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Message-Id: <20150324140642.7f8b9da9782fd7164e574f38@linux-foundation.org>
Date: Tue, 24 Mar 2015 14:06:42 -0700
From: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
To: Sanidhya Kashyap <sanidhya.gatech@...il.com>
Cc: mfasheh@...e.com, jlbec@...lplan.org, ocfs2-devel@....oracle.com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, taesoo@...ech.edu,
sanidhya@...ech.edu, blee@...ech.edu, csong84@...ech.edu,
changwoo@...ech.edu
Subject: Re: [Ocfs2-devel] [PATCH] ocfs2: trusted xattr missing
CAP_SYS_ADMIN check
On Tue, 24 Mar 2015 11:46:32 -0400 Sanidhya Kashyap <sanidhya.gatech@...il.com> wrote:
> The trusted extended attributes are only visible to the process which hvae
> CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability but the check is missing in ocfs2 xattr_handler
> trusted list. The check is important because this will be used for implementing
> mechanisms in the userspace for which other ordinary processes should not
> have access to.
>
> ...
>
> --- a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c
> +++ b/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c
> @@ -7326,6 +7326,9 @@ static size_t ocfs2_xattr_trusted_list(struct dentry *dentry, char *list,
> const size_t prefix_len = XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN;
> const size_t total_len = prefix_len + name_len + 1;
>
> + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> + return 0;
> +
> if (list && total_len <= list_size) {
> memcpy(list, XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX, prefix_len);
> memcpy(list + prefix_len, name, name_len);
Ouch. Won't this break existing userspace?
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