Message-ID: <alpine.LFD.2.00.1502031613010.14681@localhost.localdomain>
Date:	Tue, 3 Feb 2015 16:41:27 +0100 (CET)
From:	Lukáš Czerner <lczerner@...hat.com>
To:	Alexander Holler <holler@...oftware.de>
cc:	linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/5] WIP: fs: ext4: support unlinkat_s() for secure
 deletion of files

On Tue, 3 Feb 2015, Alexander Holler wrote:

> Date: Tue, 03 Feb 2015 15:50:53 +0100
> From: Alexander Holler <holler@...oftware.de>
> To: Lukáš Czerner <lczerner@...hat.com>
> Cc: linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
> Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/5] WIP: fs: ext4: support unlinkat_s() for secure
>     deletion of files
> 
> Am 03.02.2015 um 14:50 schrieb Lukáš Czerner:
> > On Mon, 2 Feb 2015, Alexander Holler wrote:
> > 
> > > Date: Mon,  2 Feb 2015 18:05:11 +0100
> > > From: Alexander Holler <holler@...oftware.de>
> > > To: linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
> > > Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Alexander Holler <holler@...oftware.de>
> > > Subject: [PATCH 3/5] WIP: fs: ext4: support unlinkat_s() for secure
> > > deletion
> > >      of files
> > 
> > Hi,
> > 
> > I am missing a description, where you'd describe what is this all
> > about, why and how.
> 
> Maybe you've missed the introduction, patch 0/5.
> 
> Sorry, but I'm not sponsored and the time I can spend is limited. Therefor,
> please, don't expect a paper in the kind european bureaucrazies are producing.

Please read Documentation/SubmittingPatches. What I am asking is a
description of this patch.

> 
> I'm already spending a lot of time trying to convince the developers here,
> that this a feature most people expect from any filesystem. And I've written
> these patches, for which now, even after I've marked them with all kind of
> "preliminary" terms, still get blamed.

So, you'd be much happier if we just ignored your patches ? I am not
sure you understand how this works. You spend time creating and
posting patches and at least two people (including me) spent time
reading and commenting on it, isn't that what you need ?

You have the attention to move this forward, so please take
advantage of this.

> 
> And, unfortunately, myths like that overwriting a block once on traditional
> magnetic platters isn't enough, don't help either.

Not sure about the myths, I've read the paper here

http://digital-forensics.sans.org/blog/2009/01/15/overwriting-hard-drive-data/

and it sounds good, but I have no idea about the methodology, the
details of it. Specifications of the HDD used. For example he
mention writing 512B, but on the newer (4k physical sector) drives at that
time it might have meant rewriting on 4k block twice just to write 1k. This
could also explain the difference between the 'old' and 'new' drives
(whatever that means).

So what I am saying is that I am not entirely convinced that what is
concluded in that paper is true.

> 
> 
> > I am missing very important pieces like, what happens if we require
> > secure delete, but there is no secure trim available and we're still
> > on the ssd ?
> 
> As written in 0/5, I don't know if trim (without secure) might be enough.

Well, then you should find out since you're the one writing the
patches. My point is that this case has to be taken care of in the
code.

> 
> > 
> > What if the underlying storage is thinly provisioned ?
> > 
> > What if the underlying storage consist of hardware which does
> > support secure discard and one that does not ? The request crossing
> > the borders will fail.
> > 
> > What if the underlying hardware does support secure trim, but the
> > storage under the fs is in raid configuration, which brings  me to
> > the next question.
> 
> That's all about how unlinkat_s will be documented. I would suggest to let
> unlinkat_s() fail if it is sure it can't delete stuff, but otherwise would
> write in the documentation that it might be useless in many cases like stacked
> filesystems, mixed raids and similiar constructs. Maybe the documentation for
> shred is something which could be used as an template.

Well, that's problematic. Documentation is not really enough, you
can't just expect every phone user to read unlinkat_s documentation.

Once you try to delete the file securely and it fails, you have a
problem. Because you might no longer have the references to the
blocks used by that file. That's why I think that error handling is
important here. You have to give a user the way out so he can use
other means of getting rid of the file.

> 
> > 
> > Discard/secure discard does have a granularity and alignment, so
> > what if the extent is smaller than a discard granularity, or it is
> > not aligned properly ? Such discard requests would be ignored.
> 
> You can throw in another dozen complications. That's just another way to say
> "never", to kill any further user expectations or requests and to hide the
> forest behind trees.

That's not what your code does.

> 
> I wonder how you ever solve problems if you never start with solving even the
> most trivial case, always getting lost in an uncountbale number of problems.

How ? By listening to feedback and discussing, or implementing
missing parts. What this patch does in it's current version is
implementing something that we already know, while ignoring all the
important questions.

> 
> > Error handling is missing here. Also I am not sure that zeroing out
> > the blocks is really enough. Yes, I've seen the link you've posted,
> > but I am not convinced.
> 
> Implementing a sb_issue_zeroout_30_times() should be trivial. You could even
> make that an mount option, if that would convince you. But besides that, I've
> never heared of any case where someone has read anything back which was
> overwritten just once. But in contrast, there are countless case where stuff
> was read back because the filesystem didn't really delete it.

Right, but reading deleted data is expected. We never pretend that
this was not the case. However when you want to make it disappear,
you have to be sure it work.

> 
> > 
> > Did you consider metadata information for the file ? File name,
> > timestamps, size, data placement ? Is it something you want to
> > remove as well, or are you going to ignore it ? It can potentially
> > contain valuable information for the attacker as well. I am just
> > trying to understand the scope of this thing.
> 
> I prefer to start with simple steps to cover a least the most trivial cases
> which already would make 99% percent of users happy. You can always find some
> cases when it doesn't work and you could always make unlinkat_s() more
> complicated.

So, you are or are not considering dealing with metadata information ?
It's not really clear from your answer.

> 
> I'm aware of all the other stuff you are mentioning below, but I'll now stop
> arguing further. Sorry, I've already expected all these response, but at
> least, I've tried it in the hope someone else might still see the forest
> behind all those trees.

You might be aware, but I could not tell that from the code and the
lack of description of those cases and why you've ignored it.

Best regards,

-Lukas

> 
> Maybe I should request removal of shred from Fedora/RH instead. According to
> you it's one of the most misleading and useless tools. So why still confuse
> people with it and still ship it?
> 
> Have a nice day, week or year ...
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Alexander Holler
> 
> > 
> > Moreover with inline data you might have the data in the inode
> > itself, which also means the it will be in the journal as well.
> > 
> > Also with data=journal the data will be in the journal.
> > 
> > With no journal this would not work at all, you have to make this
> > for nojournal case as well.
> > 
> > What if you do defragmentation in the file, in that case the file data
> > could be all over the place.
> > 
> > What if you're device is not a real hardware, but just let's say a
> > loop device ? Talking about the smart phones I had Samsung phone
> > with that setup (not sure anyone is doing that anymore).
> > 
> > 
> > With all that said, the devil is in the details and since it's
> > security feature the details and corner cases is what you need
> > to focus on. We have '-o discard' mount option for years now and
> > we could have made 'secure delete' by simply calling
> > sb_issue_discard() with BLKDEV_DISCARD_SECURE flag, but that's not
> > really enough.
> > 
> > Not mentioning the unreliable hardware. And I am not going to rely
> > on the hardware which was not designed with security in mind for my
> > security feature, no one should. It's much better, easies and more
> > feasible just to use disk encryption - it also comes with advantages
> > that no one can actually read your existing files as opposed to just
> > deleted files.
> > 
> > >   	err = ext4_mb_load_buddy(sb, entry->efd_group, &e4b);
> > >   	/* we expect to find existing buddy because it's pinned */
> > >   	BUG_ON(err != 0);
> > > diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c
> > > index 2c9e686..f87e3ff 100644
> > > --- a/fs/ext4/super.c
> > > +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c
> > > @@ -1100,6 +1100,17 @@ static const struct quotactl_ops
> > > ext4_qctl_sysfile_operations = {
> > >   };
> > >   #endif
> > > 
> > > +static void ext4_set_secure_delete(struct super_block *sb, bool secure)
> > > +{
> > > +	struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
> > > +	// TODO: will overflow with a very large number of
> > > +	// concurrent calls of unlinkat_s().
> > > +	if (secure)
> > > +		atomic_inc(&sbi->secure_delete);
> > > +	else
> > > +		atomic_dec(&sbi->secure_delete);
> > > +}
> > > +
> > >   static const struct super_operations ext4_sops = {
> > >   	.alloc_inode	= ext4_alloc_inode,
> > >   	.destroy_inode	= ext4_destroy_inode,
> > > @@ -1119,6 +1130,7 @@ static const struct super_operations ext4_sops = {
> > >   	.quota_write	= ext4_quota_write,
> > >   #endif
> > >   	.bdev_try_to_free_page = bdev_try_to_free_page,
> > > +	.set_secure_delete = ext4_set_secure_delete,
> > >   };
> > > 
> > >   static const struct export_operations ext4_export_ops = {
> > > 
> > --
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> > 
> 
> 
> 

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