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Message-ID: <554B8B99.8070602@linux.intel.com>
Date: Thu, 07 May 2015 08:58:17 -0700
From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
CC: Ingo Molnar <mingo2.kernel.org@...il.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@...el.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 084/208] x86/fpu: Rename xsave.header::xstate_bv to 'xfeatures'
On 05/07/2015 08:33 AM, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> * Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com> wrote:
>>> Btw., regarding XCR0.PKRU: that enables 'Protection Keys' in the
>>> PTE format. What's the main purpose of these keys? They seem to
>>> duplicate the read/write bits in the PTE, with the exception that
>>> they don't impact instruction fetches. So is this used to allow
>>> user-space to execute but otherwise not read instructions?
>>>
>>> Or some other purpose I missed?
>>
>> You can change the permissions of a given key with writes to the
>> register without changing the PTE. No TLB shootdown, plus the
>> permission changes are local to the CPU thread.
>
> interesting ... where are we doing that? kmap_atomic() is the only
> place I can think of in the kernel, but there we are already skipping
> the TLB shootdown by doing an INVLPG.
Userspace. :)
It's for userspace-only.
>>>> We'd need to determine which fields are in the init state before we
>>>> do an xsaves.
>>>
>>> Why? I don't think that's necessary.
>>
>> "If RFBM[i] = 0, XSTATE_BV[i] is written as 0."
>
> Yes, that's natural: RFBM is the combination of XCR0 (constant) and
> the 'instruction mask' (constant as well) - i.e. it's a wide bitmask
> including all our xfeatures - essentially 'xfeatures_mask' (in
> tmp.fpu).
>
>> We need to pull XSTATE_BV in to the instruction mask when doing an
>> XSAVE* if our RFBM has bits unset that *are* set in XSTATE_BV.
>> Otherwise, we'll destroy the bits at XSAVE* time.
>
> But why would our RFBM be narrower than any possible XSTATE_BV we
> handle? Our XCR0 is at the max.
>
> Also, the XSTATE_BV value of the save area is immaterial when we do an
> XSAVES: all the state is in CPU registers, we want to save it to the
> save area. XSAVES will write it for us.
>
>> It's not a problem today because the instruction mask is always -1,
>> so it always has every bit set that *MIGHT* be set in XSTATE_BV.
>
> Yes. And why would we ever want to narrow it?
Because it actually allows us to take advantage of the compaction.
Think of the layout of a task using protection keys and MPX.
MPX = 8*4 + 8*2 = 48 bytes.
PKEYs = 4 bytes
They'll be spread out in the standard form *OR* the compacted form with
a RFBM=-1. But, with the compacted form with RFBM=PK|MPX_BITS, they'll
fit in a cacheline.
>> As for the whole bit 63 thing... It's possible and valid to have a
>> XCOMP_BV[62:0]=0 because the instruction mask only contained bits
>> that were unset in XCR0|IA32_XSS. You need bit 63 to tell you which
>> format you are using.
>
> So basically if you request an XSAVES to ... write nothing (XCR0 AND
> instruction mask is 0), then it will represent this as 0|1<<63 in
> XCOMP_BV?
>
> In that case it does not matter whether the area is compacted or
> standard: nothing was saved and nothing will have to be restored, only
> the xsave header area will be accessed. Am I missing something?
Take a look at the SDM. There are differences in the behavior when
restoring the compacted vs. standard format. I don't know the deep
reasons for *WHY*, just that there are some deltas clearly spelled out
there.
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