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Message-ID: <20150206210309.GA32377@www.outflux.net>
Date: Fri, 6 Feb 2015 13:03:09 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: akpm@...ux-foundation.org
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
"Dmitry V. Levin" <ldv@...linux.org>
Subject: [PATCH] seccomp: cap SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO data to MAX_ERRNO
The value resulting from the SECCOMP_RET_DATA mask could exceed MAX_ERRNO
when setting errno during a SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO filter action. This makes sure
we have a reliable value being set, so that an invalid errno will not be
ignored by userspace.
Reported-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@...linux.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
---
kernel/seccomp.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index 4ef9687ac115..4f44028943e6 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -629,7 +629,9 @@ static u32 __seccomp_phase1_filter(int this_syscall, struct seccomp_data *sd)
switch (action) {
case SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO:
- /* Set the low-order 16-bits as a errno. */
+ /* Set low-order bits as an errno, capped at MAX_ERRNO. */
+ if (data > MAX_ERRNO)
+ data = MAX_ERRNO;
syscall_set_return_value(current, task_pt_regs(current),
-data, 0);
goto skip;
--
1.9.1
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
--
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