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Message-Id: <a60903bf3633bdfd1254b1766ac51d56439c650e.1431761807.git.jslaby@suse.cz>
Date:	Sat, 16 May 2015 09:36:07 +0200
From:	Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>
To:	stable@...r.kernel.org
Cc:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, David Sterba <dsterba@...e.cz>,
	Chris Mason <clm@...com>, Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>
Subject: [PATCH 3.12 007/142] btrfs: don't accept bare namespace as a valid xattr

From: David Sterba <dsterba@...e.cz>

3.12-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit 3c3b04d10ff1811a27f86684ccd2f5ba6983211d upstream.

Due to insufficient check in btrfs_is_valid_xattr, this unexpectedly
works:

 $ touch file
 $ setfattr -n user. -v 1 file
 $ getfattr -d file
user.="1"

ie. the missing attribute name after the namespace.

Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=94291
Reported-by: William Douglas <william.douglas@...el.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@...e.cz>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@...com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>
---
 fs/btrfs/xattr.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/btrfs/xattr.c b/fs/btrfs/xattr.c
index 05740b9789e4..7e21b2b3fcf2 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/xattr.c
@@ -322,21 +322,40 @@ const struct xattr_handler *btrfs_xattr_handlers[] = {
 /*
  * Check if the attribute is in a supported namespace.
  *
- * This applied after the check for the synthetic attributes in the system
+ * This is applied after the check for the synthetic attributes in the system
  * namespace.
  */
-static bool btrfs_is_valid_xattr(const char *name)
+static int btrfs_is_valid_xattr(const char *name)
 {
-	return !strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
-			XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN) ||
-	       !strncmp(name, XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX, XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX_LEN) ||
-	       !strncmp(name, XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX, XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN) ||
-	       !strncmp(name, XATTR_USER_PREFIX, XATTR_USER_PREFIX_LEN);
+	int len = strlen(name);
+	int prefixlen = 0;
+
+	if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
+			XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN))
+		prefixlen = XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN;
+	else if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX, XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX_LEN))
+		prefixlen = XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX_LEN;
+	else if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX, XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN))
+		prefixlen = XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN;
+	else if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_USER_PREFIX, XATTR_USER_PREFIX_LEN))
+		prefixlen = XATTR_USER_PREFIX_LEN;
+	else
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	/*
+	 * The name cannot consist of just prefix
+	 */
+	if (len <= prefixlen)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
 ssize_t btrfs_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 		       void *buffer, size_t size)
 {
+	int ret;
+
 	/*
 	 * If this is a request for a synthetic attribute in the system.*
 	 * namespace use the generic infrastructure to resolve a handler
@@ -345,8 +364,9 @@ ssize_t btrfs_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX, XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX_LEN))
 		return generic_getxattr(dentry, name, buffer, size);
 
-	if (!btrfs_is_valid_xattr(name))
-		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	ret = btrfs_is_valid_xattr(name);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
 	return __btrfs_getxattr(dentry->d_inode, name, buffer, size);
 }
 
@@ -354,6 +374,7 @@ int btrfs_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value,
 		   size_t size, int flags)
 {
 	struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(dentry->d_inode)->root;
+	int ret;
 
 	/*
 	 * The permission on security.* and system.* is not checked
@@ -370,8 +391,9 @@ int btrfs_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value,
 	if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX, XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX_LEN))
 		return generic_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
 
-	if (!btrfs_is_valid_xattr(name))
-		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	ret = btrfs_is_valid_xattr(name);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
 
 	if (size == 0)
 		value = "";  /* empty EA, do not remove */
@@ -383,6 +405,7 @@ int btrfs_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value,
 int btrfs_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 {
 	struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(dentry->d_inode)->root;
+	int ret;
 
 	/*
 	 * The permission on security.* and system.* is not checked
@@ -399,8 +422,9 @@ int btrfs_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 	if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX, XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX_LEN))
 		return generic_removexattr(dentry, name);
 
-	if (!btrfs_is_valid_xattr(name))
-		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	ret = btrfs_is_valid_xattr(name);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
 
 	return __btrfs_setxattr(NULL, dentry->d_inode, name, NULL, 0,
 				XATTR_REPLACE);
-- 
2.3.7

--
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