat.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 00/17] Kernel address sanitizer - runtime memory debugger. On 01/22/2015 12:53 AM, Andrey Ryabinin wrote: > 2015-01-22 8:34 GMT+03:00 Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@...il.com>: >> 2015-01-22 3:22 GMT+03:00 Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@...cle.com>: >>> On 01/21/2015 11:51 AM, Andrey Ryabinin wrote: >>>> Changes since v8: >>>> - Fixed unpoisoned redzones for not-allocated-yet object >>>> in newly allocated slab page. (from Dmitry C.) >>>> >>>> - Some minor non-function cleanups in kasan internals. >>>> >>>> - Added ack from Catalin >>>> >>>> - Added stack instrumentation. With this we could detect >>>> out of bounds accesses in stack variables. (patch 12) >>>> >>>> - Added globals instrumentation - catching out of bounds in >>>> global varibles. (patches 13-17) >>>> >>>> - Shadow moved out from vmalloc into hole between vmemmap >>>> and %esp fixup stacks. For globals instrumentation >>>> we will need shadow backing modules addresses. >>>> So we need some sort of a shadow memory allocator >>>> (something like vmmemap_populate() function, except >>>> that it should be available after boot). >>>> >>>> __vmalloc_node_range() suits that purpose, except that >>>> it can't be used for allocating for shadow in vmalloc >>>> area because shadow in vmalloc is already 'allocated' >>>> to protect us from other vmalloc users. So we need >>>> 16TB of unused addresses. And we have big enough hole >>>> between vmemmap and %esp fixup stacks. So I moved shadow >>>> there. >>> >>> I'm not sure which new addition caused it, but I'm getting tons of >>> false positives from platform drivers trying to access memory they >>> don't "own" - because they expect to find hardware there. >>> >> >> To be sure, that this is really false positives, could you try with >> patches in attachment? > > Attaching properly formed patches > Yup, you're right - that did the trick. Just to keep it going, here's a funny trace where kasan is catching issues in ubsan: :) [ 2652.320296] BUG: AddressSanitizer: out of bounds access in strnlen+0xa7/0xb0 at addr ffffffff97b5c9e4 [ 2652.320296] Read of size 1 by task trinity-c37/36198 [ 2652.320296] Address belongs to variable types__truncate+0xd884/0xde80 [ 2652.320296] CPU: 17 PID: 36198 Comm: trinity-c37 Not tainted 3.19.0-rc5-next-20150121-sasha-00064-g3c37e35-dirty #1809 [ 2652.320296] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff88011069f9f0 ffff88011069f938 [ 2652.320296] ffffffff92e9e917 0000000000000039 0000000000000000 ffff88011069f9d8 [ 2652.320296] ffffffff81b4a802 ffffffff843cd580 ffff880a70f24457 ffff00066c0a0100 [ 2652.320296] Call Trace: [ 2652.320296] [<ffffffff92e9e917>] dump_stack+0x4f/0x7b [ 2652.320296] [<ffffffff81b4a802>] kasan_report_error+0x642/0x9d0 [ 2652.320296] [<ffffffff843cd580>] ? pointer.isra.16+0xe20/0xe20 [ 2652.320296] [<ffffffff843bc882>] ? put_dec+0x72/0x90 [ 2652.320296] [<ffffffff81b4abf1>] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x61/0x80 [ 2652.320296] [<ffffffff843b9a97>] ? strnlen+0xa7/0xb0 [ 2652.363888] [<ffffffff843b9a97>] strnlen+0xa7/0xb0 [ 2652.363888] [<ffffffff843c605f>] string.isra.0+0x3f/0x2f0 [ 2652.363888] [<ffffffff843cd912>] vsnprintf+0x392/0x23b0 [ 2652.363888] [<ffffffff843cd580>] ? pointer.isra.16+0xe20/0xe20 [ 2652.363888] [<ffffffff81547101>] ? get_parent_ip+0x11/0x50 [ 2652.363888] [<ffffffff843cf951>] vscnprintf+0x21/0x70 [ 2652.363888] [<ffffffff81629ee0>] ? vprintk_emit+0xe0/0x960 [ 2652.363888] [<ffffffff81629f14>] vprintk_emit+0x114/0x960 [ 2652.363888] [<ffffffff843cf951>] ? vscnprintf+0x21/0x70 [ 2652.363888] [<ffffffff8162aa1f>] vprintk_default+0x1f/0x30 [ 2652.363888] [<ffffffff92e71c7c>] printk+0x97/0xb1 [ 2652.363888] [<ffffffff92e71be5>] ? bitmap_weight+0xb/0xb [ 2652.363888] [<ffffffff92ea10f5>] ? val_to_string.constprop.3+0x191/0x1e4 [ 2652.363888] [<ffffffff92ea1c4c>] __ubsan_handle_negate_overflow+0x13e/0x184 [ 2652.363888] [<ffffffff92ea1b0e>] ? __ubsan_handle_divrem_overflow+0x284/0x284 [ 2652.363888] [<ffffffff81612c20>] ? do_raw_spin_trylock+0x200/0x200 [ 2652.363888] [<ffffffff81bba468>] rw_verify_area+0x318/0x440 [ 2652.363888] [<ffffffff81bbe816>] vfs_read+0x106/0x490 [ 2652.363888] [<ffffffff81c4db19>] ? __fget_light+0x249/0x370 [ 2652.363888] [<ffffffff81bbecb2>] SyS_read+0x112/0x280 [ 2652.363888] [<ffffffff81bbeba0>] ? vfs_read+0x490/0x490 [ 2652.363888] [<ffffffff815fb1f9>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x519/0x850 [ 2652.363888] [<ffffffff92f64b42>] tracesys_phase2+0xdc/0xe1 [ 2652.363888] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 2652.363888] ffffffff97b5c880: fa fa fa fa 04 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 [ 2652.363888] ffffffff97b5c900: 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 fa [ 2652.363888] >ffffffff97b5c980: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa 04 fa fa fa [ 2652.363888] ^ [ 2652.363888] ffffffff97b5ca00: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa [ 2652.363888] ffffffff97b5ca80: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Thanks, Sasha -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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