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Message-ID: <550972A7.9030100@iogearbox.net>
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2015 13:42:15 +0100
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
To: Stephan Mueller <smueller@...onox.de>,
Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@...essinduktion.org>
CC: mancha <mancha1@...o.com>, tytso@....edu,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
herbert@...dor.apana.org.au, dborkman@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [BUG/PATCH] kernel RNG and its secrets
On 03/18/2015 01:20 PM, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> Am Mittwoch, 18. März 2015, 13:19:07 schrieb Hannes Frederic Sowa:
>
> Hi Hannes,
>
>> On Wed, Mar 18, 2015, at 13:14, Stephan Mueller wrote:
>>> Am Mittwoch, 18. März 2015, 13:02:12 schrieb Hannes Frederic Sowa:
>>>
>>> Hi Hannes,
>>>
>>>> On Wed, Mar 18, 2015, at 12:09, Stephan Mueller wrote:
>>>>> Am Mittwoch, 18. März 2015, 11:56:43 schrieb Daniel Borkmann:
>>>>>> On 03/18/2015 11:50 AM, Hannes Frederic Sowa wrote:
>>>>>>> On Wed, Mar 18, 2015, at 10:53, mancha wrote:
>>>>>>>> Hi.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The kernel RNG introduced memzero_explicit in d4c5efdb9777 to
>>>>>>>> protect
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> memory cleansing against things like dead store optimization:
>>>>>>>> void memzero_explicit(void *s, size_t count)
>>>>>>>> {
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> memset(s, 0, count);
>>>>>>>> OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(s);
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> }
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR, introduced in fe8c8a126806 to protect
>>>>>>>> crypto_memneq>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> against timing analysis, is defined when using gcc as:
>>>>>>>> #define OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(var) __asm__ ("" : "=r" (var) :
>>>>>>>> "0"
>>>>>>>> (var))
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> My tests with gcc 4.8.2 on x86 find it insufficient to prevent
>>>>>>>> gcc
>>>>>>>> from optimizing out memset (i.e. secrets remain in memory).
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Two things that do work:
>>>>>>>> __asm__ __volatile__ ("" : "=r" (var) : "0" (var))
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> You are correct, volatile signature should be added to
>>>>>>> OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR. Because we use an output variable "=r", gcc
>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>> allowed to check if it is needed and may remove the asm
>>>>>>> statement.
>>>>>>> Another option would be to just use var as an input variable -
>>>>>>> asm
>>>>>>> blocks without output variables are always considered being
>>>>>>> volatile
>>>>>>> by gcc.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Can you send a patch?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I don't think it is security critical, as Daniel pointed out,
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> call
>>>>>>> will happen because the function is an external call to the
>>>>>>> crypto
>>>>>>> functions, thus the compiler has to flush memory on return.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Just had a look.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> $ gdb vmlinux
>>>>>> (gdb) disassemble memzero_explicit
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Dump of assembler code for function memzero_explicit:
>>>>>> 0xffffffff813a18b0 <+0>: push %rbp
>>>>>> 0xffffffff813a18b1 <+1>: mov %rsi,%rdx
>>>>>> 0xffffffff813a18b4 <+4>: xor %esi,%esi
>>>>>> 0xffffffff813a18b6 <+6>: mov %rsp,%rbp
>>>>>> 0xffffffff813a18b9 <+9>: callq 0xffffffff813a7120
>>>
>>> <memset>
>>>
>>>>>> 0xffffffff813a18be <+14>: pop %rbp
>>>>>> 0xffffffff813a18bf <+15>: retq
>>>>>>
>>>>>> End of assembler dump.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (gdb) disassemble extract_entropy
>>>>>> [...]
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 0xffffffff814a5000 <+304>: sub %r15,%rbx
>>>>>> 0xffffffff814a5003 <+307>: jne 0xffffffff814a4f80
>>>>>>
>>>>>> <extract_entropy+176> 0xffffffff814a5009 <+313>: mov %r12,%rdi
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 0xffffffff814a500c <+316>: mov $0xa,%esi
>>>>>> 0xffffffff814a5011 <+321>: callq 0xffffffff813a18b0
>>>>>>
>>>>>> <memzero_explicit> 0xffffffff814a5016 <+326>: mov
>>>>>> -0x48(%rbp),%rax
>>>>>> [...]
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I would be fine with __volatile__.
>>>>>
>>>>> Are we sure that simply adding a __volatile__ works in any case? I
>>>>> just did a test with a simple user space app:
>>>>>
>>>>> static inline void memset_secure(void *s, int c, size_t n)
>>>>> {
>>>>>
>>>>> memset(s, c, n);
>>>>> //__asm__ __volatile__("": : :"memory");
>>>>> __asm__ __volatile__("" : "=r" (s) : "0" (s));
>>>>>
>>>>> }
>>>>
>>>> Good point, thanks!
>>>>
>>>> Of course an input or output of s does not force the memory pointed
>>>> to
>>>> by s being flushed.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> My proposal would be to add a
>>>>
>>>> #define OPTIMIZER_HIDE_MEM(ptr, len) __asm__ __volatile__ ("" : :
>>>> "m"(
>>>> ({ struct { u8 b[len]; } *p = (void *)ptr ; *p; }) )
>>>>
>>>> and use this in the code function.
>>>>
>>>> This is documented in gcc manual 6.43.2.5.
>>>
>>> That one adds the zeroization instructuctions. But now there are much
>>> more than with the barrier.
>>>
>>> 400469: 48 c7 04 24 00 00 00 movq $0x0,(%rsp)
>>> 400470: 00
>>> 400471: 48 c7 44 24 08 00 00 movq $0x0,0x8(%rsp)
>>> 400478: 00 00
>>> 40047a: c7 44 24 10 00 00 00 movl $0x0,0x10(%rsp)
>>> 400481: 00
>>> 400482: 48 c7 44 24 20 00 00 movq $0x0,0x20(%rsp)
>>> 400489: 00 00
>>> 40048b: 48 c7 44 24 28 00 00 movq $0x0,0x28(%rsp)
>>> 400492: 00 00
>>> 400494: c7 44 24 30 00 00 00 movl $0x0,0x30(%rsp)
>>> 40049b: 00
>>>
>>> Any ideas?
>>
>> Hmm, correct definition of u8?
>
> I use unsigned char
>>
>> Which version of gcc do you use? I can't see any difference if I
>> compile your example at -O2.
>
> gcc-Version 4.9.2 20150212 (Red Hat 4.9.2-6) (GCC)
I can see the same with the gcc version I previously posted. So
it clears the 20 bytes from your example (movq, movq, movl) at
two locations, presumably buf[] and b[].
Best,
Daniel
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