Date:	Wed, 8 Apr 2015 15:38:57 -0700
From:	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To:	David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@...il.com>
Cc:	Tom Gundersen <teg@...m.no>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
	One Thousand Gnomes <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
	Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>,
	Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Daniel Mack <daniel@...que.org>,
	Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 00/14] Add kdbus implementation

[Trying again due to HTML mail goof.  Trimming and responding better, too.]


On Fri, Apr 3, 2015 at 4:51 AM, David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@...il.com> wrote:
> Hi
>
> On Tue, Mar 31, 2015 at 8:29 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> wrote:
>> On Tue, Mar 31, 2015 at 8:10 AM, Tom Gundersen <teg@...m.no> wrote:
>>> On Tue, Mar 31, 2015 at 3:58 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> IOW you're taking something that you dislike aspects of and shoving
>>>> most of it in the kernel.  That guarantees us an API in the kernel
>>>> that even the creators don't really like.  This is, IMO, very
>>>> unfortunate.
>>>
>>> This is a misrepresentation of what David wrote. We do want this API
>>> regardless of dbus1 compatibility, but compatibility is by itself a
>>> sufficient motivation. A further motivation is reliable introspection,
>>> since this meta-data allows listing current peers on the bus and
>>> showing their identities. That's hugely useful to make the bus
>>> transparent to admins.
>>
>> I've heard the following use cases for per-connection metadata:
>>
>>  - Authenticating to dbus1 services.
>
> Not necessarily authentication, but we need to support the legacy API,
> for whatever reason it was used by old applications. But..
>
>>  - Identifying connected users for admin diagnostics.
>>
>> I've heard the following use cases for per-message metadata:
>>
>>  - Logging.
>>
>>  - Authenticating to kdbus services that want this style of authentication.
>
> ..please note that authentication on DBus has always been done with
> per-message metadata (see polkit history). However, this had to be
> reverted some years ago as it is racy (it used /proc for that, which
> can be exploited by exec'ing setuid binaries). However, the
> per-message metadata authentication worked very well for _years_
> (minus the race..), so this is already a well-established scheme. With
> kdbus we can finally implement this in a race-free manner.
>
> [...]
>> This is simply not okay for a modern interface, and in my opinion the
>> kernel should not carry code to support new APIs with weakly defined
>> security semantics.  It's important that one be able to tell what the
>> security implications of one's code is without cross-referencing with
>> the implementation of the server's you're interacting with.
>
> Again, I disagree. Our concepts are established and used on UDS and
> DBus for decades.

SO_PASSCRED does not justify anything in my book.  It was a mistake
and it remains a minor disaster.  Please don't use it as justification
for something being a good idea.

Similarly, the fact that the *receiver* chooses which of SO_PASSCRED
and SO_PEERCRED to use is awful.

>
> Yes, we provide two ways to retrieve metadata, but the kernel offers
> several more paths to gather that information. Just because those APIs
> are available does not mean they should be used for authentication. We
> mandate per-message metadata. If applications use per-connection
> metadata, /proc, netlink, or random data, they're doing it wrong.

ISTM kdbus is trying to add three more interfaces, at least two of
which are also doing it wrong.  (Which two is debatable.)

>
> Furthermore, dbus provides pretty complete and straightforward
> libraries which hide that from you. If you use glib, qt or sd-bus, you
> don't even need to deal with all that.

Libraries can't hide the issue of whether:

init_my_favorite_library();
connect_to_thingy();
setresuid(nobody);

is secure.  It is either secure, insecure, or ambiguous.
Unfortunately, kdbus as currently proposed is aiming for ambiguous.

>
>> To top that off, the kdbus policy mechanism has truly bizarre effects
>> with respect to services that have unique ids and well-known names.
>> That, too, is apparently for compatibility.
>>
>> This all feels to me like a total of about four people are going to
>> understand the tangle that is kdbus security, and that's bad.  I think
>> that the kernel should insist that new security-critical mechanisms
>> make sense and be hard to misuse.  The current design of kdbus, in
>> contrast, feel like it will be very hard to use correctly.
>
> Native kdbus clients are authenticated with their credentials at time
> of method call. Legacy clients will always have their credentials at
> time of connect in effect. No fallbacks, no choices. It's a simple
> question whether it's a legacy client or not.
> Sounds simple to me.

I had the distinct impression that the kdbus-client-to-dbus1-server
proxy used kdbus clients' connection metadata.  I could be wrong here.

--Andy
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