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Message-ID: <55392F01.1090307@tycho.nsa.gov>
Date: Thu, 23 Apr 2015 13:42:25 -0400
From: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
CC: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
One Thousand Gnomes <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
Tom Gundersen <teg@...m.no>, Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Daniel Mack <daniel@...que.org>,
David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@...il.com>,
Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] kdbus for 4.1-rc1
On 04/23/2015 01:16 PM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> The binder developers at Samsung have stated that the implementation we
> have here works for their model as well, so I guess that is some kind of
> verification it's not entirely tied to D-Bus. They have plans on
> dropping the existing binder kernel code and using the kdbus code
> instead when it is merged.
Where do things stand wrt LSM hooks for kdbus? I don't see any security
hook calls in the kdbus tree except for the purpose of metadata
collection of process security labels. But nothing for enforcing MAC
over kdbus IPC. binder has a set of security hooks for that purpose, so
it would be a regression wrt MAC enforcement to switch from binder to
kdbus without equivalent checking there.
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