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Message-ID: <alpine.DEB.2.11.1502231041580.21784@gentwo.org>
Date: Mon, 23 Feb 2015 10:44:32 -0600 (CST)
From: Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>
To: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...ntu.com>
cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Aaron Jones <aaronmdjones@...il.com>, Ted Ts'o <tytso@....edu>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, akpm@...uxfoundation.org,
"Andrew G. Morgan" <morgan@...nel.org>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@...il.com>,
Markku Savela <msa@...h.iki.fi>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] capabilities: Ambient capability set V1
On Mon, 23 Feb 2015, Serge Hallyn wrote:
> The core concern for amorgan is that an unprivileged user not be
> able to cause a privileged program to run in a way that it fails to
> drop privilege before running unprivileged-user-provided code.
I do not see a problem with dropping privilege since the ambient set
is supposed to be preserved across a drop of priviledge.
> Since your desire is precisely for a mode where dropping privilege
> works as usual, but exec then re-gains some or all of that privilege,
I would say that the ambient set stays active even if the setuid binary
drops to regular perms.
> we need to either agree on a way to enter that mode that ordinary
> use caes can't be tricked into using, or find a way for legacy
> users to be tpiped off as to what's going on (without having to be
> re-written)
Well if the ambient set is completely separate then the existing
semantics are preserved while the ambient set stays active as intended.
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