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Message-ID: <87k2yflqqf.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 08:04:40 -0500
From: ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Dave Hansen <dave@...1.net>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, tytso@....edu,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com
Subject: Re: [RFCv2][PATCH 1/2] fs proc: make pagemap a privileged interface
Dave Hansen <dave@...1.net> writes:
> From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
>
> Changes from v1:
> * Do not allow a child pid namespace to unset paranoid
> when its parent had it set.
> * Update description text to clarify the options we
> have to solve this problem.
Again.
Nacked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
The option name "paranoid" is entirely too general. Who knows what
it referrs to.
A mount option is not an appropriate place to control one small bit of
policy like this. Proc mount options are a real pain in the butt to
deal with and to maintain.
Further a per pid namespace decision does not actually work, for having
restricted policy only for a small set of processes because it is only
with very careful container setup that you would expose this policy.
If you really need a subset of processes with a restricted policy make
it a prctl, and bloat struct task. Then disallow a process with the
prctl set from reading the file.
Eric
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