[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <CALCETrXNDV5tdK7WaP55akZz4yR-X4i3GYUHARKPzbbF9sUJSA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2015 10:30:56 -0700
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To: Jann Horn <jann@...jh.net>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
Mikael Pettersson <mikpelinux@...il.com>,
linux-man <linux-man@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Russell King <linux@....linux.org.uk>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
Jeff Dike <jdike@...toit.com>,
Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] seccomp.2: Add note about alarm(2) not being sufficient
to limit runtime
On Thu, Mar 12, 2015 at 6:07 AM, Jann Horn <jann@...jh.net> wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 11, 2015 at 10:43:50PM +0100, Mikael Pettersson wrote:
>> Jann Horn writes:
>> > Or should I throw this patch away and write a patch
>> > for the prctl() manpage instead that documents that
>> > being able to call sigreturn() implies being able to
>> > effectively call sigprocmask(), at least on some
>> > architectures like X86?
>>
>> Well, that is the semantics of sigreturn(). It is essentially
>> setcontext() [which includes the actions of sigprocmask()], but
>> with restrictions on parameter placement (at least on x86).
>>
>> You could introduce some setting to restrict that aspect for
>> seccomp processes, but you can't change this for normal processes
>> without breaking things.
>
> Then I think it's probably better and easier to just document the existing
> behavior? If a new setting would have to be introduced and developers would
> need to be aware of that, it's probably easier to just tell everyone to use
> SIGKILL.
>
> Does this manpage patch look good?
Looks good to me.
FWIW, if we wanted to fix this in the kernel, I think it could be
easier to add SIG_KILL which would be just like SIG_DFL except always
fatal even if masked rather than coming up with complicated changes to
sigreturn.
--Andy
>
> ---
> man2/seccomp.2 | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/man2/seccomp.2 b/man2/seccomp.2
> index 702ceb8..f762d07 100644
> --- a/man2/seccomp.2
> +++ b/man2/seccomp.2
> @@ -64,6 +64,31 @@ Strict secure computing mode is useful for number-crunching
> applications that may need to execute untrusted byte code, perhaps
> obtained by reading from a pipe or socket.
>
> +Note that although the calling thread can no longer call
> +.BR sigprocmask (2),
> +it can use
> +.BR sigreturn (2)
> +to block all signals apart from
> +.BR SIGKILL
> +and
> +.BR SIGSTOP .
> +Therefore, to reliably terminate it,
> +.BR SIGKILL
> +has to be used, meaning that e.g.
> +.BR alarm (2)
> +is not sufficient for restricting its runtime. Instead, use
> +.BR timer_create (2)
> +with
> +.BR SIGEV_SIGNAL
> +and
> +.BR sigev_signo
> +set to
> +.BR SIGKILL
> +or use
> +.BR setrlimit (2)
> +to set the hard limit for
> +.BR RLIMIT_CPU .
> +
> This operation is available only if the kernel is configured with
> .BR CONFIG_SECCOMP
> enabled.
> --
> 2.1.4
>
--
Andy Lutomirski
AMA Capital Management, LLC
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists