[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-Id: <1426282708-21485-7-git-send-email-matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2015 11:38:22 -1000
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@...ula.com>
To: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Cc: james.l.morris@...cle.com, serge@...lyn.com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, keescook@...omium.org, hpa@...or.com,
gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk,
Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@...ula.com>
Subject: [PATCH 06/12] acpi: Limit access to custom_method if trusted_kernel is true
custom_method effectively allows arbitrary access to system memory, making
it possible for an attacker to modify the kernel at runtime. Prevent this
if trusted_kernel is true.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@...ula.com>
---
drivers/acpi/custom_method.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
index c68e724..774bb7b 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/debugfs.h>
#include <linux/acpi.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include "internal.h"
@@ -29,6 +30,9 @@ static ssize_t cm_write(struct file *file, const char __user * user_buf,
struct acpi_table_header table;
acpi_status status;
+ if (get_trusted_kernel())
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (!(*ppos)) {
/* parse the table header to get the table length */
if (count <= sizeof(struct acpi_table_header))
--
2.1.0
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists