lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date:	Wed, 22 Apr 2015 12:29:54 -0400
From:	Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>
To:	Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>
Cc:	lizefan@...wei.com, mingo@...hat.com, peterz@...radead.org,
	richard@....at, fweisbec@...il.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	cgroups@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 4/4] cgroups: implement the PIDs subsystem

> @@ -0,0 +1,368 @@
> +/*
> + * Process number limiting controller for cgroups.
> + *
> + * Used to allow a cgroup hierarchy to stop any new processes
> + * from fork()ing after a certain limit is reached.
> + *
> + * Since it is trivial to hit the task limit without hitting
> + * any kmemcg limits in place, PIDs are a fundamental resource.
> + * As such, PID exhaustion must be preventable in the scope of
> + * a cgroup hierarchy by allowing resource limiting of the
> + * number of tasks in a cgroup.
> + *
> + * In order to use the `pids` controller, set the maximum number
> + * of tasks in pids.max (this is not available in the root cgroup
> + * for obvious reasons). The number of processes currently
> + * in the cgroup is given by pids.current. Organisational operations
> + * are not blocked by cgroup policies, so it is possible to have
> + * pids.current > pids.max. However, fork()s will still not work.
> + *
> + * To set a cgroup to have no limit, set pids.max to "max". fork()
> + * will return -EBUSY if forking would cause a cgroup policy to be
> + * violated.
> + *
> + * pids.current tracks all child cgroup hierarchies, so
> + * parent/pids.current is a superset of parent/child/pids.current.
> + *
> + * Copyright (C) 2015 Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>

The above text looks wrapped too narrow.

> +struct pids_cgroup {
> +	struct cgroup_subsys_state	css;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Use 64-bit types so that we can safely represent "max" as
> +	 * (PID_MAX_LIMIT + 1).
            ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
...
> +static struct cgroup_subsys_state *
> +pids_css_alloc(struct cgroup_subsys_state *parent)
> +{
> +	struct pids_cgroup *pids;
> +
> +	pids = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pids_cgroup), GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!pids)
> +		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> +
> +	pids->limit = PIDS_MAX;
                      ^^^^^^^^^

> +	atomic64_set(&pids->counter, 0);
> +	return &pids->css;
> +}
...
> +static void pids_detach(struct cgroup_subsys_state *old_css,
> +			struct task_struct *task)
> +{
> +	struct pids_cgroup *old_pids = css_pids(old_css);
> +
> +	pids_uncharge(old_pids, 1);
> +}

You can do the above as a part of can/cancel.

> +static int pids_can_fork(struct task_struct *task, void **private)

Maybe @priv_p or something which signifies it's of different type from
others?

> +{
...
> +	rcu_read_lock();
> +	css = task_css(current, pids_cgrp_id);
> +	if (!css_tryget_online(css)) {
> +		retval = -EBUSY;
> +		goto err_rcu_unlock;
> +	}
> +	rcu_read_unlock();

Hmmm... so, the above is guaranteed to succeed in finite amount of
time (the race window is actually very narrow) and it'd be silly to
fail fork because a task was being moved across cgroups.

I think it'd be a good idea to implement task_get_css() which loops
and returns the current css for the requested subsystem with reference
count bumped and it can use css_tryget() too.  Holding a ref doesn't
prevent css from dying anyway, so it doesn't make any difference.

> +static void pids_fork(struct task_struct *task, void *private)
> +{
...
> +	rcu_read_lock();
> +	css = task_css(task, pids_cgrp_id);
> +	css_get(css);

Why is this safe?  What guarantees that css's ref isn't already zero
at this point?

> +	rcu_read_unlock();
> +
> +	pids = css_pids(css);
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * The association has changed, we have to revert and reapply the
> +	 * charge/uncharge on the wrong hierarchy to the current one. Since
> +	 * the association can only change due to an organisation event, its
> +	 * okay for us to ignore the limit in this case.
> +	 */
> +	if (pids != old_pids) {
> +		pids_uncharge(old_pids, 1);
> +		pids_charge(pids, 1);
> +	}
> +
> +	css_put(css);
> +	css_put(old_css);
> +}
...
> +static ssize_t pids_max_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of, char *buf,
> +			      size_t nbytes, loff_t off)
> +{
> +	struct cgroup_subsys_state *css = of_css(of);
> +	struct pids_cgroup *pids = css_pids(css);
> +	int64_t limit;
> +	int err;
> +
> +	buf = strstrip(buf);
> +	if (!strcmp(buf, PIDS_MAX_STR)) {
> +		limit = PIDS_MAX;
> +		goto set_limit;
> +	}
> +
> +	err = kstrtoll(buf, 0, &limit);
> +	if (err)
> +		return err;
> +
> +	/* We use INT_MAX as the maximum value of pid_t. */
> +	if (limit < 0 || limit > INT_MAX)

This is kinda weird if we're using PIDS_MAX for max as it may end up
showing "max" after some larger number is written to the file.

Thanks.

-- 
tejun
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ