Message-ID: <CALCETrX8vkqnAoZBpopGMO_BjJ6VRFWLQOuUnWA5we1KgkNpUw@mail.gmail.com>
Date:	Wed, 22 Apr 2015 12:36:12 -0700
From:	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To:	Michal Hocko <mhocko@...e.cz>
Cc:	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
	Daniel Mack <daniel@...que.org>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
	One Thousand Gnomes <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>,
	Tom Gundersen <teg@...m.no>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
	David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@...il.com>,
	Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] kdbus for 4.1-rc1

On Apr 22, 2015 7:57 AM, "Michal Hocko" <mhocko@...e.cz> wrote:
>
> On Tue 21-04-15 11:11:35, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > On Tue, Apr 21, 2015 at 7:27 AM, Michal Hocko <mhocko@...e.cz> wrote:
> > > On Tue 21-04-15 16:01:01, David Herrmann wrote:
> > >> Hi
> > >>
> > >> On Tue, Apr 21, 2015 at 2:20 PM, Michal Hocko <mhocko@...e.cz> wrote:
> > >> > On Tue 21-04-15 12:17:49, David Herrmann wrote:
> > >> >> Hi
> > >> >>
> > >> >> On Tue, Apr 21, 2015 at 11:35 AM, One Thousand Gnomes
> > >> >> <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk> wrote:
> > >> >> >> On top of that, I think that someone into resource management needs to
> > >> >> >> seriously consider whether having a broadcast send do get_user_pages
> > >> >> >> or the equivalent on pages supplied by untrusted recipients (plural!)
> > >> >> >> is a good idea.
> > >> >> >
> > >> >> > Oh but its so much fun if you pass pages belonging to a device driver, or
> > >> >> > pass bits of a GEM object thereby keeping entire graphics textures
> > >> >> > referenced 8)
> > >> >>
> > >> >> We do not use GUP, nor do we pass around pinned pages. All we use is
> > >> >> __vfs_read() / __vfs_write() on shmem. Whether generic_file_write() /
> > >> >> copy_from_user() internally relies on GUP or not, is an orthogonal
> > >> >> issue that does not belong here.
> > >> >
> > >> > It kind of does AFAIU.
> > >>
> > >> No, it is not. The issue with GUP is that you elevate the page
> > >> ref-count and thus prevent lru isolation, sealing, whatsoever.
> > >
> > > The point was that such a memory might be not present yet and need a
> > > page fault with all the side effects - memory reclaim, memcg charge...
> > >
> > >> I cannot see how it is related to kdbus. However, ...
> > >>
> > >> > If for nothing else then the memcg reasons mentioned in
> > >> > other email (http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=142953380508188). If an
> > >> > untrusted user is allowed to hand over a shmem backed buffer which hasn't
> > >> > been charged yet (read faulted in) and then kdbus forced to fault it in
> > >> > a different user's context then you basically allow to hide memory
> > >> > allocations from the memcg. That is a clear show stopper.
> > >> >
> > >> > Or have I misunderstood the way how shmem buffers are used here?
> > >>
> > >> ..as you mentioned memcg, lets figure that out here. shmem buffers are
> > >> used as receive-buffers by kdbus peers. They are read-only to
> > >> user-space. All allocations are done by the kernel on message passing.
> > >
> > > OK, so the shmem buffer is allocated on the kernels behalf and under
> > > its control and no userspace can hand over one to kdbus. Do I get
> > > it right? If yes then the memcg escape I was describing above is
> > > not possible of course. This wasn't clear to me from the previous
> > > discussion. Thanks for the clarification!
> >
> > I'm still missing something here, I think.  At the time of pool
> > creation, the kernel calls shmem_file_setup in the context of the
> > untrusted user.  Then, when a privileged daemon broadcasts, the kernel
> > calls vfs_iter_write or similar, thus allocating the page, right?  I
> > don't see why the page would be allocated early or why vfs_iter_write
> > and the associated shmem code would care what memcg created the shmem
> > file -- all of that code seems to use current's memcg on brief
> > inspection.
>
> Yes it is the current task on the first charge or the original memcg on
> the swap in. But my understanding from the above, and I haven't read the
> code yet, is that the untrusted userspace is only reader from the buffer
> and isn't allowed to modify the buffer.
>
> > Bear in mind that the bad guy gets to use madvise, etc to mess around
> > with the page cache state.
>
> How can an untrusted user play with shmem when it is read-only?
> shmem_file_setup shouls create an unlinked file so no process can access
> it via tmpfs AFAIU and potentially fault the memory before the producent
> will fill it up (thus fault in in the trusted context). I have no idea
> how the receiver gets to the buffer though.
>

The receiver gets to mmap the buffer.  I'm not sure what protection they get.

The thing I'm worried about is that the receiver might deliberately
avoid faulting in a bunch of pages and instead wait for the producer
to touch them, causing pages that logically belong to the receiver to
be charged to the producer instead.

--Andy

> --
> Michal Hocko
> SUSE Labs
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