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Message-ID: <554156A1.3010903@kernel.org>
Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2015 15:09:37 -0700
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
To: Shawn Chang <citypw@...il.com>, linux-mm@...ck.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
CC: spender@...ecurity.net, keescook@...omium.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Hardening memory maunipulation.
On 04/29/2015 08:39 AM, Shawn Chang wrote:
> From: Shawn C <citypw@...il.com>
>
> Hi kernel maintainers,
>
> It won't allow the address above the TASK_SIZE being mmap'ed( or mprotect'ed).
> This patch is from PaX/Grsecurity.
>
> Thanks for your review time!
Does this actually reduce the attack surface of anything?
These functions all search for vmas. If there's a vma outside of the
user range, we have a problem.
Also, that use of TASK_SIZE is IMO ridiculous. Shouldn't be TASK_SIZE_MAX?
--Andy, who is annoyed every time another pointless TIF_IA32 reference,
even hidden in a macro, makes it into the kernel
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