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Open Source and information security mailing list archives
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Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2015 12:35:26 -0400 From: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov> To: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>, LSM <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>, LKLM <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org> CC: Paul Moore <pmoore@...hat.com>, John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>, Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>, Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/7 v21] LSM: Multiple concurrent LSMs On 03/11/2015 12:25 PM, Stephen Smalley wrote: > On 03/09/2015 09:13 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote: >> Subject: [PATCH 0/7 v21] LSM: Multiple concurrent LSMs >> >> Replace the current ad hoc stacking of the capabilities >> and Yama security modules with a generalized stacking scheme. >> >> The old structure had a single set of module hooks contained >> in a security_operations structure. This structure was initialized >> with a set of stubs referred to as the "capabilities" module. >> In fact only a few of these hooks actually did anything useful. >> When a module replaced the capabilities module the entries >> supplied replaced those from the capabilities module. The >> new hook was expected to call the replaced capability code >> if "stacking" was desired, which it usually was. Yama stacking >> is done by ifdefs in the security infrastructure. >> >> The new structure provides a list of module hooks for each >> interface. The non-trivial functions from the capabilities >> module are add to the list first. If Yama stacking is configured >> the Yama functions are added next. If a module is specified as >> the "default" module, or is specified on the command line, it >> is added next. >> >> Functions are called in the order added to the list. The >> security interfaces stop when a function indicates an access >> denial. It is possible for a list to be empty. That is treated >> as a success in most cases. >> >> Each security module provides an array of function list entries. >> This is initialized with the information needed to properly add >> the entries to the function lists. >> >> The sheer size of this patch set is somewhat frightening. This >> is an artifact of the number of security interfaces involved and >> except for a few cases the changes are mechanical in nature. >> Except for the removal of some information specific to the security >> module infrastructure itself, the change is transparent to the rest >> of the kernel. >> >> This is going to break out-of-tree security modules. It's easy to >> update a module to the new scheme, and I'd be happy to do it for >> any module I know about, but if it isn't in the tree, I don't know >> about it. >> >> The stacking of modules that use the security blob pointers >> cred->security, inode->i_security, etc has not been addressed. >> That is future work with a delightful set of issues. >> >> This patch set is based on James Morris' security-next tree, >> which is itself based on Linus' 4.0-rc1. It reflects the 11 >> patches of v20. >> >> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com> > > Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov> > > Passes the selinux-testsuite with SELINUX alone or > SELINUX+YAMA+YAMA_STACKED. Hmm..sorry, I missed something. Rescinding my ACK; comments to follow. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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