linux-kernel - [PATCH v3 082/110] may_follow

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Message-Id: <1431367690-5223-82-git-send-email-viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Date:	Mon, 11 May 2015 19:07:42 +0100
From:	Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>
To:	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc:	Neil Brown <neilb@...e.de>, Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v3 082/110] may_follow_link(): trim arguments

From: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
---
 fs/namei.c | 11 +++++------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 05efcc0..82cb1bc 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -765,7 +765,6 @@ int sysctl_protected_hardlinks __read_mostly = 0;
 
 /**
  * may_follow_link - Check symlink following for unsafe situations
- * @link: The path of the symlink
  * @nd: nameidata pathwalk data
  *
  * In the case of the sysctl_protected_symlinks sysctl being enabled,
@@ -779,7 +778,7 @@ int sysctl_protected_hardlinks __read_mostly = 0;
  *
  * Returns 0 if following the symlink is allowed, -ve on error.
  */
-static inline int may_follow_link(struct path *link, struct nameidata *nd)
+static inline int may_follow_link(struct nameidata *nd)
 {
 	const struct inode *inode;
 	const struct inode *parent;
@@ -788,7 +787,7 @@ static inline int may_follow_link(struct path *link, struct nameidata *nd)
 		return 0;
 
 	/* Allowed if owner and follower match. */
-	inode = link->dentry->d_inode;
+	inode = nd->link.dentry->d_inode;
 	if (uid_eq(current_cred()->fsuid, inode->i_uid))
 		return 0;
 
@@ -801,8 +800,8 @@ static inline int may_follow_link(struct path *link, struct nameidata *nd)
 	if (uid_eq(parent->i_uid, inode->i_uid))
 		return 0;
 
-	audit_log_link_denied("follow_link", link);
-	path_put(link);
+	audit_log_link_denied("follow_link", &nd->link);
+	path_put(&nd->link);
 	path_put(&nd->path);
 	return -EACCES;
 }
@@ -1985,7 +1984,7 @@ static void path_cleanup(struct nameidata *nd)
 static int trailing_symlink(struct nameidata *nd)
 {
 	const char *s;
-	int error = may_follow_link(&nd->link, nd);
+	int error = may_follow_link(nd);
 	if (unlikely(error))
 		return error;
 	nd->flags |= LOOKUP_PARENT;
-- 
2.1.4

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