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Message-ID: <alpine.DEB.2.11.1502041555500.26435@gentwo.org>
Date: Wed, 4 Feb 2015 15:57:33 -0600 (CST)
From: Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
"Andrew G. Morgan" <morgan@...nel.org>,
Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...ntu.com>,
Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Aaron Jones <aaronmdjones@...il.com>, Ted Ts'o <tytso@....edu>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
lkml <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...uxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC] Implement ambient capability set.
On Wed, 4 Feb 2015, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> But someone will want to run *bash* as an untrusted user with, say,
> CAP_NET_BIND permitted and ambient. Then that user has a non-empty
> ambient set, and they can run a setuid-root program, and who knows
> what will go wrong? Requiring no_new_privs would prevent this type of
> failure entirely.
>
> If we need to relax that later, it's easy, I think. The rule's not
> that convoluted, and there's precedent for having new fancy features
> require setting no_new_privs first.
It would make the patch pointless. The case of having to run a setuid root
prpgrams from a shell that has the caps enabled is a routine thing for
testing etc.
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