Date:	Mon, 09 Mar 2015 18:08:16 -0500
From:	ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To:	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc:	Dave Hansen <dave@...1.net>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 1/2] fs proc: make pagemap a privileged interface

Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> writes:

> On Mon, Mar 9, 2015 at 3:13 PM, Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com> wrote:
>> Dave Hansen <dave@...1.net> writes:
>>
>>> From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
>>>
>>> Physical addresses are sensitive information.  There are
>>> existing, known exploits that are made easier if physical
>>> information is available.  Here is one example:
>>>
>>>       http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~vpk/papers/ret2dir.sec14.pdf
>>>
>>> If you know the physical address of something you also know at
>>> which kernel virtual address you can find something (modulo
>>> highmem).  It means that things that keep the kernel from
>>> accessing user mappings (like SMAP/SMEP) can be worked around
>>> because the _kernel_ mapping can get used instead.
>>>
>>> But, /proc/$pid/pagemap exposes the physical addresses of all
>>> pages accessible to userspace.  This works against all of the
>>> efforts to keep kernel addresses out of places where unprivileged
>>> apps can find them.
>>>
>>> This patch introduces a "paranoid" option for /proc.  It can be
>>> enabled like this:
>>>
>>>       mount -o remount,paranoid /proc
>>>
>>> Or when /proc is mounted initially.  When 'paranoid' mode is
>>> active, opens to /proc/$pid/pagemap will return -EPERM for users
>>> without CAP_SYS_RAWIO.  It can be disabled like this:
>>>
>>>       mount -o remount,notparanoid /proc
>>>
>>> The option is applied to the pid namespace, so an app that wanted
>>> a separate policy from the rest of the system could get run in
>>> its own pid namespace.
>>>
>>> I'm not really that stuck on the name.  I'm not opposed to making
>>> it apply only to pagemap or to giving it a pagemap-specific
>>> name.
>>>
>>> pagemap is also the kind of feature that could be used to escalate
>>> privileged from root in to the kernel.  It probably needs to be
>>> protected in the same way that /dev/mem or module loading is in
>>> cases where the kernel needs to be protected from root, thus the
>>> choice to use CAP_SYS_RAWIO.
>>
>>
>> There is already a way to make pagemap go away.  It is called
>> CONFIG_PROC_PAGE_MONITOR.
>>
>> I suspect the right answer here is if you enable kernel address
>> randomization you disable CONFIG_PROC_PAGE_MONTIOR.  Aka you make the
>> two options conflict with each other.
>
> It's not a good idea to make CONFIG options conflict with each other
> like this as it puts distros is a tricky spot to decide which to use.
> Allowing both and having a runtime flag of some kind tends to be the
> better option (e.g. kASLR vs Hibernation).

But there is a fundamental conflict.  As such it might as well be
expressed in Kconfig.

>> That is a lot less code and a lot less to maintain.
>>
>> On the other hand if this is truly a valuable interface that you can't
>> part with we need an alternative to pagemaps that does the same job
>> with out the exploit potential.  And I don't how to do that.
>>
>> Arguing in favor of just making the options conflict is the fact that
>> kernel address randomization is pretty much snake oil.  At least on
>> x86_64 the address pool is so small it can be trivially brute forced.  I
>> think there are maybe 10 bits you can randomize within.
>>
>> As for a way to disable this I expect it would do better with something
>> like a set once flag that prevents a process and all of it's children
>> from accessing this file.
>>
>> *Blink* *Blink* Did you say you are worried about escalting privileges
>> from root into the kernel space.  That is non-sense.  We give root the
>> power to shot themselves in the foot and any proc option will be
>> something that root will be able to get around.
>>
>> The pieces of the patch description don't add up.
>
> No, that's an entirely valid use-case. You can trust the kernel but
> not root. This is the point of the "trusted_kernel" patch series that
> disables all sorts of dangerous interfaces that allow root to get at
> physical memory.
>
> This situation is more a memory leak than a direct compromise, so it
> seems like providing at least some runtime control of it (separate
> from potential future "trusted_kernel" stuff) makes sense.

I am too tired to argue about the kASLR snake-oil.

I do not think a proc mount option is at all apropriate for controlling
the behavior of the pagemap file.  And "paranoid" is entirely too
generic of a string to have any meaning.

Either just tighten the permissions when kASLR is enabled, or have the
file go away entirely.

If you want run-time knobs there are all kinds of run-time knobs you can
use.

If the concern is to protect against root getting into the kernel the
"trusted_kernel" snake-oil just compile out the pagemap file.  Nothing
else is remotely interesting from a mainenance point of view.

As I said.
Nacked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>

Eric
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