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Message-ID: <CALCETrUmMA9sK4SJCSiF24iAiPLMBf=-JBw6TcLV+aLt_eN=Sw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 6 Feb 2015 12:12:41 -0800
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: "Dmitry V. Levin" <ldv@...linux.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
"linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org"
<linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
Linux MIPS Mailing List <linux-mips@...ux-mips.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...mgrid.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@...il.com>,
Michael Kerrisk-manpages <mtk.manpages@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 3/5] x86: Split syscall_trace_enter into two phases
On Fri, Feb 6, 2015 at 12:07 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
> On Fri, Feb 6, 2015 at 11:32 AM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> wrote:
>> On Fri, Feb 6, 2015 at 11:23 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
>>> And especially since a ptracer
>>> can change syscalls during syscall-enter-stop to any syscall it wants,
>>> bypassing seccomp. This condition is already documented.
>>
>> If a ptracer (using PTRACE_SYSCALL) were to get the entry callback
>> before seccomp, then this oddity would go away, which might be a good
>> thing. A ptracer could change the syscall, but seccomp would based on
>> what the ptracer changed the syscall to.
>
> I want kill events to trigger immediately. I don't want to leave the
> ptrace surface available on a SECCOMP_RET_KILL. So maybe it can be
> seccomp phase 1, then ptrace, then seccomp phase 2? And pass more
> information between phases to determine how things should behave
> beyond just "skip"?
I thought so too, originally, but I'm far less convinced now, for two reasons:
1. I think that a lot of filters these days use RET_ERRNO heavily, so
this won't benefit them.
2. I'm not convinced it really reduces the attack surface for anyone.
Unless your filter is literally "return SECCOMP_RET_KILL", then the
seccomp-filtered task can always cause the ptracer to get a pair of
syscall notifications. Also, the task can send itself signals (using
page faults, breakpoints, etc) and cause ptrace events via other
paths.
--Andy
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