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Message-ID: <CALCETrW9ckw=7-1JSyFkenhFu2_1MvVqjA+inOmsuuWemGaU0w@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2015 07:31:22 -0700
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To: Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>,
Andrew Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
"Ted Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...uxfoundation.org>,
"Andrew G. Morgan" <morgan@...nel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@...il.com>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
Aaron Jones <aaronmdjones@...il.com>,
Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Markku Savela <msa@...h.iki.fi>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>
Subject: Re: [RFC] capabilities: Ambient capabilities
On Mar 30, 2015 7:55 AM, "Christoph Lameter" <cl@...ux.com> wrote:
>
> On Sat, 14 Mar 2015, Andrew G. Morgan wrote:
>
> >
> > I thought I did. Please implement a lockable secure bit and I will
>
> Would this suffice? It puts the CAP_SETPCAP limitation back to how it
> was in my earlier patch.
>
I really don't like that variant. CAP_SETPCAP is dangerous and so
absurdly powerful that people really shouldn't hand it out.
I'll submit a new version this week with the securebits. Sorry for the delay.
--Andy
>
>
> Subject: ambient caps: Allow disabling with SETPCAP
>
> Do not allow setting ambient caps if CAP_SETPCAP is not set.
>
> Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>
>
> Index: linux/security/commoncap.c
> ===================================================================
> --- linux.orig/security/commoncap.c
> +++ linux/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -962,6 +962,9 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned
> if (((!cap_valid(arg3)) | arg4 | arg5))
> return -EINVAL;
>
> + if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SETPCAP))
> + return -EPERM;
> +
> if (arg2 == PR_CAP_AMBIENT_GET) {
> return !!cap_raised(current_cred()->cap_ambient, arg3);
> } else if (arg2 != PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE &&
--
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